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Restoring and sustaining growth in Eastern Europe and Central Asia requires reforms to
boost competitiveness and increase labor productivity. Among the required changes are
reforms to education. In surveys conducted immediately before the economic crisis,
companies in the region reported shortage of skills as one of the most significant bottle-
necks in their operations, suggesting that education systems in Eastern Europe and Central
Asia— with a reputation for high enrollment rates and well-trained teachers—still need to
improve their performance.
In fact, international test results show that many students—outside of a handful of coun-
tries in the region—are failing to acquire more than the most basic literacy and numeracy
skills. Anecdotal evidence also indicates that the rapid expansion in higher education has
led to a decline in the quality and relevance of education provided. At the same time, there
are few opportunities for adults to retrain, upgrade, or acquire new skills—the life-long
learning needed for employability.
As Skills, Not Just Diplomas suggests, the shortage of skills is a wake-up call to reform
education and training systems to provide higher quality education with the flexibility
for students and training institutions to better respond to market signals. Such deep
reform will have to center on the following:
• Focusing more on measuring whether students learn and graduates find jobs, and
using this information to actively improve teaching and learning.
• Using incentives across the education system, including granting greater autonomy
to institutions on curriculum, teaching methods, resource use and institutional mission,
and increasing accountability for learning.
• Addressing the huge inefficiencies in the sector by downsizing the school network
in response to dwindling student numbers, and using freed-up resources to restore
the attractiveness of the teaching profession, expand adult education and training, and
measure learning outcomes.
Only by embracing and seriously pursuing such difficult and long-term reforms will the
countries in Eastern Europe and Central Asia substantially improve their education outcomes
and support the competitiveness of their economic systems.
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Foreword
It is no secret that good education lies at the heart of economic growth 
and development. At the same time, improving the quality and relevance 
of education is enormously difficult not least because there is no one 
single policy measure that will do so effectively. This book contributes to 
our understanding of how to improve education by examining the recent 
experience of the countries of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet 
Union. 
Fabled for uniform access and high quality of education 20 years ago, 
the countries in this region have struggled to maintain their reputation. 
Three factors have contributed to the slide in quality and relevance. 
First, one of the legacies of central planning is that the countries pay 
too much attention to the measurement of inputs into learning—such 
as the number of schools and the number of teachers—and not enough 
to outcomes. Indeed, they have been late in developing systems to 
assess how much students are learning and whether learning is leading 
to employment. In this sense, their education systems operate in the 
dark, which makes policy making extremely difficult. Second, the sys-
tem of management, also a vestige of the past, limits the ability of 
schools to improve the learning environment for students, as well of 
municipalities that may want a different mix of programs to meet local 
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labor market needs. As with assessment, the countries have been slow 
to embrace the governance and accountability reforms that are now 
part of the landscape of education systems the world over. These limita-
tions to autonomy and accountability for outcomes have reduced the 
energy and the incentives for improvements from within the system, 
contributing to a shortage of skills. Indeed, firm complaints about the 
shortage of relevant skills for expansion and growth have risen to a cre-
scendo in most countries. Finally, the systems increasingly allocate 
resources where they are not needed. For example, the sharp decline in 
student numbers in the past 20 years has not resulted in a commensu-
rate decline in the number of classrooms and teachers. As a result, 
resources are increasingly tied up in buildings and teachers where they 
may be better spent elsewhere. Most of these limitations are found not 
just in schools but extend to higher education and to training.
The result of these limitations is that the quality and relevance of 
education in the countries in the region is increasingly questionable. A 
large proportion of students finish lower secondary school with a mini-
mal command of literacy and numeracy. Their failure to learn even the 
basics is not picked up early enough by assessment systems, nor are 
schools and municipalities given sufficient incentives to ensure that all 
students learn the basics. The systems are also struggling with imparting 
higher order skills beyond the basics, for which well-motivated and high-
quality teachers are critically needed but which few school systems are 
able to attract, given the low pay and historical overstaffing. And without 
the vision or resources to make vocational and technical education an 
attractive option for students—indeed, this remains one of the most 
unreformed subsectors of the education system—quality has eroded and 
students have shied away from this form of education, possibly contrib-
uting to the widespread shortage of vocational and technical skills now 
found in these countries. 
This book makes the case that improving the quality and relevance of 
education requires a fundamental change of approach to education in the 
countries of the region. To start with, education systems need to “turn the 
lights on” and take seriously the measurement of what students actually 
learn as opposed to measurement of the inputs into the education process 
on the implicit assumption that learning follows. This assessment needs 
to inform both teaching and policy making. Policy makers also need to 
move away from controlling inputs and processes and instead increase the 
emphasis on incentives to improve student learning, whether in school or 
in higher education. And, finally, for these reforms to be financially fea-
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sible, current spending on education needs to be used much more effec-
tively. In particular, countries in the region cannot afford to maintain one 
of the lowest class sizes in the world while heating and lighting half-
empty buildings when resources are needed elsewhere.
It is our sincere hope that this book will stimulate debate about how 
to improve education and training both for the countries under discussion 
and in the world at large, and thereby encourage action to help realize 
prosperity for all.
Philippe Le Houerou
Vice President
Europe and Central Asia Region
World Bank
Washington, D.C.
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1 
Overview
The countries of Europe and Central Asia (ECA)1 are currently emerging 
from the deepest recession suffered by any developing region. Post-crisis 
conditions are very different from those of preceding years. Financial 
resources are more limited and more expensive, and export growth is 
restrained by potentially slower growth in destination countries. Restoring 
and sustaining growth in this context require reforms that boost com-
petitiveness and increase labor productivity. Such reforms are all the 
more important given the shrinking of the working-age population in 
many countries of the region.
Earlier boom years in the ECA region exposed significant bottlenecks 
to growth, particularly with respect to the skills of the labor force (Mitra 
et al. 2010). Paradoxically, for a region with relatively high and expanding 
educational attainment (as measured by the number of years of com-
pleted schooling) and relatively high-quality education in the early years 
of schooling, a shortage of worker skills has emerged as one of the most 
important constraints to firm expansion. This book seeks to answer the 
following questions: Why do ECA firms increasingly complain that they 
cannot find graduates with the right skills? What can ECA countries do 
to close the skills gap?
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When trying to answer these questions, this book faces a fundamental 
problem: data exist on the number of students who graduate (i.e., how 
many diplomas are issued) in ECA countries, but internationally compa-
rable data on whether graduates of upper secondary and tertiary institu-
tions (from which the bulk of ECA graduates now enter the labor market) 
have the right skills and competencies for the job market do not exist.
This book uses a range of different data sources to argue that the skills 
problem in the ECA region relates more to the quality and relevance of 
the education provided in ECA countries than to problems of access. A 
central argument of the book is that ministries of education are con-
strained in a number of ways from effectively managing their education 
and training sectors. The three most important and interrelated impedi-
ments to improving quality and relevance are the lack of systematic data 
on key skills-related performance issues (i.e., how much students are 
learning and whether they are finding jobs after they graduate), the legacy 
of central planning, and inefficient use of resources. 
Lack of data on student learning and employment outcomes makes it 
difficult for education ministries to address the legacy of central planning, 
which emphasizes centralized management based on inputs. Ministries of 
education in the region continue to micromanage the sector using 
detailed norms and regulations. This input-oriented style of management 
leads to the inefficient use of resources and results in a rigid education 
sector—not the type of flexible sector needed by ECA to create modern, 
skilled workforces. This book highlights how these constraints manifest 
themselves and then presents ways of overcoming them, relying on the 
experience of ECA countries that have successfully addressed them, 
together with international experience. Recommendations are presented 
in separate chapters for pre-university, tertiary, and adult education.
The Skills Challenge 
The ECA region had a well-regarded education system before the transi-
tion. While the intervening years have taken some of the shine off this 
reputation, these countries continue to have strong achievements. 
Notably, enrollments are high at all levels of education. The communist 
legacy is particularly visible in low-income countries in the region, which 
have the highest secondary enrollments in the world for their income 
level. Tertiary enrollments, which have grown rapidly in the past two 
decades, are also high relative to income levels, with the exception of a 
few low-income Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) countries, 
such as Azerbaijan and Uzbekistan.
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The ECA region is reasonably successful not only in terms of enroll-
ment rates, but also in terms of providing quality education in the early 
grades. In particular, in international tests that measure student compe-
tencies in primary and lower secondary education, students in many (but 
not all) ECA countries outperform their peers in countries with the same 
income level (see figure O.1). For instance, students in Estonia, where 
gross domestic product (GDP) per capita was $21,6442 in 2008, outper-
formed their peers in Denmark, Sweden, Iceland, and Austria—where per 
capita income is almost twice as high—on the mathematics part of the 
2009 Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA). The pic-
ture for educational quality within the ECA region is varied, however, as 
more than several countries, such as Bulgaria, Romania, Montenegro, 
Azerbaijan, and the Kyrgyz Republic, have students (in the early grades) 
that underperform relative to their income level.
In spite of these positive achievements of ECA education systems, the 
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD)–World 
Bank Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Surveys (BEEPS) 
show that ECA firms’ perception of skills constraints changed dramati-
cally around 2005.3 By 2008, skilled labor shortages had become the 
second most commonly reported constraint to growth in the BEEPS sur-
vey across all countries in the region, second only to tax rates (see figure 
O.2). On average, 30 percent of firms considered education and skills to 
Figure O.1 Analysis of Reading Competency of 15-Year-Old Students 
on the PISA 2009
Source: PISA 2009 Database and World Bank staff calculations based on World Development Indicators Database.
Note: PISA = Programme for International Student Assessment. The figure shows a regression line representing 
countries’ predicted PISA reading scores based solely on GDP per capita, compared to the Organisation for Eco-
nomic Co-operation and Development mean reading score (horizontal line) and GDP per capita in 2008. See 
 “Abbreviations” for a key to country abbreviations. 
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be a major or severe constraint in 2008. The highest proportion of firms 
reporting constraints were found among the middle-income CIS coun-
tries, where upwards of 40 percent of firms were dissatisfied with the 
availability of skilled workers. A smaller proportion of firms in the Western 
Balkans reported similar levels of dissatisfaction, with significant variabil-
ity in the dissatisfaction levels of firms in the EU10+1 (European Union 
10+1) countries and Turkey (BEEPS dataset 2008). While the recession 
may have provided something of a respite from these labor shortages, as 
the economies in the region recover, labor demand will tighten once again 
and skilled labor shortages will likely be worse than before. 
Why Are Skills an Emerging Problem if Education 
Systems Are Delivering?
Despite generally high average enrollment and attainment rates, as well as 
respectable quality education (where measured, at the early grade level) 
Figure O.2 Distribution of Firms in ECA Region that Consider Worker Skills a 
“Major” or “Very Severe” Constraint, 2008
Source: Authors’ calculations based on BEEPS 2008. 
Note: LI = low-income, MI = middle-income, x = % of firms (in respective countries) that consider education 
as an obstacle. Figure shows data obtained from the fourth round of the BEEPS carried out in 2008–09, 
which covered approximately 11,800 enterprises in 29 countries. See “Abbreviations” for a key to country 
 abbreviations.
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for their income level, ECA countries’ growth is constrained by skills 
shortages. This is a puzzle that cannot be fully resolved, mainly because 
crucial information is missing. Put simply, there is no internationally com-
parable information on the quality of upper secondary or tertiary educa-
tion or the relevance of education at these levels—information that 
would indicate whether graduates have the right skills for the modern job 
market 
There are international assessments that provide information on stu-
dent competencies up to the age of 15 (usually the end of lower second-
ary education), but this is not an age when most people in the region are 
entering the job market. Beyond these early-stage assessments, no com-
prehensive, fully reliable information exists on student competencies. 
What is more, the information on student competencies that is available 
relates only to fundamental cognitive skills, not behavioral skills— 
involving such issues as work ethic and teamwork—which are empha-
sized by employers. For policy makers to better understand the causes 
of the emerging skills bottleneck—and how to address it—this informa-
tional gap needs to be closed. Given the lack of data on the skills of new 
labor market entrants, the book’s conclusions are necessarily based only 
on the data that are obtainable. 
Two problems related to quality seem particularly acute in the ECA 
region: too many students are failing, and education systems have dif-
ficulties imparting problem-solving skills. In terms of the many stu-
dents that fail, PISA 2009 data show that all ECA countries (except a 
handful of new EU member states) have very large proportions of 
15-year-olds who have such poor numeracy and literacy skills that their 
success in the modern workplace is highly doubtful. As work becomes 
more demanding even for this group, their poor skills will become more 
apparent. Although ECA countries perform strongly on international 
assessments that measure students at the primary level (grade 4), their 
performance is weaker on assessments of students around the end of 
lower secondary education (grade 8). These results suggest that their 
education systems are adept at imparting basic skills, but have problems 
imparting higher order skills such as problem solving—the very skills 
that firms increasingly seek. 
More troubling, the quality of education in the ECA region also does 
not show signs of consistent improvement. In fact, up to 2006 it appeared 
to be getting worse in many countries. Rather than narrowing the gap 
between their scores and Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD) mean scores, many ECA countries that participate 
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in international learning assessments at this level—which are likely the 
better-managed countries—either seemed stuck or had regressed in terms 
of their scores. It is probable, moreover, that the situation is even worse in 
ECA countries that do not participate in efforts to measure and compare 
the academic performance of their students. Encouragingly, the latest 
round of PISA (2009) may have marked a turning point for 11 ECA coun-
tries that showed improvements compared to their 2006 performance 
(including significant increases in Bulgaria, Romania, Serbia, the Kyrgyz 
Republic, and Turkey). However, seven ECA countries continued the 
downward slide observed previously with a deterioration compared to 
their 2006 performance.
The quality of upper secondary and tertiary education in the region is 
also unlikely to have improved, although lack of data makes it hard to 
confirm this contention. Since educational quality is not showing consis-
tent improvement at the lower secondary level, this weakness is probably 
mirrored at the upper secondary level (albeit with a lag). Enrollments at 
the tertiary level used to be tightly controlled and reserved for the few, 
best performers. In the past two decades, however, enrollments have 
doubled, tripled, or quadrupled, but without the benefit of the quality 
assurance mechanisms needed for the many new programs, institutions, 
and types of students, and without the kind of information required for 
parents and students to make informed choices. As a result, it is unclear if 
the expansion of the system has been accompanied by growing quality. 
Graduates of upper secondary and tertiary education may also be 
graduating with the wrong set of skills. During the early years of the tran-
sition, the vocational school system—which once produced more than 
half of all secondary graduates in most ECA countries—collapsed very 
quickly. Voting with their feet, students have left vocational schools in 
favor of general secondary education and the prospect of pursuing a ter-
tiary degree. It may be that the pendulum has swung too far in one direc-
tion, however, as employers assert that it is now hard to find graduates 
with technical skills. Yet, until the region’s vocational schools are reformed 
to ensure that they can produce graduates with appropriate skills, it may 
be too soon to be encouraging students to return to this sector. 
The contribution of education to the skills gap is not only a story of 
the uncertain quality and relevance of formal education. It also involves 
too little progress in providing workers with options for further training. 
Growing evidence shows that continuous adult education and training 
fosters employment and greater productivity. The development of this 
sector should accordingly be central to the region’s economic growth 
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agenda, particularly in more advanced ECA countries and countries that 
are facing a significant demographic decline—a decline that suggests that 
labor force participation and individual productivity will have to increase 
in order to generate higher rates of economic growth. Yet many of these 
countries have only started to prepare for an expansion of the adult train-
ing sector, needed not only to compete in the global economy, but also to 
address the lag effects of the transition to market economies. In light of 
growing employer demands for greater skills, adult education and training 
in ECA countries can no longer be ignored. 
Priority Areas for Action
As noted at the outset, three major impediments are inhibiting the cre-
ation of flexible and responsive education systems in the ECA region. 
First, these systems have been operating “in the dark” because they design 
policies and take management decisions without systematically collecting 
and analyzing data on the learning and employment outcomes of stu-
dents and graduates. Second, the legacy of central planning has kept the 
management of school systems highly centralized, with central policy 
makers intensely involved in operational details. While virtually all OECD 
countries have embraced performance-oriented management in educa-
tion since the 1980s (see OECD 2004)—albeit at different speeds—most 
ECA countries continue to use management practices that focus on com-
pliance with detailed regulations and financing schemes based on inputs, 
not outputs. This means that most local education authorities and school 
principals lack the autonomy and authority to make crucial management 
decisions for their own institutions, including how much and what type 
of vocational content students can choose from and how many teachers 
to employ. As a result, the system is inflexible and does not respond either 
to labor market needs or changes in student numbers. 
Third, education systems in the ECA region use financial resources 
highly inefficiently. Nowhere is this more apparent than in the pre- 
university sector, where few countries have adjusted teacher staffing levels 
in response to falling student numbers over the past 20 years. Consequently, 
student-teacher ratios have fallen sharply (and per student costs have 
risen)—more so than in any other region in the world (see figure O.3). 
This implies that scarce resources are tied up in paying meager salaries to 
too many staff members and heating half-empty buildings. 
To be fair, these impediments affect ECA countries differently and 
vary accordingly to the level of education. However, no ECA country 
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has fully escaped the legacy of central planning.4 That system focused 
on controlling inputs—that is, it checked whether local actors were in 
compliance with detailed norms for all inputs. Education ministries 
remained uninformed, however, about whether students acquired skills 
and competencies. 
In terms of how these impediments affect the different levels of educa-
tion, they are most clearly apparent at the pre-university level, which 
absorbs two-thirds of total education funding in the ECA region. The 
same three impediments affect tertiary education in a slightly different 
way, as this sector has already undergone significant reform over the past 
20 years, during which time it has doubled or tripled in size in many 
countries (see chapter 5). Because most ECA countries do not yet have 
adult education sectors in the modern sense, these impediments cannot 
be fairly characterized as problems of this sector. However, the policy 
recommendations offered in this book do apply to adult education and 
offer ideas and principles for how this subsector could be developed and 
managed in the region (see chapter 6).
Figure O.3 Primary School Student-Teacher Ratios in ECA Compared to 
Other Regions of the World, 1990–2008
Sources: EdStats database, plus authors’ linear interpolations for missing years. 
Note: Actual data are marked with dots. One of the problems with international data on student-teacher ratios 
(in both the World Bank’s EdStats database and the other international education databases) is that it is unclear 
whether or not data for a particular country are reported on a full-time equivalent basis.
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Managing Education Systems for Results
To address the three impediments outlined above, countries in the ECA 
region need to manage their education systems for results. First and fore-
most, they need to collect more information on “performance,” that is, on 
what students are learning, what jobs they are finding, and what salaries 
graduates are earning. In addition, ECA countries could benefit from fol-
lowing the lead of OECD countries and several developing countries and 
replace input-oriented management of the education sector with perfor-
mance-oriented management. This change implies devolving more 
autonomy to frontline providers and putting in place accountability 
mechanisms—for instance, in the form of performance contracts and 
performance-based budgeting—that emphasize performance and not 
compliance with norms. With a greater availability of performance data 
and with frontline providers empowered with greater decision-making 
power, the preconditions will be in place for education systems in the 
region to become both more responsive to labor market needs and more 
efficient. 
Focus Attention on Learning and Employment Outcomes 
Countries in the ECA region would benefit from greater measurement 
of student learning and employment outcomes, information that they 
can then use to design better policies. There is significant consensus on 
the key skills and competencies that education is expected to deliver, as 
well as standardized tests to measure them.5 Many countries in the 
region already participate in international assessments, but have moved 
more slowly than other regions in generating useful information from 
national assessments. Although all school systems in the region have 
some kind of national assessment system, many are in the early stages of 
development (see figure O.4) and there is very little evidence to date 
that ECA countries are using these assessments to inform policy. Rather, 
national assessments continue to be seen as a certification mechanism, 
one that confirms a student has gained a mastery of a predetermined 
curriculum, thus enabling a diploma to be issued or the student to prog-
ress to upper secondary or tertiary education. Student assessments are 
rarely seen as an opportunity to identify the strengths and weaknesses of 
an education system.
When students graduate, ministries of education in the ECA region do 
not systematically collect, analyze, and disseminate information on their 
employment outcomes. Such information is, however, critical for policy 
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makers and higher education institutions because it helps them detect 
which programs and fields of study are in high demand among employers. 
Moreover, this data can help students make better choices about which 
university and field of study to pursue. Again, some member countries of 
the OECD (including Hungary, Italy, and the Netherlands), together with 
Romania, provide examples in this area for others to emulate.
Figure O.4 Status of Measuring and Using Data on Student Learning Outcomes in 
the ECA Region, 2009 
Sources: Authors’ assessments based on data from UNICEF (2007, table 2.1); the extent of countries’ participation 
in PISA, Progress in International Literacy Study (PIRLS) and Trends in International Mathematics and Science 
Study (TIMSS) since 1995; and inputs from World Bank country experts. The UNICEF data is drawn from “Table 2.1: 
Status of Reforms of Assessment and Examination Systems, 2006,” regarding “Introduction of other school exams 
or assessments (e.g. basic school)” and “Introduction of sample-based national assessment.” In this table, UNICEF 
scores the progress of countries on a range of 0 to 4, with 0 representing “not planned or started” and 4 repre-
senting “operational.” In addition, the figure uses World Bank staff compilations on the number of  international 
assessments in which each country has participated.
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Introduce Autonomy and Accountability Based on Results
Overcoming the legacy of central planning involves moving away from 
detailed norms and instead holding actors accountable for performance 
(or results). At the central level, this implies that policy makers in the 
ECA region would relinquish certain duties and assume others so that 
education systems may innovate and improve student learning outcomes. 
The opportunity before central governments in these countries is to 
move away from managing schools and classrooms and focus instead on 
setting goals, policies, and standards; defining responsibilities; mobilizing 
financial resources; ensuring political consensus; targeting poor and 
excluded students; and monitoring and evaluating service delivery and 
system quality. 
Extending autonomy throughout education systems means placing 
authority and responsibility in the hands of the people most able to 
innovate and improve the quality of education: local managers and 
education authorities (see Osborne and Gaebler 1992). It also means 
holding these actors accountable for improving the learning out-
comes of the bulk of their students. Aligning the incentives of these 
stakeholders with the student learning outcomes desired by policy 
makers requires education ministries to set overall performance 
goals; articulate who is responsible and accountable to whom and for 
what; and ensure that these responsibilities are agreed, accepted, and 
understood. 
At the pre-university level, policy makers can expand the autonomy of 
lower-level actors in the school system by granting them greater decision-
making power over school operations and budgets and relaxing norms on 
class sizes. Greater autonomy is particularly needed in vocational educa-
tion and training, where programs and institutes need the ability to 
expand or contract course offerings in response to student and employer 
demand, not rigid governmental norms. 
Simultaneously, policy makers will need to implement a range of 
accountability mechanisms to hold schools accountable for results. 
Potential mechanisms include the creation of school councils that 
involve parents and local communities in school decision-making pro-
cesses; requiring schools to prepare school development plans that out-
line each school’s strengths and weaknesses, together with an action plan 
for making improvements; preparing “school scorecards” that include 
basic indicators on a school’s performance; as well sanctioning low-per-
forming schools and rewarding high-performing schools. Here, however, 
it is important to define a high-performing school as one that delivers 
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improved learning outcomes to all types of students, including those 
from low-income and minority households. 
Significant improvements in the direction of greater autonomy and 
accountability will, however, be difficult to achieve in the school system 
unless policy makers in the region address the demoralization of the 
teaching force, an effort that will involve resolution of serious overstaff-
ing and improving the pay, professional development, and work condi-
tions of teachers.
At the tertiary level, greater autonomy and effective accountability are 
equally critical. The first part of this equation has been carried out in a 
number of countries in the region—mainly the new EU member states 
and, to a lesser degree, the countries of South Eastern Europe as well as 
the Russian Federation and Ukraine—which have already granted tertiary 
providers considerable autonomy. These countries, while continuing to 
make needed improvements in the devolution of managerial authority, 
must now face the primary (but not exclusive) challenge of improving 
academic and fiscal integrity in the sector by introducing stronger 
accountability mechanisms. Other countries in the region, especially 
Belarus and most of the low-income CIS states, have yet to change how 
their tertiary education systems are managed. These countries face the 
simultaneous challenges of enhancing university autonomy while devel-
oping accountability mechanisms and introducing performance-based 
financing. Regarding the need to monitor and evaluate system delivery 
and quality, all countries in the region lag behind; in other words, all need 
to make greater efforts to “turn on the lights” by vastly improving their 
data collection on student learning and educational outcomes.
Even though fundamental integrity problems remain widespread in 
the university sector, it is important that ECA policy makers refrain from 
attempting to resolve these problems before they devolve authority to 
universities and introduce flexible financing. The group of ECA countries 
that have not yet initiated tertiary reforms need to introduce autonomy 
and accountability as mutually reinforcing policy instruments. Policy 
makers in these countries need not simply transfer autonomy to static, 
traditional universities, but can instead mandate that increased autonomy 
be accompanied by more “businesslike” and accountable leadership and 
management.
In view of the relatively weak institutional capacity in the region—
including somewhat newly established or nonexistent quality assurance 
agencies—policy makers may need to employ many different, comple-
mentary tools to strengthen accountability for results. These tools include 
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rankings, tracer studies, and creation of an enabling environment to 
facilitate the growth of the private sector. Counting on a quality assurance 
agency to quickly establish the capacity needed to externally monitor a 
rapidly growing sector is risky—this kind of agency needs to be part of 
the solution, but not the only response.
Improve the Efficiency of Resource Use through 
Performance-based Financing
Managing school systems for performance means moving away from 
inflexible line-item budgeting towards greater use of delegated budgets, 
with incentives for maintaining enrollment and attendance (i.e., per stu-
dent financing—a path on which the majority of ECA countries have 
already embarked). More flexible, smarter financing in the form of block 
grants (i.e., contract- or performance-based) can also provide funding to 
institutions in return for meeting agreed learning outcomes. Not only 
does this type of financing give local education managers much-needed 
flexibility that input-based budgets do not permit, it keeps them focused 
on student results. 
In addition to performance-based financing, improving financial effi-
ciency at the pre-university level will require creating incentives for larger 
class sizes, encouraging school optimization, and addressing the issue of 
overstaffing. At the tertiary level, several ECA countries (for example, 
Poland and Romania) have already adopted per student financing, shift-
ing their focus away from inputs and toward results. The remainder of 
countries in the region will need to introduce performance-based financ-
ing to improve the efficiency of spending in this sector. 
If ECA countries want to simultaneously raise participation rates 
and increase the quality of tertiary education, more private resources 
will also be needed—the cost pressures facing higher education in the 
region are simply too great. Mobilizing private resources will help 
strengthen results-oriented outcomes in the tertiary sector in two fun-
damental ways: (1) by increasing competition, as more nimble and 
innovative private providers help bring innovations to public providers, 
and (2) by increasing students’ connection to the education process. 
When students and parents pay tuition fees—whether to a public or a 
private provider—they are generally more demanding about the quality 
and relevance of the education provided. There is no single ideal level 
of funding for higher education, and no single ideal mix of public and 
private funding sources. Different countries will make different kinds 
of trade-offs. 
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Build the Foundations of Adult Learning Systems
Unlike pre-university and university education, adult education systems 
are largely nonexistent in most ECA countries. Building such systems will 
require shifting away from government-defined programs towards a well-
regulated market of private and public providers that deliver training 
services to both working and unemployed adults. Governments in the 
region will, however, continue to play a role in education and training for 
the unemployed, often by contracting private providers to deliver needed 
services. Policies that address market failures in this sector are especially 
important to lay the groundwork for effective adult education systems. In 
general, successful systems require a high degree of coordination and part-
nership between government agencies and the private sector, as well as 
giving the demand side of training—that is, businesses and individuals—a 
strong voice in determining training policy. Once a solid adult learning 
sector is established, governments can then “steer” it by monitoring data 
on program quality, promoting autonomy in return for accountability, and 
improving the efficiency of government financing in the sector. 
Expanding adult learning is a priority for advanced economies in the 
region that are facing a demographic decline. Their challenge is to 
ensure that existing coordination mechanisms function well and that 
regulation and financing are used to facilitate the emergence of a private 
sector- oriented adult education and training market. The principal prior-
ity of less advanced economies in the region experiencing a demographic 
decline (i.e., many of those in South Eastern Europe and the middle- 
income CIS countries) is to introduce a policy framework for adult 
 learning and create the tools needed to implement this strategy (e.g., 
coordination mechanisms, plus initial steps toward regulation). For the 
less advanced economies in the region that are not facing a demographic 
decline (i.e., those of low-income CIS countries and Albania), it may be 
more productive to limit efforts to establish policy frameworks and 
coordination mechanisms for this sector. For many countries, participat-
ing in the OECD’s Programme for International Assessment of Adult 
Competencies (PIAAC) would be an important first step in understand-
ing the current skills and competencies of their work forces.
Conclusion
It will take time to steer education systems in the ECA region away from 
a focus on inputs toward a focus on delivering a quality education to the 
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majority of students. Waiting to begin this process will only cause coun-
tries to fall farther behind in delivering the skills their economies need to 
compete in a global economy. Overall, much greater measurement of 
student learning outcomes is needed at all levels of education if policy 
makers are to understand the strengths and weaknesses of their respective 
systems and design effective policies to improve them. If the role of cen-
tral governments is redefined to focus on strategic policy, system goals, 
and regulation, central policy makers will be freed to use incentives to 
manage lower-level actors to meet goals and then measure the results. 
In schools, this process will involve greater use of per capita financing, 
more autonomy, and greater accountability for learning outcomes. At the 
level of higher education, strengthening national quality assurance mech-
anisms is needed to improve the accountability of education providers, 
as is greater dissemination of information on learning and employment 
outcomes (e.g., results from tracer studies, or university rankings) to 
inform student choice. In addition, existing financing incentives will need 
strengthening through the introduction of more performance-based bud-
geting and, where warranted, greater institutional autonomy. Although 
adult learning systems are critically important for the region, their priority 
in individual ECA countries will depend on economic and demographic 
conditions and other, perhaps more pressing education challenges. All 
countries in the region can, however, begin to develop a coherent strategy 
for adult education and training.
Notes
 1. The countries included in the Europe and Central Asia (ECA) region include 
Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, 
Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Georgia, Hungary, Kazakhstan, Kosovo, 
Kyrgyz Republic, Latvia, Lithuania, the former Yugoslav Republic of 
Macedonia, Moldova, Montenegro, Poland, Romania, the Russian Federation, 
Serbia, the Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Tajikistan, Turkey, Turkmenistan, 
Ukraine, and Uzbekistan.
 2. Adjusted for Purchasing Power Parity, or PPP. 
 3. The EBRD–World Bank Business Environment and Enterprise Performance 
Surveys (BEEPS) provide successive snapshots of the self-reported constraints 
to expansion by firms in the ECA region. The surveys were conducted in 
virtually all ECA countries in 1999, 2002, 2005, and 2008. Survey samples 
are constructed by random sampling from the national registry of firms (or 
equivalent) and cover both industry and service sectors.
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 4. It should be noted that Turkey does not have a socialist past, but does operate 
“in the dark” to a large extent and has not made the performance-oriented 
management reforms of other OECD countries. The expenditure efficiency 
issues are, however, different in nature. See World Bank 2005a.
 5. While the use of learning assessments is not uncontroversial, testing method-
ologies have improved in recent years, making these tests better and more 
useful for assessing student learning than was previously the case. 
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C H A P T E R  1
The Demand for Skills in ECA
Throughout the world there has been an increase in the demand for 
skilled labor in what is now a global knowledge economy. More specifi-
cally, the demand for skills related to complex communication and non-
routine cognitive tasks has increased, while the demand for routine and 
manual skills has declined. Employment trends in the region encompass-
ing Eastern Europe and Central Asia (ECA) reflect this new reality: jobs 
have been shifting significantly from unskilled to skilled labor and the 
wages of highly skilled workers have dramatically improved over the past 
20 years. This shift parallels an economic transition that has involved 
intensive enterprise restructuring as countries moved from centrally 
planned to market-based economies. New skills have come into demand, 
as employment has been allocated away from declining industries and 
firms toward expanding ones. In addition, there has been a large-scale 
shift of jobs from agriculture and, to a lesser extent, industry towards the 
service sector.
This evolution in the labor market is at the heart of major changes in 
employment outlook throughout the region. The movement toward 
greater use of skilled labor has in turn produced relatively greater unem-
ployment for low-skilled workers. Wages of highly skilled white collar 
workers have also grown at a much faster rate than those of less-skilled 
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manual workers. As a result, returns to education and professional 
skills—that is, their value on the marketplace—have sharply increased 
during the transition. The parallel upward movement of employment 
and wages points to a shift in demand rather than supply as the main 
cause of these trends. 
Research indicates that this change in demand has not been adequately 
met by an adjustment in the supply of skills, resulting in a kind of skills 
“mismatch” throughout the region. In fact, many modern firms in ECA 
countries view the lack of necessary skills among potential workers as a 
major impediment to their operations and development. These needed 
skills include not just the ability to apply knowledge and solve tasks, but 
also the ability to work as part of a team—just one example of the type 
of behavioral skills increasingly desired by employers.
This chapter describes the evolution and patterns of demand for 
skills in the entire ECA region (see “Abbreviations” for a list of country 
groupings used in this report. The notion of “labor demand” has differ-
ent meanings in different ECA subregions because of vast differences in 
income level and the degree of formality of the labor market. While in 
many of the new member states of the European Union (EU), wage 
(-dependent) employment represents a large share of total employment, 
in other countries (e.g., the Western Balkans or Commonwealth of 
Independent States [CIS] members), it represents a lower fraction 
(about 30–40 percent). Furthermore, a substantial part of wage employ-
ment in many subregions is in the public service sector. Accordingly, the 
results presented in this chapter for wage workers refer to a considerably 
larger part of some subregions than others.
Background: The Demand for Highly Skilled Labor 
in the Global Knowledge Economy
There is no question that skilled labor is increasingly in demand in today’s 
modern economies. Skills requiring expert, inventive thinking are sought 
after and skills involving repetitive tasks are not. In the United States, 
for example, the task content of the work done by the labor force has 
changed greatly over the past 40 years. As shown in figure 1.1, the pro-
portion of the U.S. labor force employed in occupations that make inten-
sive use of nonroutine cognitive tasks—both interactive and  analytic—has 
increased substantially since 1960. In contrast, the percentage of the 
labor force employed in occupations involving routine cognitive and 
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manual tasks, as well as nonroutine manual activities, has declined (Autor, 
Levy, and Murnane 2003). 
There are three labor market ramifications of the shift in employment 
from routine and manual tasks towards nonroutine cognitive tasks. First, 
employment structure changes: a growing proportion of the labor force is 
employed in jobs requiring higher-level, nonroutine skills (see Levy and 
Murnane 2004). Second, wage structure changes: wage inequality rises 
due to an increase in the skill premium; in particular, the wage gap 
between low- and highly skilled workers widens. Third, unemployment 
rises among less-skilled workers following the elimination of routine jobs.
Technological development also spurs change in how work is orga-
nized, which itself can lead to higher-skill needs. Computer technology, 
for example, has contributed to the shift away from the so-called Taylorist 
organization of labor (characterized by mass production and bureau-
cratic controls) to high-performance work practices (characterized by 
Figure 1.1 Trends in Routine and Nonroutine Tasks of U.S. Labor Force, 
1960–2002
Source: Autor, Levy, and Murnane 2003. With data updated to 2002 by David Autor.
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decentralized decision making, just-in-time operations, teamwork, and 
multitasking (EC 2008; OECD 1999b). U.S. data on firms that adopted 
information and communication technology show, for example, that 
increases in the demand for highly skilled workers can be attributed 
more to the requirements of new work organization than to the introduc-
tion of new technology itself (Breshnan, Brynjolfsson, and Hitt 2002), a 
process that has been termed “skill-biased organizational change.”1
Workers in today’s economies are increasingly required to solve com-
plex and unexpected tasks in their jobs, which involve fewer and fewer 
simple, predictable activities. In addition, workers must be able to master 
changing technologies and make sense of large amounts of information. 
Figure 1.2 shows the complexities of this new working environment, as 
expressed by worker responses to questions about the nature of their 
employment.
Demand for Skilled Labor Has Risen in the ECA Region
This section focuses on two measurable aspects of skills in the ECA 
region from a labor market perspective:2 educational attainment and 
Figure 1.2 Worker Responses to Survey on Working Conditions in Europe, 2005
Source: Authors’ calculations based on data obtained from Eurofound 2007.
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occupation. The more educated a worker, the more skilled he or she is 
assumed to be. It is taken for granted that some occupations (e.g.,  manager 
or  professional) require higher-level skills than others (e.g., service worker, 
salesperson, machine operator). Education levels cannot be mapped 
directly to occupations and skills, but education levels and occupations 
can shed light on the demand for skills in a given labor market. The text 
that follows relies on the International Standard Classification of 
Occupations, known as ISCO-88 rev. 3, to classify various types of 
employment in ECA countries.3 
While data are not available that would allow the kind of analysis pre-
sented in figure 1.1 for the ECA region, a wide range of proximate data 
points to similar trends there. Shifts in demand in favor of more skilled 
labor have been reinforced in ECA by the transition from plan to market. 
Turkey, although not a transition economy, has also experienced deep 
structural changes associated with economic modernization and rapid 
growth that have brought about changes in the demand for skills.
The economic transition in the region has been associated with 
 significant job flows between sectors, with labor moving to the service 
sector, largely from agriculture and, to a lesser degree, from industry. 
In reality, this transition simply removed institutional barriers to a natu-
ral restructuring process associated with economic development. For 
example, in Estonia, service sector employment as a share of total 
employment increased by 18 percentage points from 1990 to 2007; in 
Slovakia, by 12 percentage points from 1994 to 2007; in Moldova, by 
13 percentage points over the seven-year period, 2000 to 2007; and in 
the Kyrgyz Republic, by 5 percentage points in just four years. In Turkey, 
again, not a transition economy, the share of services in the national 
economy increased by 15 percentage points between 1990 and 2006. 
In all cases, increases in service employment as a share of total employ-
ment were accompanied by some drop in the share of employment 
in industry, but mainly by a sharp drop in the share of employment in 
agriculture. 
There has also been significant job reallocation among enterprises 
within the same industry in ECA countries (Rutkowski and Scarpetta 
2005). In fact, job reallocation rates in transition economies exceed those 
in developed countries (Bartelsman, Haltivanger, and Scarpetta 2004). 
This reallocation can be attributed in some measure to firm turnover 
(i.e., the entry and exit of firms), particularly in transition economies. For 
example, in a number of ECA countries for which firm-level data are 
available, newly established firms account for between 25 and 50 percent 
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of total job creation, exceeding the share common in developed countries 
(Rutkowski and Scarpetta 2005). 
Looking at employment structure by occupation provides a straight-
forward measure of the skill content of labor demand. In most ECA 
countries, employment has shifted away from less skilled occupations 
towards more skilled occupations. In particular, there has been a shift 
from blue- to white-collar occupations, as well as an increase in the skill 
content of employment in both kinds of work. The typical pattern of 
change in occupational structure has included (1) a substantial fall in 
demand for agricultural skills, (2) a fall in demand for manual labor, both 
skilled and unskilled, (3) a rise in demand for service sector occupations, 
and finally, (4) a surge in demand for professional skills. 
Figure 1.3 shows the occupational profile (and, by implication, skill 
profile) of newly created jobs versus jobs being destroyed in Georgia in 
2007. As seen in the figure, a gradual but measured shift from industry 
to services is occurring, with many jobs destroyed and few created for 
such manual labor-oriented professions as technicians and machine 
operators. Viewed in terms of labor demand, workers in these occupa-
tions saw the demand for their skills fall. At the same time, few jobs were 
Figure 1.3 Job Creation and Destruction Rates for Selected Occupations in 
 Georgia, 2007
Source:  Data obtained during a labor market survey of Georgian firms in 2007. The survey is discussed in greater 
detail in Rutkowski 2008b.
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destroyed and many were created for service workers and salespeople, 
who thus saw the demand for their skills rise. 
The pattern of job reallocation was somewhat different in Ukraine 
(see figure 1.4). In 2007, demand shifted away from unskilled towards 
skilled manual labor. The job destruction rate exceeded the job creation 
rate for elementary occupations;4 consequently, the share of jobs requir-
ing elementary skills decreased. At the same time, the job creation rate 
exceeded the job destruction rate for skilled manual occupations, mean-
ing the share of skilled manual jobs increased. There was also a decline in 
professional employment in Ukraine.
Figure 1.5 shows patterns of change in the occupational structure of 
employment across the ECA region over a longer time series, patterns 
that are especially well illustrated by the panels for Poland (panel a) and 
Russian Federation (panel d). Within the broad trend of the shift from 
unskilled to skilled labor, there are numerous country-specific exceptions. 
A diverse group of countries, from Romania to Turkey to the Kyrgyz 
Republic, saw increases in the demand for manual labor (not decreases), 
but these increases were for skilled manual labor. Some countries (e.g., 
the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia) saw a sharp increase in the 
Figure 1.4 Job Creation and Destruction Rates for Selected Occupations in 
Ukraine, 2007
Sources: Ukraine Labor Demand Survey (World Bank 2009); Bank staff calculations.
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demand for medium-level professional skills (e.g., technicians and associ-
ate professionals), and a rise in unskilled manual employment. Others 
(e.g., Georgia and Ukraine) saw a fall in the share of professional occupa-
tions. These variations notwithstanding, the overall picture is one of a 
rising demand for skilled labor. The limited number of existing studies on 
the demand for skills in transition economies also confirms this picture.5
Figure 1.5 Changes in Occupational Share of Total Employment in Selected ECA 
Countries, Various Years
Sources:  UNECE SD, Labour Force and Wages; Eurostat SD, Labour Market; World Bank staff calculations.
Note: The arrows in each panel suggest hypothetical movements of workers between occupations (i.e., possible 
movements of labor between different occupations during this time period).
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Unemployment Patterns in ECA Countries Confirm the 
Demand for Skilled Labor 
Increased demand for skilled labor is also evident in the pattern of 
unemployment and exit from unemployment found in the ECA region.6 
Table 1.1 presents unemployment rates by educational attainment by 
subregion.7 As a rule, the unemployment rate is highest among workers 
with only a basic education, except in Turkey and the middle-income 
CIS countries. The relatively low unemployment rate among workers 
with this level of education can be attributed to the fact that many of 
these workers are employed in agriculture.
By contrast, the unemployment rate is by far the lowest among work-
ers with a tertiary education in all ECA subregions. In fact, it is roughly 
half that of workers with a general secondary education. In all subregions, 
workers who finish school with vocational or technical skills are less 
likely to be unemployed than workers with general secondary skills 
(Turkey being an exception).8 The difference is particularly pronounced 
in  middle-income CIS countries, where the unemployment rate among 
workers with a vocational or technical education is half that among work-
ers with a general secondary education. 
Table 1.1 Unemployment Rates by Educational Attainment and 
ECA Subregion, 2006 
(percent)
Country group
Education level
Primary 
or less
Secondary 
general
Secondary vocational 
and/or technicala Tertiary
EU10 + 1 22.1 12.4 9.6 5.8
SEE 32.0 24.5 22.7 12.5
Middle-income CIS 7.2 14.2 7.2 5.0
Low-income CIS 29.7 26.1 22.3 16.2
Turkey 15.8 20.0 25.0 9.4
Sources: EBRD-World Bank 2006; authors’ calculations.
Note: See the “Acronyms and Abbreviations” section of this book for a key to country groupings. Unemployment 
rates estimated using data from the EBRD-World Bank Life in Transition Survey (LITS) may differ from official 
country data because of methodological differences.
a. The category of  “secondary technical/vocational education” used by the LITS combines two different subcate-
gories: (1) workers who completed secondary technical school (4–5 years of courses leading to a secondary 
school diploma), and (2) workers who received basic vocational training (1–3 years of courses, which do not lead 
to a secondary school diploma). Evidence from countries for which the more detailed breakdown is available 
indicates that the employment chances of workers with secondary technical education are significantly better 
than that of workers with basic vocational training. For example, in Poland the unemployment rate among work-
ers with basic vocational training tends to be one-third higher than that among workers with secondary techni-
cal education. This may be due to the inferior quality of training received during the shorter courses, or to a sort-
ing process whereby students who are less able or come from a disadvantaged background tend to self-select 
into schools that offer basic vocational training rather than the more demanding secondary technical schools.
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The high demand for professional and technical skills in the ECA 
region is also evident when one looks at the movement of workers from 
unemployment to jobs. Professionals and technicians across countries in 
the region have by far the highest chances of escaping unemployment 
and finding a new job. Figure 1.6 depicts outflow rates from unemploy-
ment to employment for two ECA subregions: the EU10+1 (European 
Union+1) countries and low-income CIS countries (the pattern prevail-
ing in middle-income CIS and South Eastern Europe (SEE) countries is 
similar to that in the EU10+1 group). 
In the EU10+1 countries, the escape rate from unemployment is 
highest among professionals and technicians, followed by medium-
skilled white- and blue-collar workers. It is lowest among unskilled and 
agricultural workers. In low-income CIS countries, the pattern is some-
what different: medium-skilled, blue-collar agricultural workers have 
better chances of finding a job than do medium-skilled white-collar 
workers. But workers in more skilled occupations nevertheless find jobs 
more easily than those in less-skilled occupations.
The poor employment prospects of less-skilled workers in the region 
are also evident from the unemployment-to-vacancy (U/V) ratio, which is 
high for less-skilled workers and low for highly skilled workers. Data on 
the U/V ratio for Croatia, the Czech Republic, and Ukraine illustrate the 
point (see figure 1.7). Job opportunities for different occupations are quite 
similar in these three countries: the number of unemployed professionals 
and technicians (skill levels 3 and 4, respectively, in the ISCO-88 frame-
work) per vacancy is low and that of unemployed unskilled workers (skill 
level 1) is high. Employment chances are also relatively good for skilled 
manual workers, especially craft workers (skill level 2). But job prospects 
are limited for white-collar workers with medium-level skills (e.g., clerks, 
service workers, salespeople). The demand for white-collar labor with 
medium-level skills is limited relative to supply, while the demand for 
blue-collar labor with mid-level skills is high relative to supply. 
Putting together the information on employment presented in the 
previous section with the data on unemployment presented in this 
section, it is possible to obtain an estimate of shortages and surpluses 
in the economies of the ECA region, particularly by comparing the 
relative shares of employment and unemployment of different educa-
tional groups. Figure 1.8 shows that in countries as diverse as Croatia, 
Poland, Russia, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan (listed in order of gross 
national income [GNI] per capita), there is a shortage of workers with 
professional or technical qualifications and a surplus of workers with 
SNJD.indb   26 9/27/11   10:10:23 PM
The Demand for Skills in ECA       27
Figure 1.6 Yearly Outflow Rates from Employment to Jobs by Occupation in Two 
Subregions of ECA, 2006
Sources: EBRD–World Bank 2006; World Bank staff calculations. 
Note: The yearly outflow rate from unemployment to jobs is the number of workers who were employed during 
the reference week, but unemployed one year earlier expressed as a percentage of all unemployed.
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Figure 1.7 Unemployment-to-Vacancy Ratio by Occupation in Croatia, the Czech 
Republic, and Ukraine, Various Years
Sources: Data provided by the Croatian Employment Service for 2006, Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs of the 
Czech Republic for 2006, and Ukraine State Employment Service for 2007; authors’ calculations.
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Figure 1.8 Labor Shortages and Surpluses by Level of Educational Attainment, 
Selected ECA Countries
Sources: Crostat 2007; Bulgaria 2007; Poland 2007; Russian Federation 2007; World Bank 2005b, 2003a; authors’ 
calculations.
Note: The skill shortage or surplus index is calculated as (e/u–1)*100, where e and u are respectively employment 
and unemployment shares of a given occupational group.
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basic skills. This pattern is common in most ECA countries, regardless 
of their income level or progress in the  transition towards a market 
economy. In addition to the skills mismatch between educational cate-
gories, there is also a mismatch within educational categories in certain 
countries. For example, a study of Croatia found that among workers 
with a tertiary education, there was a shortage of engineers and a sur-
plus of lawyers and art designers (Rutkowski 2008a).
It is important to note that there continues to be excess demand for 
skilled manual workers at the same time that there is an excess supply of 
unskilled workers, medium-skilled nonmanual workers, and agricultural 
workers. There is some evidence that the excess demand for skilled man-
ual workers is the result of a shrinking supply of workers in this category. 
The relative shortage of skilled manual workers could have occurred 
in three ways. First, as seen in figure 1.5, there has been a shift in occu-
pational structure away from skilled manual occupations in some coun-
tries (e.g., Poland, Russia, and FYR Macedonia). Given poor employment 
prospects at home, some workers—especially younger workers—may 
have decided to migrate to Western Europe, where employment pros-
pects and wages are better. There is substantial anecdotal evidence that 
this has actually been the case for the populations of the EU10 countries 
(especially after EU accession in 2004 allowed for greater labor mobil-
ity). Poland and Ukraine (the first a member of the EU, the second a 
nonmember) provide good examples of the widespread outmigration of 
skilled manual workers.9 Second, the supply of skilled manual workers 
is likely to have declined due to a shift from vocational towards general 
secondary education that has occurred in most ECA countries (Poland 
is again a relevant example). Finally, older workers with vocational skills 
may have decided to drop out of the labor force.
An important question is whether the apparent simultaneous excess 
demand for some workers and excess supply of others is the result of 
friction in labor market adjustments, or whether it has a structural com-
ponent. While structural unemployment is difficult to assess, there 
appears to be significant long-term unemployment in the region concen-
trated among low-skilled workers, often leading to poverty and social 
exclusion (Alam et al. 2005). Retraining is often ineffective because the 
skill requirements of newly created jobs differ significantly from those 
of the jobs that were destroyed.10 Some degree of friction in the labor 
market is customary, but the skill profile of labor demand is changing 
fairly rapidly in ECA countries due to both technological progress and 
the adoption of new production processes. There are thus good reasons 
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to believe there is a structural component to the labor surpluses and 
shortages observed in the region.
The ability of the labor market—and the education system—to 
respond to this disequilibrium is a question of market signals and institu-
tions. Among potential issues are whether wages are sufficiently flexible 
to adjust to changing demand and supply conditions, labor market infor-
mation on job prospects by type of education and occupation is available, 
educational institutions can adjust program offerings to the needs of the 
labor market, and employment services can effectively match workers to 
available jobs. The next sections examine whether labor market signals 
(via returns to education) reflect the underlying changes in labor demand 
in the region and whether employers are able to attract workers with the 
right skills.
Wages Have Risen for Skilled Labor
Changes in the demand for skills are certainly reflected in the movement 
of wages. Given the supply of skills, an increase in demand for certain 
skills manifests as an increase in the relative wages of workers who possess 
these skills. In the majority of ECA countries, the returns to education 
have sharply increased and are presently comparable to those observed in 
developed market economies. However, as shown in figure 1.9, returns to 
education are still relatively low in some of the less advanced, slower- 
reforming transition countries. The evolution of the occupational wage 
structure unambiguously points to an increase in wage premia for white-
collar skills, particularly professional and managerial skills.
Figure 1.9 reveals that ECA countries in the early 2000s could be 
divided into three groups: a small group where returns to schooling 
were high by international standards, a dominant group where returns 
were moderate, and a small but nonnegligible group where returns were 
low. There is a clear association between the degree of progress of 
 economic transition to a market economy and the level of returns to 
schooling in these countries (Flabbi, Paternostro, and Tiongson 2007). 
The high-returns group included advanced transition economies (e.g., 
Hungary and Poland), while the low-returns group included mainly less 
advanced economies (e.g., Romania, Tajikistan, and Ukraine).11 As a rule, 
countries where returns to education were high were those where 
employment had already shifted towards more skilled occupations, 
whereas countries where they were low were those where there had 
been less of a shift. At that time, the rates of returns to education in 
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most ECA economies were broadly comparable with those of developed 
economies (about 7.5 percent), but substantially lower than those of 
developing economies (where the rate is above 10 percent; Psacharopulos 
and Patrinos 2004).
The increase in returns to schooling during the economic transition 
in the region has been driven by a surge in returns to tertiary educa-
tion.12 Wage premia to tertiary education have increased dramatically, 
while those to secondary education have remained roughly stable.13 This 
is well illustrated by the example of Hungary (see figure 1.10), where 
the wage premium to university education more than doubled in the 
wake of the transition. At the same time, the premium to secondary 
education (both general and technical) rose only slightly higher than it 
Figure 1.9 Returns to Schooling in Selected ECA Transition Countries, 
Various Years
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Sources: Patrinos 2008 (Ukraine); Kapelyushnikov 2008 (Russia) and Yemtsov, Cnobloch, and Mete 2006 (Belarus, 
Bulgaria, Georgia, Hungary, Moldova, Poland, Romania, and Tajikistan). 
Note: Average return per a year of additional education estimated based on a Mincerian wage regression of 
the form: lnw = α + ρs + β0x + β1x
2 + γz + ε; where w represents the wage of an individual, s denotes years of 
 schooling, x denotes labor market experience (years), z is a vector of other individual and job characteristics 
(e.g., gender, industry, etc.), and ε is an error term, which inter alia captures unmeasured differences in innate 
ability. The parameter ρ represents the return to one year of schooling.
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was before the transition. Similar trends occurred in other EU10+1 
countries (Rutkowski 1996a, 2001). Although time series data for other 
ECA countries are not available, it seems fair to assume that the increase 
in the wage premium to university education was a decisive factor in 
other countries, too. The sharp increase in returns to tertiary education 
is consistent with the growth in demand for highly professional skills 
documented earlier in this chapter.
While in most ECA countries workers with a tertiary education earn 
considerably higher salaries than workers with a secondary education, 
returns to secondary education are limited. Figure 1.11 illustrates this 
trend for Russia and Turkey. In Russia, an average worker with a univer-
sity education earns over twice as much as a worker with only primary 
education and nearly 60 percent more than a worker with general sec-
ondary education.14 In turn, a worker with general upper-level secondary 
education earns only 20 percent more than a worker with less education. 
Differences in the wage premia by type of secondary school are virtually 
negligible. A very similar pattern prevails in Turkey.
The shift in demand for skills during the economic transition produced 
a new wage structure that is remarkably similar across ECA economies 
(see figure 1.12). Using the average wage of workers in elementary occu-
pations as a reference, managers earn 3.5–4.5 times as much; profession-
als, 2.5–3.0 times more; technicians, about 2 times more; and skilled 
Figure 1.10 Wage Premia by Level of Education in Hungary, 1986–2004
Sources: Campos and Jolliffe 2007; authors’ calculations. 
Note: Wage premia are relative to uncompleted primary education.
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Figure 1.11 Wage Premia by Education Level in the Russian Federation and Turkey
Sources: Kapelyushnikov 2008 (Russian Federation); Ercan 2008 (Turkey); authors’ calculations.
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manual workers and clerks, about 1.5 times more. Service workers and 
salespeople earn only slightly more—some 10 percent—than workers in 
elementary occupations. While patterns across most ECA countries are 
similar, the relative wage status of skilled manual workers is much better 
in Russia than in the EU10 countries. Concomitantly, the relative wage 
status of professionals and technicians is worse in Russia. Moreover, 
there are no returns to clerical skills in Russia; clerks earn on average the 
same wage as laborers. Thus the occupational wage structure in Russia 
is biased towards skilled manual labor; as such, it is closer to that prevail-
ing under central planning. A similar pattern also prevails in Ukraine 
(World Bank 2009b).15
In addition to the current variance in wages across job categories, 
there is evidence that wage rates are diverging over time. In most ECA 
countries for which data are available, workers in occupations requiring 
highly skilled labor (e.g., managers, professionals, and technicians) saw 
their relative wages increase, while workers in occupations requiring 
Figure 1.12 Premia by Occupation Relative to Elementary Occupations in Various 
ECA Countries
Sources: Eurostat, Labor Market Statistics (database) (Bulgaria and Czech Republic); Ercan 2008 (Turkey), 
Kapelyushnikov 2008 (Russia); World Bank staff calculations.
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medium- and lower-level skills (especially manual skills) saw their rela-
tive wages fall. Thus the wage differential between highly skilled white-
collar workers and less skilled white- and blue-collar workers has 
substantially widened. Figure 1.13 illustrates this trend in Bulgaria and 
Poland.16 The wage status of highly skilled white-collar workers in these 
countries has substantially improved, while that of less skilled workers 
(both white- and blue-collar) has deteriorated during the transition.
Lack of Needed Skills Is Impeding Enterprise Growth
The preceding sections documented the shift in labor demand in ECA 
countries from less to more skilled labor within both blue- and white-
collar occupations. In addition, demand has shifted notably from blue- to 
white-collar occupations. These changes, which have resulted in high 
rates of return to investment in skills in the region, are the result of two 
simultaneous changes: an increase in demand for skilled workers arising 
from skill-biased technological and organizational change and (in the 
transition economies) factors specific to the transition from a centrally 
planned to a market economy.
Available evidence suggests that the supply of skills has adjusted fairly 
slowly to the changes in demand. Many firms in ECA, especially modern 
and growing firms, now see the skills of available workers as a major 
obstacle to their operations and growth. The strongest evidence for this 
perception comes from the findings of the Business Environment and 
Enterprise Performance Surveys (BEEPS) conducted by the European 
Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) and the World 
Bank.17 For the first time since BEEPS was launched in 1999, workers’ 
education and skills were recently identified by employers as one of the 
top constraints to firm growth.18 
In fact, worker skills were not typically identified by firms as a con-
straint until 2005; other constraints (e.g., taxes and business environ-
ment) were deemed more important. However, during the most recent 
round of BEEPS, conducted in 2008, lack of skilled manpower moved up 
to become the second-most common constraint on growth cited by firms. 
Indeed, by 2008 the traditional strengths of ECA countries—good 
endowments of infrastructure and skills—appear to have eroded (Mitra, 
Selowsky, and Zalduendo 2010).
Panel a of figure 1.14 shows the distribution of ECA countries accord-
ing to the level of dissatisfaction with workers’ education and skills 
among local firms. On average, 30 percent of firms considered these 
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Figure 1.13 Wage Growth by Occupation in Bulgaria and Poland, 1996–2006
(average wage growth = 1) 
Sources: Eurostat, Labor Market Statistics (database); World Bank staff calculations.
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Figure 1.14 Employers’ Perceptions of Worker Skills as a Constraint to Growth, 
Various ECA Countries 
Sources: BEEPS 2008; Mitra, Selowsky, and Zalduendo 2010. 
Note: LI = low-income, MI = middle-income. See “Abbreviations” for country abbreviations and groupings. 
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factors to be a major or severe constraint to their operations and growth. 
The greatest dissatisfaction was among middle-income CIS countries, 
where more than 40 percent of firms were dissatisfied. In  contrast, rela-
tively less dissatisfaction was reported by firms in the Western 
Balkan countries and significant variability was reported in the EU10+1 
countries.
Worker skills are particularly likely to become a binding constraint 
during periods of rapid economic growth. As might then be expected, the 
percentage of firms for which the availability of the “right” workers was 
either no obstacle or a minor obstacle decreased during the period between 
2005 and 2008 due to strong economic growth in the region. Panel b of 
figure 1.14 depicts the difference in percentage of satisfied firms between 
2005 and 2008 regarding the suitability of the skills and education of 
workers for doing business. A negative value (along the x axis) assigned 
to a particular country indicates a decline in the percentage of satisfied 
firms over this period. For example, if the share of satisfied firms in coun-
try A declined by 25 percent between 2005 and 2008, then country A 
would be positioned in the –0.2 to –0.3 percent range of the x-axis. As 
this panel shows, all ECA countries, with the exception of one EU mem-
ber state, experienced a decline in the share of satisfied firms between 
2005 and 2008. The worst deterioration in the availability of skills rela-
tive to demand took place in the middle-income CIS countries. But even 
in a large number of new EU members and other CIS countries, the 
reduction in satisfied firms was between 0.2 and 0.3 (or 20–30 percent 
of all firms).
As might be expected, modern firms suffer more from skills shortages 
than do traditional ones.19 Across the ECA region, modern companies 
find it more difficult to recruit workers with the required qualifications 
than do traditional firms, particularly professional and skilled manual 
workers. For example, in the EU10+1 countries in 2005, modern firms 
needed, on average, five weeks to hire a professional worker, while tradi-
tional firms needed fewer than three weeks (see panel a of figure 1.15). 
In low-income CIS countries, the search for a skilled manual worker 
among modern firms was, on average, one week longer than that of tradi-
tional enterprises (see panel b of figure 1.15). 
Skills Mismatch in the ECA Region 
As the previous sections have documented, there is a skills mismatch in 
the ECA region. Unless it is addressed, governments in the region will be 
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Figure 1.15 Time Needed by Firms to Hire Specific Workers, by 
ECA Subregion, 2005
Sources: EBRD-World Bank 2005; World Bank staff calculations.
Note: See “Abbreviations” for country abbreviations and groupings.
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unable to facilitate either the growth of firms or a reduction in  structural 
unemployment. Why the skills mismatch exists is a subject of intense 
inquiry.20 Although evidence indicates that many factors are involved, this 
book focuses on one possible cause: education and training institutions in 
the region provide inappropriate types of skills to their graduates. 
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There are several ways in which the skills mismatch can be related to 
the education and training of graduates in ECA countries. First, gradu-
ates may not have the necessary technical skills to do the jobs that 
employers have to offer. This is not solely a matter of educational attain-
ment, that is, of completing a certain level of education. It is also a mat-
ter of whether students have the skills needed on the job—the relevant 
knowledge, the ability to apply that knowledge, and the know-how to 
complete tasks and solve problems—when they graduate. In addition, 
the relevance of the education received by graduates is also important. 
That is, students may be studying the wrong things. Second, graduates of 
education and training systems in the region may lack the necessary 
behavioral (or soft) skills needed by employers, such as job attitudes and 
teamwork skills. There is widespread evidence from across the ECA 
region that firms seek graduates who not only have knowledge as well 
as technical and general skills, but who also have behavioral skills. 
For instance, recent surveys of employers in Kazakhstan (panel a of 
 figure 1.16) and Poland (panel b of figure 1.16) show that firms value 
such behavioral skills as highly (in some instances, more highly) as 
knowledge and routine cognitive skills (e.g., mathematics and computer 
skills)—important as the  latter may be.21 
Before turning to the ways in which education and training systems 
fall short of delivering the right skills, it is worth noting that one possible 
reason for the continued identification of skills as a bottleneck to growth 
in the ECA region is unreasonable expectations on the part of ECA firms. 
A recent comparison of firms’ expectations of new workers in the United 
Kingdom and Poland, for example, showed that Polish employers 
expected young workers to possess advanced vocational job-specific 
skills, while their U.K. counterparts preferred workers who had reached 
an adequate level of literacy and numeracy, without necessarily having 
fully developed, job-specific vocational skills (World Bank 2010b). The 
report concluded that: “The expectations of Polish employers will prob-
ably have to change, and they will have to assume a greater role in the 
financing and provision of vocational training to their workforce” (World 
Bank 2010b).
Summary
The demand for highly skilled labor has increased in most if not all ECA 
countries. This profound change in demand stems from the opening 
of their economies to international competition and the consequent 
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Figure 1.16 Employers’  Valuation of Workers’ Knowledge and Skills in Kazakhstan 
and Poland
(percentage of firms reporting as “very important”)
Sources: Ivaschenko 2008; World Bank 2010b.
Firms were categorized as “innovative” if in the year preceding the survey they introduced innovations, otherwise 
they were categorized as “traditional.”
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 far-reaching reallocation of labor that took place. New firms have entered 
the market, new economic activities have emerged, and new jobs have 
been created, calling for different skills than those required previously. As 
economies have shifted, the service sector has expanded, while the agri-
cultural and, to a lesser degree, industrial sectors have shrunk. Firms have 
changed the skills composition of their workforces to raise productivity 
and improve competitiveness; as a result, labor demand has shifted away 
from lower-skilled toward higher-skilled occupations. 
This change in employment structure is most pronounced in the 
countries of Central Europe, but is visible in some form everywhere in 
the ECA region. Simultaneously, returns to education have increased and 
the wages of highly skilled professional workers have greatly improved, 
while those of lesser-skilled workers have deteriorated. Consequently, 
the job prospects of better-educated, highly skilled workers have 
expanded dramatically. Unemployment and low-paid employment in 
the region is accordingly concentrated among less educated and less 
skilled workers, a group whose job opportunities are increasingly limited 
in most ECA countries.
All of these changes have put added strains on education and training 
systems in the region, which are expected to prepare workers for changed 
and changing labor markets, but which do not appear geared to meet 
those labor market needs. The next chapter looks at the supply of skills 
to the labor market in ECA countries in more detail. Given that skills 
shortages have become a major constraint to firm growth in many ECA 
countries, whatever changes have occurred on the supply side appear to 
have been insufficient. The next chapter tries to explain why. 
Notes
 1. Alternatively, upgrading the education of the workforce may itself be a 
 factor that leads to increased demand for higher-level skills. That is, the 
increase in demand for such skills may reflect an increase in the supply of 
these skills, a process known as endogenous skill-biased technological 
change. Acemog˘lu (1998) argues that a high proportion of skilled workers 
in the labor force implies a large market size for skill-complementary tech-
nologies, meaning that the productivity of skilled workers will be upgraded 
faster. In this model, an increase in the supply of skills over the long run 
induces skill-biased technological change, which shifts the relative demand 
for skills (EC 2008).
 2. Chapter 2 discusses skills from an education and training perspective.
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 3. In this book, high-level white-collar (i.e., nonmanual) skills refer to ISCO-88 
groups 1 and 2, and high-level order blue-collar (manual) skills refer to 
ISCO-88 groups 6, 7, and 8. Low-level, nonmanual skills refer to ISCO-88 
groups 4 and 5, and low-level manual skills refer to ISCO-88 group 9. See 
ILO (1988). 
 4. Elementary occupations consist of simple and routine tasks that mainly 
require the use of hand-held tools and often some physical effort.
 5. Peter (2003) analyzes skill-biased changes in wages and employment in the 
Russian economy during the transition. Commander and Köllö (2004) exam-
ine the evolution of demand for skills in Hungary, Romania, and Russia. 
Bartlett (2007) examines the demand for skills in the Western Balkans, and 
Rutkowski (2008b) and the World Bank (2009b) document the skills mis-
match in Georgia and Ukraine, respectively.
 6. At the beginning of the transition, the rising unemployment rates of low-
skilled workers likely in part reflected the hidden unemployment of these 
workers—that is, workers whom the state claimed to be employed but who 
were in fact superfluous to production. With the transition to a more market-
based economy, this de facto unemployment was essentially unmasked, rather 
than created. However, by 2011, the rising unemployment rates of low-skilled 
workers is more likely a reflection of actual shifts in demand for labor rather 
than a continued unmasking of hidden unemployment. 
 7. Unemployment statistics by educational attainment can be difficult to inter-
pret because the determination of whether a respondent is in the labor force 
affects both the numerator and the denominator of the unemployment rate. 
If a larger share of workers with vocational secondary education are judged to 
be “discouraged workers” and out of the work force, this may lead to a lower 
unemployment rate for workers in this category, even if a smaller share of 
them are employed. The more appropriate statistic to use for judging the 
match between terminal level of education and employment status is the 
employment rate (employed share of graduates with the specific education 
level) and not the unemployment rate. Such calculations can be done if coun-
tries start tracking their graduates using “graduate tracer studies,” as recom-
mended in this book.
 8. It can be argued that the better employment outcomes of workers with 
technical secondary education compared with those of workers with gen-
eral secondary education reflect the different composition of both groups. 
One hypothesis is that due to the selection process, graduates of general 
secondary schools who do not proceed to tertiary education are less able, 
on average, than the graduates of secondary technical schools. However, 
this hypothesis remains to be tested. Another possibility is that workers 
with technical secondary education are in a different age cohort—one 
that received a better education—than workers with general secondary 
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 education. Yet available evidence indicates that the cohort effect is small 
and thus unlikely to account for the differences between the two educa-
tional groups. 
 9. While not under the scope of this book, it should be noted that migration has 
had a significant effect on labor trends in the region. A recent World Bank 
study examines both migration and remittances in the region. See Mansoor 
and Quillin 2007.
 10. Surveys of demand for skills that were carried out in Poland and FYR 
Macedonia in 2009 indicated that most newly created jobs require profes-
sional or nonmanual skills, while most jobs that were destroyed required 
manual skills. This obviously limits the scope for retraining (Rutkowski 2010; 
World Bank 2010b).
 11. The low returns to schooling for these countries is presumably in part a legacy 
of the socialist period, when education levels were much higher than would 
be predicted for their level of development, a situation that holds down wages 
during the time when the economic structure is catching up to education 
levels.
 12. As figure 1.9 suggests, much of the increase in these returns was concentrated 
in the early years of the transition. A few countries, typically those with lower 
returns, show a flatter trajectory. 
 13. The terms “premia” and “returns” to education are used here interchangeably. 
However, strictly speaking, they are not synonymous. Returns to education 
take into account both wage premia and private costs of obtaining education. 
Accordingly, premia could have increased without private returns increasing 
as dramatically.
 14. These estimates do not control for other factors that affect wages, such as 
labor market experience, gender, location, and so forth.
 15. This finding likely reflects the legacy of central planning and a noncompeti-
tive wage setting, especially in enterprises fully or partly owned by the state, 
in both countries.
 16. In some countries in the region there were deviations from the overall trend 
presented here. For example, salaries of professionals in the Czech Republic 
decreased slightly in relative terms between 1996 and 2007. Similarly, in 
Estonia and the Slovak Republic, the relative wages of managers fell slightly 
during the same period. The slight fall in the relative wages of professionals 
and managers that occurred in the mid-2000s likely represents an adjustment 
to the increase in the supply of the relevant skills that occurred in response 
to growing demand.
 17. BEEPS, a joint initiative of the EBRD and the World Bank, collects firm-level 
data on a broad range of issues concerning the business environment and the 
performance of firms, including labor and workforce skills.
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 18. The most common constraint identified by firms in the region was the tax 
regime.
 19. Firms were categorized as “modern” if they used the Internet in interactions 
with their clients and suppliers, and “traditional” if they did not. Clearly, use 
of the Internet is only a proxy for modern technology.
 20. Some degree of skills mismatch is natural and unavoidable in every growing 
and restructuring economy due to adjustment costs and the delayed response 
of national educational systems. Especially in the context of fast-changing 
technology, changes in the skill structure of the labor supply tend to lag 
behind those of labor demand, even in a well-performing labor market.
 21. Surveys of the demand for skills in Poland and FYR Macedonia that were car-
ried out in 2009 provide additional empirical support to the claim that 
employers value job attitudes and behavioral skills at least as much as aca-
demic or technical and/or vocational skills. At the same time, both Polish and 
Macedonian employers complain that many recent school graduates and 
young workers are lacking “soft” skills (Rutkowski 2010; World Bank 2010b).
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C H A P T E R  2
Education and the Supply 
of Skills to the ECA Market
The skills gap described in the previous chapter represents something of 
a puzzle from the perspective of the education and training sector in the 
ECA region. ECA countries have had very high educational attainment 
rates for decades and, over the past 20 years, have experienced a rapid 
expansion of tertiary enrollment. In addition, these countries deliver 
quality education (where it is measured) at the elementary and lower 
secondary levels comparable to that of their peers at the same income 
level. Given these conditions, why do ECA firms increasingly complain 
that they cannot find graduates with the right skills?
In answering this question, there is a fundamental problem: data are 
available on the number of students who graduate (i.e., how many diplo-
mas are issued) in ECA countries, but internationally comparable data on 
the quality and relevance of upper secondary and tertiary institutions do 
not exist. Data gaps are even more acute with regard to the education and 
training received by adults outside of the formal education system. Only 
a few of the new EU member states track the extent of such training (in 
terms of participation rates and hours of training); data on the quality and 
relevance of this type of training, however, do not exist anywhere. 
While the data gaps make it impossible to provide a definitive answer 
to the skills puzzle, this study is able to point to fundamental weaknesses 
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in the ECA region’s education systems that almost certainly contribute to 
the skills gaps observed in chapter 1. Addressing these shortcomings may 
not fully close these gaps, but it will create more flexible and better-
managed education systems, which will, in turn, increase the likelihood 
that young people will graduate with—and adult workers will be able to 
acquire—the skills in demand today. Moreover, it is clearly a priority that 
ECA countries address the information deficits that are currently forestall-
ing a more comprehensive—and satisfying—answer to the puzzle above.
Although the education offered in many ECA countries is respectable 
for their level of income, it does not appear to be good enough (or of the 
right relevance) to meet the rising demand for skills in the region. Two 
problems related to quality seem particularly acute: too many students are 
failing and education systems have difficulties imparting problem-solving 
skills. Educational quality, moreover, is not demonstrating reliable progress. 
It is not improving at the lower secondary level, a weakness that is proba-
bly mirrored at the upper secondary level (albeit with a lag). Enrollments 
at the tertiary level have doubled, tripled, or quadrupled in the past two 
decades, but this occurred in an environment where quality assurance 
mechanisms are very weak, indicating that quality in this sector is also 
unlikely to have improved. The skills gap can also be explained by too little 
progress in providing workers with options for continuous training, despite 
evidence that such training fosters employment and greater productivity. 
The development of the adult training sector should accordingly be central 
to the region’s medium-term economic growth agenda.
Background: The Global Knowledge Economy Requires 
Lifelong Learning 
To prepare students for the global knowledge economy, education sys-
tems must build human capital, which the OECD defines as “the knowl-
edge, skills, competencies, and other attributes embodied in individuals 
that are relevant to personal, social, and economic well-being” (OECD 
1999a). The framework for education is thus one of lifelong learning in 
which the new knowledge and skills needed for successful adaptation to 
changing circumstances are continuously acquired over the life cycle. This 
framework, and the key competencies needed to function in today’s com-
plex societies, are elaborated in the OECD’s “Definition and Selection of 
Key Competences” (DeSeCo) project (OECD 2005b), 1 which identifies 
three broad clusters of competencies:
The ability to use tools interactively, including the ability to use language, 
symbols, text, knowledge, information, and technology. This requires 
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more than having access to a tool and the technical skills required to 
handle it (e.g., the skills needed to read a text or use software). Rather, 
individuals also need to create and adapt knowledge and skills, which 
require a familiarity with the tool itself, as well as an understanding of 
how it changes the way one can interact with the world and how it can 
be used to accomplish broader goals. 
The ability to interact in heterogeneous groups, including the ability to 
relate well to others, cooperate and work in teams, and manage and 
resolve conflicts. As societies become more fragmented and more 
diverse, it becomes important to manage interpersonal relationships 
well, which benefits both individuals and their abilities to build new 
forms of cooperation. 
Box 2.1 
Defining “Skills,” “Competencies,” and Other Terms
This book utilizes a range of education and learning concepts that were used to 
develop the European Qualifications Framework for Lifelong Learning of the EU. 
There, certain key terms are defined as follows:
•  Skills: the ability to apply knowledge and use know-how to complete tasks and 
solve problems. Skills may be cognitive (involving the use of logical, intuitive, 
and creative thinking) or practical (involving manual dexterity and the use of 
methods, materials, tools, and instruments).
•  Competence (or competency): the proven ability to use knowledge; skills; and 
personal, social, and methodological abilities in work or study situations and in 
professional and personal development. Competence may be described in 
terms of responsibility and autonomy.
•  Learning outcomes: statements of what a learner knows, understands, and is 
able to do on completion of a learning process, defined in terms of knowledge, 
skills, and competencies.
•  Qualifications: a formal assessment and validation by a competency body that 
determines an individual has achieved learning outcomes in conformance with 
given standards.
•  Knowledge: the outcome of the assimilation of information through learning. 
Knowledge is the body of facts, principles, theories, and practices related to a 
field of work or study. It can be theoretical or factual or both.
Source: EU 2008. 
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The ability to act autonomously, including the ability to form and con-
duct life plans and personal projects, as well as to assert rights, interests, 
limits, and needs. Acting autonomously does not mean functioning in social 
isolation. Instead, individuals must act autonomously in order to partici-
pate effectively in the development of society and function well in differ-
ent spheres of life, including the workplace, family life, and social life. 
To develop the higher-level competencies in demand among contem-
porary employers, students must become able to organize and regulate 
their own learning, learn both independently and in groups, and over-
come difficulties in the learning process. This versatility requires that they 
become aware of their own thinking processes, as well as their learning 
strategies and methods. What they acquire from school and university 
education is the cognitive and motivational prerequisite for successful 
learning in future life, with adult education and training helping refresh 
and build on these foundations. 
Education and training systems today are assessed against their ability to 
develop the above-described competencies in their students. Clearly, such 
systems must first provide individuals access to schooling and training, as 
measured by years of education of recent graduates, current enrollment 
trends, and the share of working-age adults who participate in adult learn-
ing programs. Schooling must, moreover, be of sufficient quality in order for 
it to result in actual learning, or the acquisition of knowledge and skills 
(sometimes referred to as educational outcomes) by students. Various 
national and international student assessment instruments have been devel-
oped precisely to measure these learning outcomes. Finally, an education 
system must be able to impart the more complex competencies described 
above in graduates at all levels; that is, it must impart education that is 
relevant with respect to labor market demands and social conditions.
Formal Education in ECA Countries: High Attainment 
and Good Quality Relative to Current Income Levels
Starting from a high base, the ECA region has generally seen a significant 
improvement in educational attainment since the start of the transition 
toward market economies in the early 1990s. ECA countries went into the 
transition with an average of at least eight years of compulsory education; 
by 2006, this number had increased to nine years, corresponding roughly 
to the primary and lower secondary cycle (see annex 2A, table 2A.1). 
This increase closed the gap between most ECA and high-income OECD 
countries in terms of average years of education.
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The most rapid growth in attainment has taken place at the tertiary 
level, albeit with considerable variation across the region. In fact, the 
increase in tertiary enrollment rates over the period 1999–2006 is higher 
for ECA countries (from below 40 percent to almost 50 percent) than for 
either high-income countries or the East Asia or Latin America regions. 
This growth has occurred across the region over the past decade, although 
Turkey and the South Eastern European and low-income CIS countries 
are trailing the EU10+1 and middle-income CIS countries. Gross tertiary 
enrollment rates in the ECA region as a whole demonstrate a pattern 
similar to those in secondary education: a dip in the mid-1990s, followed 
by a strong rebound. For the period 1990–2006 overall, the level of gross 
tertiary enrollments in the region were second only to the high-income 
countries (see figure 2.1). 
ECA countries not only do well in terms of attainment, they also 
deliver relatively good-quality education, especially in the early grades. 
Indeed, many younger students in the region outperform their Western 
European peers in reading at the fourth-grade level. For example, stu-
dents from the majority of participating ECA countries scored above 
the scale average2 on the Progress in International Reading Literacy 
Study (PIRLS) in both 2001 and 2006. There are, however, important 
Figure 2.1 Gross Enrollment Rates in Tertiary Education, by World Bank Region
(percent)
Source: Edstats Database. 
Note: In the case of South Asia, the figure for 1999 is actually for 2000.
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variations across the ECA region. Countries that have not joined the EU, 
for example, scored below the average, with the marked exception of the 
Russian Federation, which scored well above the average and demon-
strated the greatest improvement between 2001 and 2006 (see fig-
ure 2.2). This strong performance in reading at the fourth-grade level 
indicates that schools in ECA countries are very capable of providing a 
quality education at the early stages. 
Many—but not all—ECA countries continue to do well on interna-
tional assessments of reading at or near the end of lower secondary educa-
tion (e.g., Programme for International Student Assessment [PISA], 
Trends in International Mathematics and Science Study [TIMSS]) relative 
to the performance of other countries at the same income level.3 Figure 
2.3 provides a scatter plot of 2008 per capita GDP against the PISA 2009 
reading scores of countries participating in PISA (with ECA countries 
highlighted by their letter acronyms). The figure shows a positive rela-
tionship between the two values, suggesting that 15-year-olds in countries 
with higher national incomes tend to perform better on the reading com-
ponent of the PISA. Significantly, the ECA region seems divided. Certain 
countries (mainly the new EU member states but also Turkey and Serbia) 
lie above the regression line, indicating that the reading performance of 
their students is better than would be predicted on the basis of GDP per 
capita alone. Others lie below the regression line, including Romania, 
Montenegro, Bulgaria, Azerbaijan, and the Kyrgyz Republic. Students in 
these countries scored lower on the reading component of PISA than 
their national per capita GDP would have predicted.
Why Are Skills Emerging as a Problem if Education 
Systems Are Delivering?
Given high attainment levels, booming tertiary enrollments, and respect-
able educational quality at lower education levels, why are firms in the 
ECA region still complaining? This is a question that cannot be fully 
resolved, mainly because crucial information is missing. Unfortunately, 
there are no internationally comparable data on the quality of upper 
secondary or tertiary education or the relevance of education at these 
levels—information that would indicate whether graduates have the right 
skills for the modern job market There are international assessments 
on student competencies up to the age of 15 (usually the end of lower 
secondary education), but few seek jobs at that age. Beyond these early-
stage assessments, no wide-ranging, fully reliable information exists on 
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Figure 2.3 Analysis of Reading Competency of 15-Year-Old Students on 
the PISA 2009 
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2008. See “Abbreviations” for a key to country abbreviations. 
student competencies. The information that is available includes basic 
cognitive skills but not behavioral skills, referring to such issues as team-
work and attitudes toward the job, which are increasingly sought after by 
employers. For policy makers to better understand the causes of the 
emerging skills bottleneck—and how to address it—this information 
deficit needs to be closed.
In addition to the data gaps, there are clear signs that ECA’s educa-
tion systems are facing problems related to quality, which are likely to 
be part of the reason why firms are complaining about declining skills. 
One problem is that too many students in the ECA region are simply not 
learning what firms increasingly need. Compared to OECD countries, 
for example, ECA countries have a much larger proportion of students 
who fail to acquire even the most basic skills. One measure of the mag-
nitude of this problem is the proportion of 15-year-olds who scored at 
or below Level 1 on the reading part of PISA 2009 (see figure 2.4). In 
the Kyrgyz Republic, 83 percent of students scored at this low level; in 
Serbia, the proportion was 32.3 percent. 
These students may not be failing according to national guidelines 
(and tests) for the competencies that a 15-year-old is expected to acquire, 
but their low scores on this assessment indicate serious deficiencies in 
their ability to use reading literacy as a tool to acquire knowledge and 
skills in other areas—an important competency needed to work in the 
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global economy. Similar weaknesses can be observed when looking at the 
share of 15-year-olds exhibiting serious problems with numeracy skills 
(e.g., see box 2.3 on Turkey). Consequently, these students may experi-
ence difficulties if they continue past secondary school and, of perhaps 
greater concern, when they attempt to enter the modern workforce. It is 
thus likely that when firms complain about workers not having the right 
skills, they are, in part, complaining about the fact that too many students 
simply did not learn enough during compulsory education.
Another reason why employers perceive a skills shortage may be that 
ECA education systems are successful in imparting basic skills, but less 
successful in imparting problem-solving skills. For example, it can be 
reasonably interpreted from the discrepancy in students’ performance on 
the PIRLS and the PISA reading assessments (see figures 2.2 and 2.3, 
Box 2.2 
Testing for Reading Competency in the Programme 
for International Student Assessment (PISA)
It is important to understand what is meant by competencies in the context of 
reading. In PISA, “reading literacy” is defined as understanding, using, and reflecting 
on written texts in order to achieve one’s goals, develop one’s knowledge and 
potential, and participate in society (OECD 2007a, 284). This definition goes beyond 
the traditional notion of decoding information and a literal interpretation of what 
is written towards more applied tasks. Reading scores in all PISA cycles are reported 
according to five levels of proficiency, corresponding to tasks of varying difficulty, 
making it possible not only to rank students’ performance but also to describe 
what students can do. Each successive reading level is associated with tasks of 
ascending difficulty. Students scoring below 355 points, that is, those who do not 
reach Level 1, are not able to routinely show the most basic reading skills that PISA 
seeks to measure. 
While such performance should not be interpreted to mean that these stu-
dents have no literacy skills, performance below Level 1 does signal serious defi-
ciencies in students’ ability to use reading literacy as a tool for the acquisition of 
knowledge and skills in other areas—an important competency. These students 
may therefore be at risk not only of difficulties in their initial transition from educa-
tion to work, but may fail to benefit from further education and learning oppor-
tunities throughout life. 
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Box 2.3 
Turkey: Many Students Fail to Acquire Even the 
Most Basic Proficiencies
Learning outcomes are vastly uneven across different types of schools in Turkey, 
resulting in lifelong inequities for students, depending on the location of their 
schools. While roughly one-third of 15-year-olds in the country had test scores 
in mathematics on the PISA 2006 that were above the OECD average of 500, 
nearly 50 percent of students achieved only the most basic proficiency (i.e., they 
scored below 420). Equivalent disparities were found with respect to reading 
and science.
Figure B2.3 Distribution of PISA 2006 Math Scores by Type of School 
in Turkey
Source: World Bank 2011a. 
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Well-performing students in Turkey are located in a handful of specialized 
(elite) schools across the country (science high schools, high schools with inten-
sive foreign language training, and Anatolian high schools). Access to these types 
of schools, which have better teaching and learning conditions, is controlled by 
examination and highly correlated with the income and wealth of students’ 
 families. One in two students in science high schools and one in three students 
(continued next page)
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respectively) that most ECA countries do well in teaching children to 
“learn to read” but less well in teaching them to “read to learn.” These 
conclusions are tentative in nature because comparing PIRLS and PISA 
test results is not straightforward, in that PIRLS tests fourth-graders, 
while PISA assesses 15-year-olds. Nevertheless, one reasonable interpre-
tation from the discrepancy in their performance on these two tests is 
that ECA countries do not impart advanced competencies to students as 
well as they impart basic reading skills. 
As a result, 15-year-olds in the ECA region may be able to read pro-
ficiently, but not adequately enough to access, store, and utilize informa-
tion from that reading, which can be described as functional literacy. An 
underlying reason for this underperformance may be that education 
systems in the region continue to place too much emphasis on convey-
ing facts and knowledge, instead of teaching problem solving and critical 
thinking (see box 2.4 on Russia). Yet it is exactly these latter skills that 
more and more firms seem to be seeking. 
in the other two types of high schools belong to the richest 20 percent of house-
holds in the country. These asymmetries in access to different types of public 
schools, and the variable quality of education that these schools provide, consti-
tute a formidable barrier to improving the quality of education for all in Turkey. 
International evidence shows that very selective systems that track students at an 
early age, such as the Turkish system, not only significantly increase educational 
inequality, but also reduce a country’s average educational performance 
(Hanushek and Wößmann 2008).
On a positive note, Turkish students did significantly better on the PISA 2009 
test (compared to their performance in 2006) in all tested areas: science, reading, 
and math. This improvement may be a first indication that recent reforms, most 
notably the 2004 reform in the primary school curricula—which moved to a stu-
dent-centered, constructivist approach—may have started to pay off. Despite the 
improvements, though, a significant proportion of 15-year-olds (25 percent in 
reading, 30 percent in math, and 42 percent in science) in Turkey continue to 
perform below even the most basic proficiency levels. It is critical to remember, 
moreover, that the PISA results represent only the 57 percent of 15-year-olds who 
are still in the educational system.
Source: PISA 2009 Database; World Bank forthcoming. 
Box 2.3 (continued)
SNJD.indb   58 9/27/11   10:10:36 PM
Education and the Supply of Skills to the ECA Market        59
An additional problem may be that ECA countries are not good at 
imparting skills that are in demand but not being tested. For instance, 
behavioral skills (discussed in chapter 1) are consistently being demanded 
by employers but are apparently not well provided by ECA education 
systems. The extent to which they are struggling on this front is difficult 
to quantify, however, since tests such as PISA do not measure these skills 
(or, for that matter, other skills in high demand, such as knowledge of 
information technology or a foreign language).
Box 2.4 
Russia: Building Higher-Order Skills Is Proving Difficult
Russian students perform relatively well on the knowledge, or factual, dimension 
of international learning assessments. For example, Russia was the top-ranked 
country on PIRLS 2006, a test of the reading achievement of grade 4 students. 
Russian students were also relatively highly ranked on TIMSS 2007, a curriculum-
based test of math and science achievement of 4th and 8th graders. By way of 
contrast, Russian students did relatively poorly on the PISA 2006, which tests a 
student’s ability to use knowledge and thinking skills to solve complex problems 
in real-world situations. Indeed, detailed analysis of TIMSS results shows that the 
scores of Russian students on factual knowledge were significantly higher than 
their scores on reasoning using this knowledge.
These results suggest that the traditional strength of the Russian education 
system is in conveying facts or knowledge or both, not problem solving or critical 
thinking skills. A recent detailed analysis (Tumeneva 2006) shows that the Russian 
curriculum still reflects deep traditions of the Soviet curriculum, focusing more on 
systematic academic knowledge and less on the application of this knowledge, 
or critical reasoning. Russian textbooks, for example, typically use texts that are 
preselected to illustrate specific ideas or themes; Russian pedagogy does not 
require students to work with real-world situations or original texts. The recent 
introduction of a school-leaving exam, which also serves as a centralized univer-
sity entrance examination, has strengthened this orientation. The test places a 
heavy emphasis on factual knowledge, which encourages teachers and students 
to memorize answers.
These weaknesses in the Russian curriculum and pedagogy were widely 
discussed after the results of the PISA 2000 were published, which showed 
(continued next page)
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As noted earlier, where it is measured, educational quality in the region 
has not consistently improved over the past decade in many ECA coun-
tries. Only a few countries have managed to improve their test results on 
all international tests since 1995 (see annex 2A, table 2A.2). The results 
of four countries (Bulgaria, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, 
the Czech Republic, and Croatia) suggest that the quality of education 
has deteriorated over time, while the majority of ECA countries have 
mixed results (some of their test results show improvement over time, 
while others show deteriorating results). Three countries—Turkey, Latvia, 
and Poland—show steady improvement across all tests and over time. 
Moreover, three latecomers to international testing—Serbia, Armenia, and 
the Kyrgyz Republic—show improvement over a shorter time horizon 
(Serbia and Armenia first participated in international assessments in 
2003; the Kyrgyz Republic, in 2006). However, PISA 2009 brought some 
positive news: several ECA countries (including Bulgaria, Romania, 
Serbia, the Kyrgyz Republic, and Turkey) showed large improvements 
from their 2006 results.
Moreover, indirect evidence suggests that the quality of upper second-
ary and tertiary education also may not be improving. Unfortunately, 
there is no equivalent of the PISA, TIMSS, or PIRLS for upper secondary 
relatively poor performance by Russian students on higher-order skills. The 
Ministry of  Education and Science subsequently led two efforts to develop more 
“competency-based” standards. Slowly, these efforts have started to show results. 
Significant improvements in student scores on TIMSS and PIRLS have been 
observed over time, and for the first time Russian students showed improve-
ments in PISA in 2009. Still, the 2009 score (in reading) was below the score 
obtained by Russian students in 2000. Even on PIRLS, the biggest improvements 
in student scores relate to factual content (Kouznetsova 2009). 
Many educators in Russia believe that the school-leaving exam needs to be 
changed to emphasize problem solving and critical thinking skills. This would 
encourage further changes in standards, teaching, and assessments at the school 
level. Changes are also needed at the higher education level, which currently pro-
motes narrow specializations over transferrable skills and key competencies.
Source: World Bank staff assessment, based on ongoing research by the State University Higher School 
of  Economics, Moscow.
Box 2.4 (continued)
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or higher education which would enable objective comparisons of the 
quality of student competencies across countries and across time. 
Moreover, no ECA country has yet put in place a monitoring system to 
track the employment and wage outcomes of recent graduates in order to 
assess their employability and the relevance of their education.4 This lack 
of data makes it impossible to draw firm conclusions about the quality of 
upper secondary and tertiary education. Instead, this book looks at indi-
rect evidence to make inferences. 
Limited improvements on international assessments at the end of 
lower secondary education (PISA and TIMSS) imply only limited 
improvements in the quality of upper secondary education (a finding 
that will persist unless upper secondary institutions can make up for the 
declining competencies of incoming students). One factor, however, may 
have helped improve upper secondary education: fewer students are 
enrolled in terminal vocational schools where, in many ECA countries, 
the quality of schooling has historically varied a great deal. As the expe-
rience of Poland shows (see box 4.2), providing students with further 
general secondary education instead of terminal vocation programs, 
which can have a big impact on providing them the types of competen-
cies measured by international assessments.
The fact that the quality of compulsory education has not been reli-
ably improving is discussed further in chapter 3. Here, it suffices to note 
that whatever policy measures have been tried in the past approximately 
15 years (the period for which international test results are available) 
have not worked consistently to improve learning outcomes. Most trou-
bling, the shift to smaller classes and smaller student-teacher ratios 
(documented in chapter 3) and the consequent increase in per student 
spending do not seem to be delivering better learning outcomes.
At the tertiary level, the indirect evidence is again not encouraging. It 
seems probable that the rapid expansion of tertiary education (see fig-
ure 2.1) has resulted in poorer-quality education for a number of reasons. 
To begin with, this expansion took place during a period when few coun-
tries had operational quality assurance agencies. When these agencies 
finally became operational, several acted swiftly to point out the wide-
spread noncompliance of many new institutions of higher learning with 
even minimum quality standards (see chapter 5). Moreover, the new 
“mass” nature of tertiary education meant that less qualified students 
continued to study. As noted earlier, when as many as a third of students 
at the age of 15 are functionally illiterate in Serbia (according to the 2009 
PISA results), such students will unquestionably not graduate with the 
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same level of proficiency from tertiary education as did the smaller, more 
qualified university cohorts of the past. 
In addition, a great deal of the expansion of tertiary education has 
occurred in new institutions whose short-term motives may be driven more 
by profits than a need to guard their institutional reputations. Although 
private, profit-based tertiary education providers can create a more flexible, 
responsive university system (see chapter 5), there are signs of persistent 
problems in this sector, including mounting quantitative (as well as anec-
dotal) evidence of fraud, corruption, and unethical behavior—the scope of 
which is extensive—raising doubts about its capacity to ensure that stu-
dents graduate with the requisite skills (and not just diplomas). For example, 
a recent survey of university students in several ECA countries found that 
more than 60 percent of respondents knew other students who had pur-
chased either entrance to the university or a specific grade (see figure 2.5). 
Finally, a large part of the expansion of tertiary education took place 
in part-time (or weekend) and long-distance learning programs. The 
format of these programs was new and their quality unknown. In 2009, 
for example, half of Poland’s undergraduate students were enrolled in 
weekend programs. In Romania in the same year, 42 percent of students 
were enrolled in private universities, 66 percent of whom were part-time 
or long-distance students. It is impossible to determine whether these 
Figure 2.5 Students Aware of Bribery for Grade or Exam in their Faculty
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students are receiving the same quality education as their peers in full-
time, regular programs. 
Students May Not Be Acquiring the Right Skills
It is not only probable that the quality of graduates’ problem-solving and 
behavioral skills are inadequate, but students at both the secondary and 
tertiary levels may also be graduating with the wrong set of skills. At the 
secondary level, for example, the collapse of vocational schools may have 
been too abrupt, stripping students of a viable option to obtain technical 
skills that are in strong demand. At the tertiary level, too many students 
may be enrolling in low-cost programs (that is, the only programs avail-
able to them), rather than programs that would meet current and future 
employer needs.
Vocational school systems in the ECA region rapidly declined in the 
early years of transition for a number of reasons, as students fled from 
these schools in large numbers (see box 2.5 for a brief history of the 
vocational school system in the region.) This decline happened in virtu-
ally all ECA countries (see figure 2.6), with the noticeable exceptions of 
Uzbekistan, Serbia, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Moldova, and Turkey. In 
some countries—Belarus and Armenia, for instance—vocational school 
systems have become virtually nonexistent. 
Students abandoned vocational schools because these schools failed 
to adjust to new realities. Nevertheless, there is evidence to suggest that 
firms still seem to want vocational and technical skills. For instance, as 
mentioned in chapter 1, students who finish school with vocational or 
technical skills—especially in middle-income CIS countries—are less 
likely to end up unemployed than students with only a general second-
ary education (Turkey being an exception). This finding has been cor-
roborated by recent surveys of graduates regarding the school-to-work 
transition in Serbia and Ukraine (the two only countries where such 
surveys have been conducted). As table 2.1 shows, it seems easier for 
students who have technical or vocational training to transition into a 
job than for those who have only a general education. In Serbia, one-
third of graduates of a three-year vocational training course find their 
first job within six months, compared with only one-fourth of gradu-
ates of general secondary schools. In Ukraine, less than 30 percent of 
graduates of secondary technical schools look for their first job for 
more than a year, compared to 44 percent of graduates of general sec-
ondary schools.5
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Box 2.5 
The History of Vocational Education in the ECA Region
Historically, secondary education has been heavily weighted in favor of voca-
tional training in the ECA region. The former planned economies entered the 
transition with a very high percentage of upper secondary school students 
enrolled in vocational programs—averaging 61.3 percent of all such students in 
1989 (see figure B2.5 below). Most of these programs were terminal, that is, they 
did not provide students access to higher education. Most also involved applied 
training in nearby public enterprises, which typically recruited many program 
graduates. The most highly vocationalized programs were in Central and Eastern 
Europe, where the average share of vocational secondary school students was 
over 70 percent. In Turkey, the single nontransition country in the ECA region, 
secondary education also has a strong vocational focus, with programs patterned 
after the German dual-system model.
Source: UIS (UNESCO Institute for Statistics). 
Note: Percentages represent averages for those countries for which data was available.
Figure B2.5 Global Comparison of Average Vocational Enrollment of 
Upper Secondary Students by Region, 1989, 1999, and 2007
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The inherited vocational focus of secondary education in ECA countries 
reflects the incentives of planned economies and the strong linkages that such 
economies forged between training institutions and state-owned enterprises. 
Since general secondary education was seen primarily as a preparation for higher 
education, enrollments in this track were limited to the few students who were 
expected to progress to university.
Vocational education in the previous system was thus the primary means of 
training workers for specific jobs in public enterprises. These enterprises typically 
contributed to the curriculum design of vocational education programs, provided 
instructors and facilities for practical training, and recruited many graduates, often 
for lifetime jobs. Labor hoarding proved an effective approach for ensuring that 
enterprises could meet planned production quotas.
Economic transition has brought new requirements that necessitate wide-
spread changes in vocational education programs, but shrinking budgets have 
made it hard to carry out these changes, particularly the hiring of instructors and 
curriculum designers with needed skills. The move to a competitive market econ-
omy has also profoundly changed the setting in which firms operate—hard bud-
get constraints and falling sales have put an end to labor hoarding and created 
widespread unemployment. These conditions have made it impossible for most 
enterprises to continue to offer training to vocational school students.
Source: Authors.
In sum, the quality and relevance of vocational education in the ECA 
region appear to be deteriorating at the same time that firms are increas-
ing their demands for higher-level technical skills.
Adult Learning Is Limited in the Region
Demographic trends in the ECA region imply that young people entering 
the job market directly from the formal schooling sector make up a 
smaller proportion of the workforce today than just 10 or 20 years ago, a 
trend that will continue. When firms complain of a skills shortage, they are 
not referring solely to the quality of new labor market entrants; they are 
also indicating that the skills they need cannot be found among all workers 
in the economy. Given the aging of the population in many countries, it 
Box 2.5 (continued)
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will become increasingly important to ensure that all workers—not just 
those recently out of school—continue to upgrade their skills. 
As much as one-half of the skills and knowledge that an individual 
accumulates over his or her lifetime is gained during the period after 
formal schooling (Heckman 1999). A large international literature docu-
mented by empirical evidence—largely for OECD countries—shows that 
adult education and training advances labor market outcomes, including 
higher wages and employment. This type of training also has a strong 
positive effect on productivity and a high internal rate of return (see, for 
example, OECD 2004a and Dearden, Reed, and van Reenen 2000). 
Significant evidence from countries around the world also documents 
that market failures tend to lead to underinvestment in adult education 
and training on the part of both individuals and firms; here, the countries 
of ECA are no exception (see chapter 6).
Table 2.1 Time Needed to Find First Job by Level of Educational Attainment 
in Serbia and Ukraine
(percent)
a. Serbia
 Primary
Secondary 
trade
Secondary 
vocational
Secondary 
general College University
No search 7.0 5.7 4.7 9.6 7.7 11.7
1–3 months 22.0 25.7 22.3 19.2 23.1 26.0
4–6 months 8.4 7.5 7.2 6.7 9.1 12.8
7–12 months 10.6 10.8 12.4 8.7 18.0 9.4
1–2 yrs 15.0 15.2 19.5 8.4 13.2 21.6
> 2 yrs 37.0 35.1 33.9 47.3 29.0 18.4
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100
Source: Huitfeldt, Johansen, and Kogan 2008.
b. Ukraine
 
Less than 
secondary
Secondary 
vocational
Secondary 
general
Junior 
specialist University
No search 0.9 7.3 4.8 9.0 26.6
1–3 months 32.7 49.5 31.4 58.2 44.4
4–6 months 6.7 7.6 10.5 7.4 8.4
7–12 months 7.5 6.9 9.6 6.1 5.2
1–2 yrs 5.2 11.8 9.1 4.5 5.4
> 2 yrs 47.0 16.9 34.7 14.7 10.0
Total 100 100 100 100 100
Source: Huitfeldt, Johansen, and Kogan 2008.
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In fact, many countries in the ECA region have not yet begun to ade-
quately promote adult learning as a means of addressing the current skills 
deficit and improving worker productivity in the face of declining demo-
graphics. Although a substantial share of workers participate in adult 
education and training programs in several ECA countries, the percent-
ages vary across the region. Even in countries that have relatively high 
availability of continuing vocational education and training programs, the 
people who take part in these programs tend to be already skilled  workers, 
rather than nonskilled and “nonproductive” workers. Finally, it seems that 
in many ECA countries, programs to help retrain or reskill the unem-
ployed only reach a few of the unemployed. 
Adult learning programs (see box 2.6) have remained a blind spot in 
education and training policy across much of the ECA region. A key 
component of the socialist production process, worker training has under-
gone substantial changes as a result of the transition to market economies. 
Under communism, such training focused exclusively on continuing 
vocational training of the employed workforce. With the exception of 
socialist Yugoslavia, unemployment in these countries was nonexistent by 
definition, hence adult education and training of the unemployed was not 
a feature of their education and training systems.
Partly, adult education and training remains a blind spot in the region 
because remarkably few data on the sector are available. While several 
OECD countries have been conducting national surveys of adult train-
ing in firms for many years, such surveys have not been comparative 
across countries and data for ECA countries is sparse. Even OECD 
countries focus on the quantity of this learning (i.e., number of partici-
pants, hours of learning), not its quality and relevance. For the ECA 
region as a whole, the 2005 and 2008 Business Environment and 
Enterprise Performance Surveys (BEEPS 2005, 2008) included some 
limited questions on adult training by firm size and some degree of 
worker characteristics; however, problems relating to cross-country 
comparability make it difficult to reach solid conclusions. In the EU, the 
firm-based Continuing Vocational Training Surveys (CVTS) of 1999 
and 2005, which offer information on worker training, and the Adult 
Education Survey (AES) of 2007, which offers data on individual par-
ticipation in formal or nonformal education and training, are the first 
surveys that permitted cross-country analysis of adult education and 
training patterns. Both included a number of ECA countries and serve 
as the basis of much of the analysis in this book. The data used here, 
therefore, center disproportionately on the EU10+1. 
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Box 2.6 
Two Forms of Adult Learning
Two categories of adult education and training are addressed in this report; both 
categories aim at adults between 25 and 64 years of age (for further discussion, 
including on the financing of adult education and training, see chapter 6):
Continuing Vocational Education and Training (CVET). These programs are aimed 
at people who are currently employed. First, they offer in-service training designed 
to aid employees in acquiring new competencies or improving existing ones rel-
evant to their firms’ operations. In-service training plays a critical role in increasing 
the human capital of the existing workforce, addressing skills depletion, and keep-
ing older workers productive for longer, as well as alleviating skills mismatches. 
Second, these programs offer education and training to individuals who seek to 
develop skills that will raise their chances of moving to a better job (that is, educa-
tion and training not related to their current job).
Retraining and remedial basic skills training (“second-chance” education). This 
type of training aims at the nonemployed, that is, the unemployed and people 
outside the labor force who face skills-related barriers to employment. In many 
ECA countries, high percentages of the population continue to lack basic skills as 
a result of leaving school early or poor learning achievement. Most ECA countries 
provide training as part of active labor market programs and there is reason to 
believe that well-designed programs can have positive economic returns 
 (Betcherman, Olivas, and Dar 2004). In addition, “second-chance” education pro-
grams address (basic) skills shortages, including literacy, in order to help youths 
and adults access the labor market and further their education and training.
ECA Lags Behind West European Countries in 
Continuing Education and Training
Today, the provision of continuing vocational education and training 
(CVET) in firms varies considerably across the ECA region. Figure 2.7 
presents data from the 2008 BEEPS survey in ECA countries, showing 
the share of manufacturing firms that offered formal training programs to 
full-time employees. The variation is wide between the Czech Republic 
and Estonia, where about 70 percent of firms provide such training, and 
Azerbaijan, where only about 10 percent do. With few exceptions, the 
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distribution broadly follows a GDP per capita pattern, with low-income 
CIS countries on one side and advanced EU10+1 countries on the other.
Independent of the data source, the Czech Republic, Slovenia, Estonia, 
and the Slovak Republic appear to lead the ECA region in adult education 
and training. Many low-income CIS countries occupy the bottom end of 
the distribution, with the bulk of South Eastern European and middle-
income CIS countries in between. However, there are some surprises at 
both the top and bottom end of the distribution. Bosnia and Herzegovina 
is in the top half, among EU10+1 countries, while Hungary, Romania, and 
Bulgaria—despite EU membership—are in the bottom half.
Data from the 2005 CVTS show that more workers in the Czech 
Republic and Slovenia participate in training proportionately than else-
where in the EU (see figure 2.8, panel a). Interestingly, results in countries 
that are thought to be similar, such as the Baltic states, can differ signifi-
cantly. For example, Estonia shows consistently higher training participa-
tion than Lithuania and Latvia. Individual-level data from the 2007 AES 
confirm this picture (figure 2.8, panel b).
However, several country studies have shown that while the share of 
firms that offer training may be high in many ECA countries, the share of 
actual workers who participate in training is relatively low and the hours 
of training are limited. A recent enterprise survey in Russia, for example, 
revealed that while 58 percent of firms in a pooled sample of small, 
medium, and large firms conducted training, only 7.7 percent of skilled 
and 1.4 percent of unskilled workers actually participated in the training 
(Tan et al. 2007).6 
Figure 2.9 (panel a) presents the percentage of EU workers participat-
ing in (rather than firms offering) continuing vocational training in those 
firms that offer training. In the Czech Republic, close to 70 percent of 
workers in firms that offer continuing vocational training participate in 
training activities, whereas the equivalent share in Hungary is less than 25 
percent. Moreover, panel b shows that with the exception of the Czech 
Republic, the Slovak Republic,  and Slovenia, workers in the EU10 coun-
tries of the ECA region participate in such training for fewer hours than 
their EU peers. This implies that the productivity effects of worker train-
ing may be lower in ECA countries than in Western European countries 
(although obviously the productivity effect also depends on the quality 
and relevance of the training, which is not captured here). 
Compared to other countries around the world, the ECA region fares 
similarly in terms of uneven participation in CVET, which is concen-
trated among workers with the best labor market opportunities. According 
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to BEEPS 2005 data, skilled workers in all ECA countries are more likely 
to participate in education and training than other workers in the same 
firm. Figure 2.10 shows that overall, firm-based worker training data 
mask substantial differences in training rates between skilled labor on 
one hand and nonskilled and so-called nonproductive workers on the 
other, with the latter two groups having a lower (sometimes much 
lower) participation rate than that of skilled workers. This finding is 
Figure 2.8 Employee- and Firm-level Data on Worker Participation in CVET 
Courses, EU10 and other EU Member States
(percent)
a. Percentage of employees of all enterprises who participate in CVET, 2005
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Source: World Bank staff calculations based on CVTS 2005 (a) and AES 2007 (b). 
Note: See “Abbreviations” for a key to country abbreviations and groupings.
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consistent with the patterns of adult education and training around 
the world. 
The extent of worker training also varies between large and small 
firms, with the variation generally larger in ECA countries than in EU 
countries that have highly developed economies. Large firms worldwide 
are substantially more likely to invest in worker training than small firms. 
This tendency may provide one explanation for the relatively lower adult 
training rates in many ECA countries compared to EU countries with 
more advanced economies: in the former, the enterprise sector consists 
primarily of small firms—the very kind that are less likely to make train-
ing available.
Figure 2.9 Training Length and Percentage of Employees Participating in CVET 
Courses, EU10 and EU27
(percent)
a. Percentage of employees participating in CVET courses
in enterprises that offer training, 2005
b. Hours in CVET courses per
employee (all enterprises), 2005
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Figure 2.11 (panel a) presents 2005 BEEPS data that confirm the 
internationally well-established fact that large firms provide more  training 
than small firms. The bottom panel presents data from the 2005 CVTS 
on the best- and worst-performing ECA countries on this measure—the 
Czech Republic and Bulgaria, respectively—and compares this data with 
the best-performing EU country in the CVTS sample, the United 
Kingdom. In Bulgaria and the Czech Republic, there is a wide gap in the 
share of companies that offer training between small and large enter-
prises, although at different levels, while the United Kingdom shows little 
divergence between small and large firms.
Very Limited Training Programs for the Unemployed
Although retraining, if well designed, can be important for promoting 
employment, the actual use of this intervention for the unemployed in 
many parts of ECA appears limited. The introduction of passive and 
active employment policies in ECA at the start of the transition gave 
priority to interventions that retrained and prequalified workers who had 
lost their jobs as part of privatization and enterprise restructuring. Today, 
retraining programs are a well-established component of active labor 
market policies (ALMPs) throughout the ECA region. While there is no 
comparative data across the entire region, table 2.2 shows that training 
participants represent sizable shares of overall ALMP participants in the 
EU10 countries, in some cases, over 50 percent (similar to the EU27 aver-
age). However, not all unemployed participate in ALMPs, and training 
actually reaches few unemployed overall in EU10 countries compared to 
the EU27 average, with the exception of Slovenia.  
Moreover, it appears that “second-chance” education programs form 
a relatively small part of the adult education and training system in 
many ECA countries. These programs are a key tool for helping early 
dropouts and workers who have lost their jobs in mid-career improve 
their skills and re-enter the labor market. There is currently no ECA-
wide, individual-level data that would allow for a breakdown of par-
ticipation in second-chance programs by worker characteristics. 
However, 2007 AES data show that EU10 countries appear to have 
fewer individuals with lower schooling levels in adult education and 
training programs than do most older member states (see figure 2.12, 
panel a). The EU10 also appear to have substantially fewer inactive 
workers and unemployed workers participating in nonformal education 
and training programs than most of their EU neighbors (see figure 2.12, 
panel b). 
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Figure 2.11 Large and Small Firms that Offer Training to Skilled Employees, 
ECA, EU, and United Kingdom, 2005
(percent)
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Indeed, anecdotal evidence suggests that remedial basic education 
and training represent a small share of the retraining programs of pub-
lic employment services in these countries. (Such programs are often 
coupled with nongovernmental organization [NGO]-provided social 
inclusion activities). However, several new EU member states have 
launched second-chance education and training programs, including 
components on literacy and functional literacy, as part of programs 
funded by the European Social Fund.
Summary 
This chapter has sought to understand why employers in the ECA region 
increasingly complain of a skills shortage despite high levels of educa-
tional attainment, respectable educational quality, and booming tertiary 
enrollments in ECA countries. Although the arguments presented here 
can necessarily be based only on the data currently available, the findings 
nevertheless point to problems with the limited quality and relevance of 
education as contributing sources of the skills deficit. Graduates of upper 
secondary and tertiary education appear to either not be learning enough 
while in school or acquiring skills that are not in demand on the labor 
market. In addition, the decline of vocational schools at the upper sec-
ondary level may have intensified the skills shortage. 
Table 2.2 Training Participants as Share of Participants in Active Labor Market 
 Policies and of Total Unemployed, EU27 and EU10, 2006
 
Training participants as 
% of ALMP participants
Training participants as 
% of total unemployed
EU27 33.6 19.8
Bulgaria 10.9 3.8
Czech Republic 12.6 2.0
Estonia 58.4 2.8
Latvia 52.3 6.3
Lithuania 41.0 7.9
Hungary 19.9 4.4
Poland 21.8 4.2
Romania 18.0 2.1
Slovenia 56.8 19.7
Slovak Republic  1.6 0.6
Source: World Bank staff calculations based on LFS database (Eurostat).
SNJD.indb   77 9/27/11   10:10:43 PM
78       Skills, Not Just Diplomas
Figure 2.12 Adult Education and Training Program Participants in EU, 2007
a. Participants by education level
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International learning assessments show that education systems in the 
ECA region are successful in imparting basic skills, but less successful in 
imparting the higher-order skills sought by employers. These systems 
continue to place too much emphasis on conveying facts and knowledge, 
instead of problem solving and critical thinking. The respectable average 
performance of ECA countries on international assessments, moreover, 
masks a long tail of underperformers: 15-year-olds who have such poor 
numeracy and literacy skills that their success in the modern workplace 
is highly doubtful. 
The quality of education in ECA countries, particularly at the lower 
levels, is good compared to countries at the same income level, but unfor-
tunately, this quality is not improving. In fact, it appears to be worsening 
at the lower secondary level in many countries, as seen in the stagnant or 
deteriorating scores of ECA countries on international assessments at this 
stage. At the upper secondary and tertiary levels, educational quality is 
less known. Because the tertiary sector expanded significantly without (in 
many—though not all—countries) strong quality assurance programs and 
information that parents and students need to make informed choices, 
the quality of many university degrees is suspect. Qualitative evidence, 
moreover, highlights significant unethical behavior in university admit-
tance, grading, and graduation policies. 
Underdeveloped adult learning systems in the region threatens to 
cement the skills deficit in the region. Given that the populations of 
many ECA countries are declining, the need to retrain and reskill adult 
workers—as well as to train unemployed workers—is becoming impera-
tive. Yet many countries in the region have only begun to lay the ground-
work for modern systems of adult learning.
In sum, education systems in the region impart excellent founda-
tional skills, but falter at the secondary level, when students need to 
acquire the more advanced competencies needed to work in modern, 
globalized economies. Despite rapid expansion, the tertiary sector does 
not yet appear to be delivering the skills sought by employers, and adults 
have very limited educational opportunities to retrain or improve exist-
ing skills. 
The next chapter takes a detailed look at the sources of the underper-
formance of ECA education systems and offers a framework for how to 
reform these systems in order to enhance educational quality and rele-
vance. Subsequent chapters then explore recommendations for improv-
ing specific levels of the education system, including continuing adult 
education and training.
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Annex 2A: Education Systems in ECA Today
Table 2A.1 Duration of Education in ECA Countries, Various Years
  1991 2000 2006
Albania Primary school starting age 6 6 6
 Primary duration 8 4 4
 Lower secondary duration .. 4 4
 Upper secondary duration .. 4 4
 Compulsory years — 8 8
 Age after compulsory education 14 14
Armenia Primary school starting age 7 7 7
 Primary duration 3 3 3
 Lower secondary duration 5 5 5
 Upper secondary duration 2 2 2
 Compulsory years — 8 8
 Age after compulsory education — 15 15
Azerbaijan Primary school starting age 7 6 6
 Primary duration 3 4 4
 Lower secondary duration 5 5 5
 Upper secondary duration 2 2 2
 Compulsory years — 11 11
 Age after compulsory education — 17 17
Belarus Primary school starting age 6 6 6
 Primary duration 4 4 4
 Lower secondary duration 5 5 5
 Upper secondary duration 2 2 2
 Compulsory years — 9 10
 Age after compulsory education — 15 16
Bosnia and Herzegovina Primary school starting age 7 6 6
 Primary duration 4 4 4
 Lower secondary duration 4 4 4
 Upper secondary duration 4 4 4
 Compulsory years — .. ..
 Age after compulsory education — — —
Bulgaria Primary school starting age 6 7 7
 Primary duration 8 4 4
 Lower secondary duration .. 4 4
 Upper secondary duration .. 3 3
 Compulsory years — 8 8
 Age after compulsory education — 15 15
Croatia Primary school starting age 7 7 7
 Primary duration 8 4 4
(continued next page)
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 Lower secondary duration .. 4 4
 Upper secondary duration .. 4 4
 Compulsory years — 8 8
 Age after compulsory education — 15 15
Czech Republic Primary school starting age 6 6 6
 Primary duration 4 5 5
 Lower secondary duration 4 4 4
 Upper secondary duration 4 4 4
 Compulsory years — 10 10
 Age after compulsory education — 16 16
Estonia Primary school starting age 7 7 7
 Primary duration 5 6 6
 Lower secondary duration 3 3 3
 Upper secondary duration 3 3 3
 Compulsory years — 9 9
 Age after compulsory education — 16 16
Georgia Primary school starting age 6 6 6
 Primary duration 4 4 6
 Lower secondary duration 5 5 3
 Upper secondary duration 2 2 2
 Compulsory years — 9 9
 Age after compulsory education — 15 15
Hungary Primary school starting age 6 7 7
 Primary duration 8 4 4
 Lower secondary duration .. 4 4
 Upper secondary duration .. 4 4
 Compulsory years — 10 10
 Age after compulsory education — 17 17
Kazakhstan Primary school starting age 7 7 7
 Primary duration 4 4 4
 Lower secondary duration 5 5 5
 Upper secondary duration 2 2 2
 Compulsory years — 11 11
 Age after compulsory education — 18 18
Kyrgyz Republic Primary school starting age 7 7 7
 Primary duration 3 4 4
 Lower secondary duration 5 5 5
 Upper secondary duration 2 2 2
 Compulsory years — 9 9
 Age after compulsory education — 16 16
(continued next page)
Table 2A.1 (continued)
  1991 2000 2006
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Latvia Primary school starting age 7 7 7
 Primary duration 4 4 4
 Lower secondary duration 5 5 5
 Upper secondary duration 3 3 3
 Compulsory years — 9 9
 Age after compulsory education — 16 16
Lithuania Primary school starting age 7 7 7
 Primary duration 4 4 4
 Lower secondary duration 5 6 6
 Upper secondary duration 3 2 2
 Compulsory years — 9 9
 Age after compulsory education — 16 16
Macedonia, FYR Primary school starting age 7 7 7
 Primary duration 8 4 4
 Lower secondary duration .. 4 4
 Upper secondary duration .. 4 4
 Compulsory years — 8 8
 Age after compulsory education — 15 15
Moldova Primary school starting age 7 7 7
 Primary duration 4 4 4
 Lower secondary duration 5 5 5
 Upper secondary duration 3 2 2
 Compulsory years — 9 9
 Age after compulsory education — 16 16
Montenegro Primary school starting age — — —
 Primary duration — — —
 Lower secondary duration — — —
 Upper secondary duration — — —
 Compulsory years — — —
 Age after compulsory education — — —
Poland Primary school starting age 7 7 7
 Primary duration 8 6 6
 Lower secondary duration — 2 3
 Upper secondary duration — 4 3
 Compulsory years — 9 9
 Age after compulsory education — 16 16
Romania Primary school starting age 6 7 7
 Primary duration 4 4 4
 Lower secondary duration 4 4 4
 Upper secondary duration 4 4 4
 Compulsory years — 8 8
 Age after compulsory education — 15 15
Russian Federation Primary school starting age 7 7 7
 Primary duration 3 3 4
(continued next page)
Table 2A.1 (continued)
  1991 2000 2006
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 Lower secondary duration 5 5 5
 Upper secondary duration 2 2 2
 Compulsory years — 10 10
 Age after compulsory education — 17 17
Serbia Primary school starting age — — —
 Primary duration — — —
 Lower secondary duration — — —
 Upper secondary duration — 4 4
 Compulsory years — 8 8
 Age after compulsory education — — —
Slovak Republic Primary school starting age 6 6 6
 Primary duration 4 4 4
 Lower secondary duration 4 5 5
 Upper secondary duration 4 4 4
 Compulsory years — 10 10
 Age after compulsory education — 16 16
Slovenia Primary school starting age 7 7 6
 Primary duration 4 4 5
 Lower secondary duration 4 4 4
 Upper secondary duration 4 4 4
 Compulsory years — 9 9
 Age after compulsory education — 16 15
Tajikistan Primary school starting age 7 7 7
 Primary duration 4 4 4
 Lower secondary duration — 5 5
 Upper secondary duration — 2 2
 Compulsory years — 9 9
 Age after compulsory education — 16 16
Turkey Primary school starting age 6 6 6
 Primary duration 5 6 6
 Lower secondary duration 3 2 2
 Upper secondary duration 3 3 3
 Compulsory years — 9 9
 Age after compulsory education — 15 15
Turkmenistan Primary school starting age 7 7 7
 Primary duration 4 3 3
 Lower secondary duration 5 5 5
 Upper secondary duration 2 2 2
 Compulsory years — 9 9
 Age after compulsory education — 16 16
Ukraine Primary school starting age 6 7 6
 Primary duration 6 3 4
 Lower secondary duration 3 5 5
(continued next page)
Table 2A.1 (continued)
  1991 2000 2006
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 Upper secondary duration 2 2 2
 Compulsory years — 11 12
 Age after compulsory education — 18 18
Uzbekistan Primary school starting age 6 7 7
 Primary duration 4 4 4
 Lower secondary duration 5 5 5
 Upper secondary duration 2 2 2
 Compulsory years — 12 12
 Age after compulsory education — 19 19
Source: EdStats Database. 
Note: .. = negligible; — = not available. For all countries, compulsory education includes primary and lower sec-
ondary education, with the exception of the following: Lithuania, where compulsory education includes only 
part of lower secondary; Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and the Russian Federation, where compulsory education also 
includes upper secondary; Belarus, the Czech Republic,  Hungary, the Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Turkey, and 
 Turkmenistan, where compulsory education also includes part of  upper secondary in at least some of the years; 
and Ukraine and Uzbekistan, where the number of compulsory years extends beyond upper secondary 
 education. 
Table 2A.1 (continued)
  1991 2000 2006
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Notes
 1. Along lines similar to the OECD DeSeCo project, the European Qualifications 
Framework for Lifelong Learning identifies eight key competences: (1) com-
munication in the mother tongue; (2) communication in foreign languages; 
(3) mathematical competence and basic competence in science and tech nology; 
(4) digital competence; (5) learning to learn; (6) interpersonal, intercultural, 
and social competences, together with civic competence (7) entrepreneurship; 
and (8) cultural expression. In addition, critical thinking, creativity, initiative 
taking, problem solving, risk assessment, decision making, and managing 
 feelings constructively are seen as playing a role in all eight key competencies 
(EU 2008). The EU framework identifies the essential knowledge, skills, and 
attitudes related to each.
 2. This is a scale metric established by setting the mean scores of participating 
countries to 500 and the standard deviation to 100, thus enabling compari-
sons over time, since all cycles are placed on this metric so that scores are 
equivalent from cycle to cycle. In contrast, the international average, obtained 
by averaging across the mean scores for each of the participating countries, 
needs to be recomputed for each new cycle, based on the set of participating 
countries and changes from cycle to cycle, depending on the set of countries 
taking part.
 3. Income level is used as a rough measure of the quality of all nonschool factors, 
including parental inputs, that help students learn. 
 4. Some ECA countries are making rapid progress in addressing this information 
gap (see chapter 5).
 5.  As noted in chapter 1, footnote 6, care should be taken when comparing 
employment outcomes of vocational vs. general secondary graduates. In par-
ticular, it can be argued that better employment outcomes of workers with 
technical secondary education compared with those of workers with general 
secondary education reflect the different composition of both groups. One 
hypothesis is that due to the selection process, graduates of general secondary 
schools who do not proceed to tertiary education are less able, on average, 
than the graduates of secondary technical schools. 
 6. The higher incidence of training among skilled than among nonskilled work-
ers is consistent with evidence from across ECA and the OECD.
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C H A P T E R  3
Resolving the Skills Shortage in the 
ECA Region: A Policy Framework 
This chapter identifies the major impediments that prevent the educa-
tion system from delivering the skills that are being demanded by the 
labor markets as identified in the previous chapters. It then offers a policy 
framework and policy directions to help overcome these impediments. 
The impediments and a policy framework for addressing them guide the 
discussion of education system reform for the remainder of the book.
Here we argue that the three most pressing problems of ECA educa-
tion systems that get in the way of imparting the needed skills are: 
(1) the lack of data on the skills and competencies that students actually 
acquire as a result of the educational process; (2) the legacy of central 
planning—particularly its effect on the management of education sys-
tems in the region—which makes education systems inflexible and resis-
tant to the initiative of front-line actors (who can actually improve 
education); and (3) the inefficient use of resources, a problem that has 
become particularly acute in the current economic climate. Certainly 
these are not the only impediments to making education systems more 
responsive to skills needs in the region. However, they are common to all 
ECA countries and lie at the heart of addressing the skills deficiencies 
discussed in chapter 2.1 
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The lack of data on student performance, the legacy of central 
 planning, and the inefficient use of resources affect all levels of education 
in the ECA region, but are most apparent at the pre-university level. This 
level is the foundation of the education system in every country and gen-
erally absorbs two-thirds of total education funding in the ECA region. 
The same three impediments affect tertiary education in a slightly differ-
ent way, as this sector has already undergone significant reform over the 
past 20 years, during which time it has doubled or tripled in size in many 
countries (see chapter 5). Because most ECA countries do not yet have 
adult education systems in the modern sense, these impediments cannot 
be fairly characterized as problems of this sector, though the policy 
 recommendations offered in this chapter are applicable to adult educa-
tion also.
To be fair, ECA countries face these impediments to different degrees, 
but none have fully escaped the legacy of central planning, which empha-
sized strict top-down control, compliance with pre-established norms, and 
intensive management involvement in operational details.2 In terms of 
measuring the quality and relevance of education, central planning focused 
on generating data on inputs—that is, checking whether local actors were 
in compliance with detailed norms for all inputs. Yet in terms of whether 
students acquired skills and competencies, these systems operated with 
the lights off—without the information needed—and as a result, educa-
tional spending in the region remains highly inefficient. Today, virtually no 
ECA country has been able to downsize its school network and staff in the 
face of falling student numbers. They are  accordingly stuck with too many 
schools and too many teachers, which absorb resources that could other-
wise be used to improve the quality of  education.
Operating in the Dark: Ministries Know Too Little 
to Effectively Manage the Education Sector
As mentioned in chapter 2, ministries of education across ECA know far 
too little about the nature of the skills shortages in their economies or the 
strengths and weaknesses of their own education systems. As a result, they 
lack an important precondition for effectively managing the sector. Better 
data alone does not make better policies. But operating in the darkness 
makes it impossible to gauge the magnitude of the problems facing policy 
makers. This section describes the current status of educational data and 
policy making in the region, identifying the missing data needed and 
showing how their absence impedes education in the region.
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Educational Data Focus on Diplomas, not Skills
It is a problem worldwide that educational data tend to focus on 
 quantity—for example, the number of enrolled and graduating students—
and not the quality of education. Where international comparative data 
are available, they focus on the quality of primary or lower secondary 
education. Given that the current policy debate in the ECA region focuses 
on “skills,” the lack of data on educational quality is problematic, particu-
larly because very few young people in the region enter the labor market 
with only a lower secondary education. As figure 3.1 shows, most ECA 
students complete at least an upper secondary degree. But with no inter-
national assessment of the skills and competencies of upper secondary or 
tertiary graduates, it is impossible to quantify the gap in competencies 
between recent labor market entrants in, say, Bulgaria and Germany. The 
data that are available today document how many students graduate in a 
particular year, not what they offer employers in terms of competencies. 
Lack of relevant data on students and their individual performance is 
particularly acute in the vocational sector because of the large variety of 
vocational schools in the ECA region and the (likely) heterogeneity of 
their student populations. The tendency of educational data to focus on 
quantity, rather than quality and relevance, is also acute in adult  education 
Figure 3.1 Educational Background of 25–34-year-olds in the ECA Region, 2006
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and training. At best, current surveys in that sector measure the number 
of training hours and courses in which individuals participate, or whether 
a firm offers training. But no international comparative data yet exist to 
compare the quality or relevance of such training. 
Narrow focus and understanding of educational quality. Many ECA 
countries tend to focus on their very best students and equate their 
 performance with “quality education.” Indeed, in discussions about the 
quality of education generally, school principals, local education authori-
ties, and representatives of education ministries often point to particular 
students’ accomplishments at the “Math Olympiads” as examples of how 
well their schools perform. Similarly, university rectors mention how 
many of their graduates manage to pursue further education at top uni-
versities abroad. 
Although it is important to create an environment where excellence 
can flourish, the few high-achieving students should not be the principal 
focus of ECA school systems, nor the criteria by which they measure 
their performance. Whereas the principals of ECA schools know how 
many of their students compete in and win Math Olympiads, they know 
very little about the average performance of their students, and much less 
about the performance of their schools vis-à-vis similar schools elsewhere 
in the country. As a result, policy makers have little information about the 
performance of the weakest students in their schools: students with a dif-
ferent mother tongue, a different ethnic origin, or, simply, from economi-
cally disadvantaged backgrounds. These students are most in need of 
support, yet, across the ECA region very little effort is made to under-
stand how far behind they are and whether existing policies—such as 
small classes, extracurricular activities, or other interventions—are work-
ing. Without relevant data, problem areas go unnoticed, and the effective-
ness of policy interventions cannot be measured. 
A broader understanding of educational performance relies on standard-
ized tests and looks at all students, differentiating their performance by 
external factors (e.g., parental income and socioeconomic background). In 
this view, truly outstanding schools are not necessarily those with the high-
est average score on standardized tests, but rather, schools that, compared 
to their peers, manage to generate the biggest improvements in test scores.
Limited Participation in National and International Assessments
For some countries in the ECA region, information weaknesses are 
 compounded by limited participation in international student learning 
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assessments, such as PISA, PIRLS, and TIMSS. Five ECA countries 
(Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Belarus, and Kosovo) have never 
participated in such an assessment. For these countries, it is impossible 
to assess the quality of even primary and lower secondary education. 
Moreover, three ECA countries have only just begun to participate in such 
assessments.
ECA countries have also been slow to use national standardized assess-
ments to measure and analyze student learning outcomes, largely for 
historical reasons. Prior to 1990, assessing students and granting diplomas 
were left entirely in the hands of teachers and schools. A recent United 
Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) report argues that this approach was 
rooted in the philosophy “that external checks on outcomes were not 
needed in a tightly controlled system of educational inputs and pro-
cesses.” As a result, “attempts in the early 1990s to introduce external 
tests and examinations ran counter to the public mood, which saw them 
as attempts to re-establish central control and undermine professional 
trust in teachers’ judgment” (UNICEF 2007, 58).
Policy makers in ECA countries are recognizing, however, that 
objective, standardized measures of learning outcomes are needed for 
a number of reasons. First, they remain the best indicator available for 
measuring the performance of an education system (Vegas and Petrow 
2008). National and international learning assessments provide policy 
makers a quantitative indicator of learning outcomes that can be 
 compared across schools and across time. These data in turn shed light 
on which policies are working and which need tweaking; they also 
illuminate weaknesses and identify areas where new policies may be 
needed. 
Second, standardized assessments allow students and their parents to 
compare a student’s performance relative to his or her peers, and a 
school’s performance relative to that of other schools. Third, when used 
alongside other indicators of performance, standardized assessments can 
be utilized to hold education managers and teachers accountable for 
results. In a decentralized education system in which local authorities 
play an important role in day-to-day management, such instruments are 
especially important for a central government to identify system needs, 
direct funding where it is most needed, and tailor new policies to support 
schools and local authorities, as needed (see box 3.1).
Limited experience of using data to drive educational policy. Despite 
some progress in developing national learning assessments and 
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 participating in international assessments, no country in the ECA region 
has yet moved from regularly gathering data on learning outcomes 
to using this data to improve policy making. The simple reason is that 
each step along the path shown in figure 3.2 requires time and capacity 
building. Specifically, moving from a culture where little or no data are 
available to a culture where data are gathered, analyzed, disseminated, 
and actively used to inform educational policies requires new skills. 
On a positive note, some countries in the region (primarily the new 
member states of the EU) now have several years’ experience with 
performance measurement, both in terms of establishing their own 
national assessment centers and participating in several rounds of 
international assessments (see figure 3.3). This group of countries is 
gradually adding the capacity to analyze test scores to design better 
policies. However, this book finds that no ECA country has, as of 2010, 
actually reached this stage. Less encouraging, a large number of coun-
tries in the region (mostly the low-income CIS countries, but also 
Turkey and Belarus) have either made no or only small steps in this 
direction (see far left column in figure 3.3). If this latter group of 
Box 3.1 
The Value of Standardized External Student Assessments 
in ECA Countries
When small questionnaires on students’ socioeconomic backgrounds are 
 administered together with standardized tests (e.g., PIRLS, PISA, TIMSS—see 
chapter 2), school systems can gauge their performance in imparting knowl-
edge and skills to their weakest students, who are often socioeconomically 
 disadvantaged. These students will never compete in Math Olympiads. They 
drop out of school earlier than their peers, and, because they are marginal stu-
dents, never show up in national averages. Yet, an important strength of a school 
system is measured by how many of these students—those with the weakest 
parental support—acquire competencies needed for the labor market. Indeed, 
the most successful school systems in the world, Finland and the Republic of 
Korea among them, show that the way to raise overall educational quality for all 
students is to focus on raising the  educational quality provided to the lowest-
achieving part of the student  population.
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countries has begun to participate in international assessments, it has 
only been quite recently. 
No systematic tracking of graduates’ employment outcomes. When stu-
dents graduate, ministries of education in the ECA region do not system-
atically collect, analyze, and disseminate information on their employment 
outcomes. Such information is useful for helping policy makers and 
higher education institutions detect which programs and fields of study 
are in high demand among employers. Moreover, such information can 
help students make better choices about which university to attend and 
which field of study to pursue. 
Several OECD countries provide examples of how data on graduation 
can be collected and disseminated. Norway has tracked such data since 
1972; Italy, since 1998; and the Netherlands, since 1989. In the 
Netherlands, almost all graduates of higher education institutions are 
surveyed a year and a half after they graduate. The survey collects com-
prehensive information on a range of different topics, including informa-
tion on the school-to-work transition (asking such questions as, How long 
did it take to find a job? Did it involve unemployment spells?); the type 
and quality of employment, if any (e.g., sector and educational and skills 
requirements); and students’ satisfaction with the education that they 
have completed (Did it provide a solid basis for entering the labor mar-
ket? Did it develop the relevant skills? Did it achieve the right mix 
collecting
data 
analyzing and
disseminating
data 
using
analysis to
improve
policies 
assessing
learning
outcomes 
e.g.,
performance-
based
budgeting 
identifying
employment
outcomes of
graduates 
Figure 3.2 Learning to Use Data to Drive Education Policy 
Source: Authors.
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between practical and theoretical knowledge?). Table 3.1 shows the types 
of information that the survey collects.
Legacy of Central Planning
As noted earlier, many problems in education systems go unnoticed and 
unaddressed in the ECA region because these systems do not produce 
not started, very
early stages, no, or
rare participation
in international
assessments    
early piloting of
own assessment
instruments,
some
participation in
international
assessments   
several years of
experience with
own assessments
and regular 
participation in
international
assessments    
several years of
experience in
measuring,
analyzing, and
making use of
learning results to
improve education
policy   
Bulgaria
Hungary
Latvia
Lithuania
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Serbia
Slovenia
Albania
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Czech Republic
Estonia
Georgia
Macedonia, FYR
Moldova
Montenegro
Poland
Russian Federation
Slovak Republic
Ukraine
Armenia
Azerbaijan
Belarus
Bosnia and
Herzagovina
Kazakhstan
Kosovo
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Figure 3.3 Status of Measuring and Using Data on Student Learning Outcomes in 
the ECA Region, 2009 
Sources: Authors’ assessments based on data from UNICEF (2007, table 2.1); the extent of countries’ participation 
in PISA, PIRLS, and TIMSS since 1995; and inputs from World Bank country experts. The UNICEF data is drawn from 
“Table 2.1: Status of Reforms of Assessment and Examination Systems, 2006,” regarding “Introduction of other 
school exams or assessments (e.g. basic school)” and “Introduction of sample-based national assessment.” In this 
table, UNICEF scores the progress of countries on a range of 0 to 4, with 0 representing “not planned or started” 
and 4 representing “operational.” In addition, the figure above uses World Bank staff compilations on the number 
of international assessments in which each country has participated.
Note: As a signal that data-driven policy is a way to build capacity, the year in which countries first participated in 
an international assessment was one of the indicators used to group countries.
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sufficient data to gauge their performance. The legacy of highly central-
ized, Soviet-style management then compounds these problems.3 
Education authorities at most levels of the system have neither the power 
nor the incentives to make key operating decisions, such as reallocating 
budgets to meet urgent local needs, that would improve the performance 
of their respective institutions (see next section). Instead, actors in the 
sector are held accountable for complying with detailed, centrally deter-
mined norms (e.g. on class sizes, or the number of nonteaching staff to be 
employed). 
The implicit assumption appears to be that if norms are followed, a 
quality education will result. There is little management understanding 
that there are multiple ways to deliver quality education, some of which 
must be discovered by the principals and teachers of individual schools. 
Surveys of the main actors in the sector (undertaken as part of the PISA 
and Teaching and Learning International Survey [TALIS] studies) verify 
this general picture of education sector management in the region.4 
Schools Lack Autonomy and Are Held Accountable 
for Complying with Norms 
ECA countries can be roughly sorted into three groups according to the 
degree of autonomy granted to schools at the pre-university level. At one 
end of the spectrum, schools in the new EU member states have been 
granted significant autonomy over budgets, some aspects of staffing, 
and—in some cases—instructional content. At the other end, schools in 
low-income countries, such as the Kyrgyz Republic and Azerbaijan, enjoy 
very little autonomy and continue to be micromanaged from the center. 
Schools in the Russian Federation, Serbia, Turkey, and several other coun-
tries lie somewhere in between: some autonomy has been granted to 
schools or to some schools as part of pilot projects. 
Rather than provide a “framework” of broad, overall rules for the sec-
tor, legislation on education in the region is highly detailed, spelling out 
minute norms for all operational areas (see box 3.2). Legions of inspec-
tors are employed to visit schools to verify if they are in compliance with 
these norms, acting more like police officers than pedagogical counsel-
ors. The result is a system that focuses on compliance with norms, not 
quality education.
Complying with norms does not necessarily lead to better results.
Detailed data on spending and test scores now exist for some ECA coun-
tries, including Poland, and show that complying with input standards 
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does not necessarily produce good-quality education. In fact, two very 
similar localities can be in compliance with norms, but spend drastically 
different amounts of resources per student and end up with the same 
results. An analysis of educational expenditures and student test scores 
in more than 3,000 municipalities of Poland that was undertaken for this 
chapter shows that high-spending municipalities often end up with stu-
dents who perform worse on standardized tests than their peers in 
municipalities that spend less. 
Box 3.2 
Detailed Regulations Set Norms Even for Education 
 Facilities in the ECA Region
In Ukraine, the following school norms are set at the ministerial level. They offer an 
example of the top-down management style that focuses on getting local actors 
to comply with detailed norms, irrespective of whether or not they make sense in 
local circumstances:
• 1 deputy school director for 11–24 class groups; 2 if more than 38 class groups
•  1 managing deputy director if an urban school has more than 600  students or 
if a rural school has more than 400 students
•  1 pedagogue if a school has more than 8 class groups (regardless of the total 
number of students in the school)
•  1 extracurricular activities group leader per each 16 class groups  (regardless of 
the total number of students in the school)
•  1 cleaner per 500 square meters (0.5 per each 250 square meters)
•  1 coat room attendant per 200 coat spots in school
•  1 yardkeeper per 1.5 hectares of school property
The examples above are commonplace across the region—remnants of 
the types of detailed norms that governed all aspects of society during pre- 
transition days. It is common for such norms to leave no room for a school or 
local authority to consider, for example, alternative ways of achieving a clean 
school (e.g., by outsourcing the task to a private company) or whether or not 
staff specified in the norms are actually needed. Norms may even exist for which 
there is no need, such as a norm that determines how many heat inspectors 
should be hired per classroom, with no provision for whether or not classrooms 
are actually in use.
Sources: World Bank 2008d; authors’ observations.
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An example of this analysis compares the two municipalities of Tarłów 
(in the south-central region of Poland) and Rutka-Tartak (in the north-
east), both in compliance with norms for class sizes in Poland. The two 
localities are also very similar in a number of ways: both are rural, have a 
similar proportion of adults with secondary or higher education, and 
roughly similar income levels. While they are similar in a number of ways, 
the educational spending and results of the two towns vary widely—
suggesting large inefficiencies. Sixth-graders in Tarłów scored an average 
of 18 out of 40 on a national achievement test in 2009, while sixth-
graders in Rutka-Tartak scored, on average, 26—a full eight points higher. 
Oddly, the high-performing municipality, Rutka-Tartak, spent the least 
per student: an average of only Zl 3,710 per pupil, compared to an aver-
age of Zl 8,330 per student in Tarłów (see figure 3.4). That is, Rutka-
Tartak achieved much better results at half the cost. 
Further analysis revealed that the differences mostly boiled down to 
differences in class sizes. Tarłów’s higher per student costs were a result 
of relatively smaller classes (an average class size of 15), compared to an 
average class size of 24 in Rutka-Tartak (see figure 3.5). Smaller classes 
imply higher per student costs, yet test score results suggest that these 
smaller classes are not resulting in better learning outcomes. 
Source: Authors’ analysis of data from the Ministry of Finance, Central Statistical Office, Ministry of National Edu-
cation, and Central Examination Board, Poland, and the World Bank’s BOOST database; Kheyfets and others 2011.
Note: Size of bubble indicates relative size of per student spending.
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 Levels, and Per Student Spending in Two Municipalities of Poland 
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The story of Rutka-Tartak and Tarłów illustrates what is a widespread 
phenomenon across the region: educational spending varies widely and 
has little connection to learning outcomes. Furthermore, there are no 
management mechanisms built into the education systems of these 
 countries to take corrective action in such cases. In fact, there are no 
mechanisms to collect per student spending and test scores in different 
localities. Not surprisingly, actors in these education systems care about 
complying with norms, not about what it costs to deliver education ser-
vices or what results are achieved.
Inflexible Management Inhibits Reform
The strong focus on meeting detailed norms, together with the lack of 
student performance data, has created rigid education systems that are 
unable to respond to changing conditions. One area in which this 
inability to reform is highly apparent is vocational education and train-
ing (VET). ECA education systems inherited large numbers of voca-
tional schools from the communist system, which in pre-transition days 
supplied workers to state-owned enterprises. Despite large drops in 
student numbers, these schools still enroll almost 40 percent of all 
Figure 3.5 Relationship between Primary School Test Scores, Average Class Size, 
and Per Student Spending in Two Municipalities of Poland 
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upper secondary graduates (the largest proportion of any region in the 
world, see figure B2.1). The most highly vocationalized programs were 
in Central and Eastern Europe, where the average share of vocational 
secondary school students was over 70 percent in 1989. Turkey, not a 
transition country, also has a strong vocational focus in secondary edu-
cation, with programs patterned after the German dual-system model. 
As economic conditions and employer requirements have changed, 
however, education systems in these countries have been unable to 
reform the sector to deliver the skills in demand on the labor market. 
In addition, the majority of these  programs were terminal, that is, they 
did not provide access to higher education. 
Given that secondary education was overwhelmingly focused on voca-
tional and technical training in planned economies, the management of 
vocational secondary education was often separated from that of general 
secondary education programs. (The latter was the gateway to university 
study, an opportunity that was limited to the select few in these econo-
mies.) In many ECA countries today, management of secondary educa-
tion is thus divided across two or more ministries. Even in Turkey, the one 
nontransition country in the ECA region, there is a distinct fragmentation 
of responsibility and oversight of secondary education within the same 
ministry. 
A further complication is that local governments in the ECA region 
are typically responsible for the management and, to some degree, the 
financing, of general secondary education in most ECA countries, whereas 
the central government remains responsible for managing and funding 
vocational secondary education. Specifically, in many countries it is the 
national Ministry of Education that retained management control over 
vocational schools (as did other national-level ministries that ran such 
schools, for example, a Ministry of Agriculture that sponsored a forestry 
school). The fragmentation is thus not only across ministries, but across 
authority levels (national and local) also.
This double management fragmentation makes it more difficult to 
adjust the supply of education programs to changes in demand (i.e., 
changes in skills requirements and labor market opportunities, which are 
then translated into changing student demand). This reluctance or inca-
pacity to reform these education programs to meet skill needs is exacer-
bated by the fact that core ministries, including ministries of finance and 
economy, are often more concerned than ministries of education—where 
management control is actually located—about the efficiency of educa-
tion programs and their responsiveness to changing skill needs. 
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Due to the fractionalized authority structures, the lack of autonomy, 
and a management focus on norms, principals of vocational schools or 
local education planners have been virtually incapable of modernizing 
these dinosaurs into attractive secondary education alternatives for 
 students. Economic transition necessitates widespread changes in educa-
tion at this level and in vocational education programs in particular, but 
rigid and divided management systems and shrinking budgets have made 
it hard to implement these changes. Many vocational schools remain 
unreformed, with outdated equipment, an outdated curriculum that 
offers too many narrow specializations, and an aging (and possibly 
increasingly unqualified) teacher workforce. Paradoxically, firms in the 
region are seeking more graduates with technical skills and have raised 
salaries in areas with skills shortages to attract workers with these abilities. 
Nevertheless, vocational programs in the region are still largely failing to 
provide the needed skills.
Inefficient Use of Funds
Education funding in the ECA region is also dictated by norms rather 
than a common-sense response to conditions on the ground. With money 
tied to norms, schools and local authorities have no flexibility or incentive 
to improve the efficiency of spending. In particular, schools in most coun-
tries in the region continue to be financed based on the number of classes 
and teachers employed (i.e., inputs), not the number of students that 
they serve. Centrally determined norms dictate the subjects that must be 
taught, and how many classes must be created at each grade level. Norms 
on class numbers determine the required number of teaching hours, 
which establish the required number of teachers. Funding flows are then 
rigidly earmarked for either personnel costs or nonpersonnel costs, leav-
ing local managers no ability to reallocate funds where they are most 
needed. As a result, the system finds it difficult to correct course in the 
face of change. 
The most glaring example of this problem has been the inability of the 
sector to downsize in response to falling student numbers over the past 
two decades. The ensuing crisis has strained the resources of education 
systems throughout the region and brought the teaching profession to the 
brink—compromising both its quality and attractiveness to future teach-
ers. Although the problems associated with smaller student numbers are 
presently most urgent at the pre-university level of education, they will 
soon impact the university sector as well.
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All but five ECA countries—Turkey and a few low-income CIS 
 countries—have experienced a dramatic decline in student enrollments as 
a result of demographic trends in the past 20 years, differing only in terms 
of the severity of the decline and its onset. As figure 3.6 shows, in some 
countries student numbers have declined by as much as 40 percent since 
the beginning of the transition.
Despite highly centralized management, the responsibility for identi-
fying which schools to close was placed on the shoulders of regional or 
local authorities or both in most ECA countries. Yet these actors had no 
incentive to undertake the politically sensitive and administratively dif-
ficult task of closing schools, particularly if their schools remained in 
compliance with generous norms on class sizes. With norms for class sizes 
allowing for variations as large as 25 percent (e.g., a minimum of 20 and 
a maximum of 25 students) or with no minimum class size at all (e.g., 
Serbia and Belarus), years could pass before a school was not in compli-
ance with class size norms. Even then, local authorities usually had ways 
to postpone closing schools by asking education ministries for exceptions, 
adding additional financing from their own sources to keep schools in 
operation, or inflating student numbers to keep schools in compliance.
Source: EdStats Database.
Note: LI = low-income, MI = Middle-income. 
a. Western Balkan population estimates are based on Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and FYR Macedonia only. 
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Plummeting Student-Teacher Ratios Reflect the Failure to Adjust 
to New Realities
Declining student-teacher ratios across the region provide clear evidence 
that policy adjustments to date have not successfully addressed inefficient 
spending in the sector. Take the example of Moldova. The average school 
in Moldova was built in 1971, when pre-university students totaled 
1.2 million and demographics looked favorable. After the Soviet Union 
collapsed, student numbers soon started to plummet. By 2010, there 
were less than 700,000 students in the country’s schools (a 44 percent 
drop from the peak student population of 1995). Yet the number of 
teachers in these schools has not declined since 2003. In fact, there were 
as many schools in Moldova in 2009 as there were in 1994; on average, 
each school has only 56 percent of the students for which it was built. 
Student-teacher ratios are one way to look at the inability to adjust to 
falling student numbers. Before the transition, average student-teacher 
ratios in the ECA region were roughly similar to those observed in other 
regions in the world, but have since dropped significantly (see figure 3.7). 
Figure 3.7 Primary School Student-Teacher Ratios in ECA Compared to Other 
Regions of the World, 1990–2008
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These low ratios are problematic for two reasons. First, other things 
being equal, lower student-teacher ratios imply that it is more costly to 
finance education per student. There is no evidence, however, that these 
rising costs have resulted in better-quality education (for instance, see 
figure 3.8 for the case of Romania, where TIMSS scores have remained 
roughly flat for a decade). Second, lower student-teacher ratios mean that 
more of the education sector’s scarce resources are tied up in employee 
costs, leaving very few resources available for either innovations or much-
needed classroom learning materials (e.g., new textbooks, computers, 
Internet access).
Teaching Profession Increasingly Devalued 
The largest casualty of inefficient resource use has been the teaching pro-
fession, with evidence pointing to its significant devaluation—and a resul-
tant deterioration in its quality at the pre-university level. Given limited 
resources, a teaching work force that is oversized relative to the number 
of students is poorly paid; indeed, teachers in most ECA countries earn 
salaries below the national median.5 Over time, low wages and uncer-
tainty about the future have diminished the attractiveness of teaching in 
the ECA region. 
The current teaching workforce has become overwhelmingly female 
and is aging rapidly (see figure 3.9). The percentage of female primary 
Sources: Authors’ calculations based on TIMSS (various years) and expenditure data obtained from Romania’s 
 Ministry of Public Finance. 
Figure 3.8 Real Per Student Expenditure Compared to TIMSS Math Scores in 
Romania, 1999–2008
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school teachers in non-EU members of the region is, in fact, considerably 
higher than in the EU15 countries (EdStats Database). And education 
systems throughout the region are finding it difficult to hire qualified 
teachers in key subjects, such as English and information technology. 
Finally, the quality of students now applying to pedagogical schools is 
inferior to that of students applying to other programs of study, with few 
of the brightest university graduates entering the profession. A recent 
study (Silova 2009) looked at the situation of teacher training institu-
tions in two countries in the ECA region (Azerbaijan and the Kyrgyz 
Republic) where detailed data on centralized university admission tests—
ideal for such analysis—were available. Consistent with the other indica-
tors reviewed in this section, Silova’s analysis supports the thesis that the 
prestige and attractiveness of the teaching profession is low and declining 
in both countries. 
Considered separately, these facts might not be alarming. Taken 
together, however, they make a compelling case that ECA countries are 
failing to attract the professionals who are urgently needed to improve 
the quality of education in the region.
Figure 3.9 Percentage of Students with a Teacher Over 50 Years Old in 
ECA Countries, Selected Years
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Addressing the Skills Challenge
Education systems in the ECA region are facing daunting challenges with 
limited resources. Resolution of the most urgent challenges of these 
systems—overstaffing at the pre-university level, delivering the skills and 
competencies needed on the contemporary job market, and revamping 
vocational education and giving it an appropriate weight in secondary 
education—can no longer be delayed. 
The very urgency of these problems presents policy makers in the region 
an opportunity to reform the way in which the education sector is man-
aged overall. Specifically, they can systematically collect student perfor-
mance data in order make better-informed decisions, make greater efforts 
to reduce the role of the central government in day-to-day operational 
issues at the school level, and link educational spending to agreed perfor-
mance goals. As will be discussed in more detail in chapter 5, some of these 
principles have already been employed in many ECA countries at the ter-
tiary level. The challenge is to disseminate these same principles at all 
levels of  education.
Turn on the Lights
In order to provide quality learning for all, countries in the ECA region 
first need to understand how much their students are actually learning. As 
noted earlier in this chapter, all ECA countries need to begin systemati-
cally collecting data on how their education systems are performing, 
principally via standardized student assessments and graduate tracer 
studies (both of which need to be linked to student background informa-
tion). Central ministries can then use this data to design policy improve-
ments. To accommodate such a shift, education ministry staff will need 
training in both analyzing trends in education performance data and 
developing education policy options based on such data. 
Participation in international assessments such as PISA and TIMSS is a 
valuable step in this direction, as it gives countries access to significant 
practical advice on how to design and administer student achievement 
tests, analyze results, draw policy conclusions, and, equally important, 
manage the dissemination and communication of these results to system 
stakeholders and the media. This subject is discussed in more detail in the 
following chapter.
Introduce Autonomy and Accountability at Lower Levels 
of the Education System
Overcoming the legacy of central planning involves changing the focus of 
education management away from detailed norms and instead holding 
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actors accountable for performance (or results). School principals and 
local authorities need more decision-making authority to pursue new 
opportunities, and the flexibility to experiment. At the central level, this 
implies that policy makers in the ECA region would relinquish certain 
duties and assume others so that education systems may innovate and 
improve student learning outcomes. The opportunity before central gov-
ernments in these countries is to move away from micromanaging schools 
and classrooms and focus instead on “steering” the system. 
Extending autonomy throughout education systems means placing 
authority and responsibility in the hands of the people most able to inno-
vate and improve the quality of education: local managers and education 
authorities (see Osborne and Gaebler 1992). The solution is not simply 
to scrap norms altogether and replace them with expanded autonomy at 
lower levels—a change in accountability relationships is also needed. The 
art of reform will thus challenge central governments in ECA countries 
to build new and more sophisticated relationships with local authorities, 
principals, teachers, and other stakeholders—relationships based on 
incentives and accountability relationships that make these actors part-
ners in achieving agreed performance goals. Not surprisingly, most sys-
temic education reforms that have taken place in OECD countries since 
the 1980s have focused on devolving responsibility for day-to-day deci-
sions to the front lines, that is, to individual schools (OECD 2004b).
Aligning the incentives of stakeholders in the education sector with 
the student learning outcomes desired by policy makers will require edu-
cation ministries to set overall performance goals; articulate who is 
responsible and accountable to whom and for what; and ensure that these 
responsibilities are agreed, accepted, and understood. Ministries will also 
need to provide lower-level actors the support they need to meet agreed 
education goals, whether in the form of financing, advice, or knowledge 
sharing of best practices. Collaborative structures, shared leadership, and 
the spirit of public service will be invaluable for supporting efforts to 
improve learning outcomes in the region. Teachers, students, and local 
education authorities need both resources and the organizational and 
human capacity to perform. Teachers in the region, whose salaries are 
rarely competitive with private sector wages, also need to feel valued, 
respected, and recognized for their service.
Introduce Performance-based Financing
Education financing in the ECA region can be more than just a flow of 
monetary resources, it can signal a desired policy direction to local educa-
tion managers. More flexible, smarter financing in the form of block 
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grants (i.e., contract- or performance-based) offers funding to learning 
institutions in return for meeting agreed learning outcomes. Not only 
does such financing give local education managers much-needed  flexibility 
that line-item, input-based budgets do not permit, it keeps them focused 
on student results. 
The majority of ECA countries have recognized the limitations of 
input-based financing schemes and have come to appreciate that financ-
ing can be used as a policy instrument. At the pre-university level, a 
typical first step away from input-based financing is to introduce a fund-
ing formula in which the number of students enrolled in a school is the 
main component. In fact, 11 ECA countries have introduced such formu-
lae and fully abandoned input-based financing (see figure 3.10).6 In 
essence, this means that public money is being allowed to “follow the 
Source: Authors’ assessment.
Figure 3.10 Progress Towards Results-based Education Financing in the 
ECA  Region, 2010
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student” rather than inputs (e.g., staff). Money can follow the student in 
many forms, such as student vouchers and block grants tied to student 
numbers. Countries that introduce per student financing typically design 
formulae that make it explicit and transparent how much a school will 
receive (see chapter 4). 
Summary
There are three major impediments preventing education systems in 
ECA countries from helping to reduce the skills shortage in their region. 
First, ECA education systems have been operating without crucial 
 information—in the dark. By focusing on top-achieving students, they 
neither seek to deliver quality education to all students, nor do they sys-
tematically collect data on the learning and employment outcomes of all 
students. Second, the legacy of central planning keeps the governance and 
management of school systems highly centralized, with central policy 
makers intensely involved in operational details. A focus on compliance 
with norms, together with financing schemes based on inputs and not 
outputs, means that most local education authorities and school princi-
pals in the ECA region lack the autonomy and authority to make crucial 
management decisions for their own institutions. 
Third, education systems in the ECA region use financial resources 
highly inefficiently. Nowhere is this more apparent than in the pre- 
university sector, where few countries have adjusted teacher staffing levels 
in response to falling student numbers over the past 20 years. As a result, 
student-teacher ratios have fallen sharply as per student costs have ris-
en—more so than in any other region in the world. 
Policy makers in the region can overcome these impediments by com-
mitting to quality education for all students, supported by systematic data 
collection on student outcomes; expanding autonomy at lower levels of 
the education system in return for accountability for student perfor-
mance; and introducing performance-based financing. ECA countries are 
specifically encouraged to develop national learning assessments, system-
atically participate in international assessments, conduct regular tracer 
studies of graduates to determine their employment outcomes, and then 
use this data to inform education policy. 
Overcoming the legacy of central planning will require central policy 
makers to reduce the role of the central government in day-to-day 
operations of their education systems. By concentrating on setting system 
standards and overall goals, the central government can then manage 
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education systems for performance instead of compliance with norms. 
Greater autonomy can be granted to local education authorities and 
school principals in return for their accountability for improved student 
(and school) performance. Finally, policy makers can introduce perfor-
mance-based financing (through such mechanisms as block grants or 
vouchers) and grant greater flexibility and decision-making power over 
school budgets to local education managers in return for meeting agreed 
learning outcomes. 
The remainder of this report focuses on how governments can use the 
conceptual framework presented in this chapter—the three key problems 
impeding the education systems’ ability to address the skills shortage and 
their corresponding policy solutions—to improve educational outcomes 
in pre-university, tertiary, and adult education, respectively, with an 
emphasis on practical options.
Notes
 1. As a nontransition country, Turkey sometimes represents a different case. 
Although much of the discussion in this chapter is relevant to Turkey, it will 
be noted in those cases where it is not.
 2. Although Turkey was not a command economy, it too has a very centralized 
system, evident, for example, in the lack of autonomy and accountability in 
the education system.
 3.  Again, though Turkey was not a command economy, it has a very centralized 
education system.
 4. The PISA assessment conducted by the OECD provides evidence of these 
large differences in school autonomy, based on a questionnaire administered 
to school principals (in which three questions relate to budgeting). Data from 
the 2006 PISA show that schools in Estonia enjoy the most autonomy of all 
ECA countries, irrespective of how the question on budgeting is asked, while 
schools in Azerbaijan enjoy the least. It should be noted that PISA data must 
be interpreted with some caution, as it is unclear what is meant by “having 
more autonomy on budgeting.” Does it mean more autonomy to formulate 
budgets, to re-allocate resources within budgets, to determine salaries and 
annual increases, or something else? Still, certain ECA countries have unam-
biguously granted substantially more flexibility to schools, principals, and 
governing boards than have others. A much better source of information on 
differences in school autonomy is provided by the Teaching and Learning 
International Survey (TALIS) study, also conducted by the OECD. In this 
survey, teachers and principals are asked more specific questions related to the 
degree of autonomy in their schools. Unfortunately, only six ECA countries 
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(Turkey, plus all new EU member states at the time) participated in the 2008 
study, which confirmed that schools in Estonia enjoy substantial autonomy.
 5. Comparing teacher salaries to those of other professions is not an easy task, 
both because salary differentials can derive from differences in educational 
background, experience, and other factors, and because different professions 
enjoy different noncash benefits. However, available data show that teacher 
salaries in the ECA region are low and that the gap between their salaries and 
the median economy-wide salary has widened in many countries. See the fol-
lowing data sources on teacher salaries: for OECD countries, OECD 2008 
(accessible online at www.oecd.org/edu/eag2010); for CIS countries, CISSTAT, 
online database of the Interstate Commerce Committee of the Commonwealth 
of Independent States (Statistics of the Countries of the CIS, Annual Data 
from 1991 to 2010, http://www.cisstat.com/2base/frame00.htm); for economy-
wide annual salaries for all countries, OECD StatExtracts, http://stats.oecd
.org/Index.aspx. (All URLs accessed December 2010.)
 6. The “result” referred to in this figure is a student enrolled. As discussed in 
chapter 4, a more desirable per student financing scheme would be to finance 
a student who is graduating, or better yet, a student who is graduating with a 
desired level of competencies. However, even the most advanced ECA coun-
tries (in terms of moving to school financing based on results) still base 
financing on the number of students enrolled (an intermediate result, at best). 
This report therefore intentionally distinguishes between the inputs of teach-
ers, classes, and finances, and among students “enrolled,” “graduating,” “gradu-
ating with a desired level of competencies,” or “graduating and finding a job” 
as results (or outputs). 
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C H A P T E R  4
Managing for Results at the 
Pre-University Level of Education
The policy framework elaborated in chapter 3 can be applied to pri-
mary and secondary education in the ECA region to help create edu-
cation systems more capable of meeting the skills gap outlined in 
chapter 1. First, policy makers in the region can overcome the debili-
tating lack of data on the performance of their education systems. 
Second, a more sophisticated relationship can be put in place between 
the central government and lower-level actors in the school system 
based on this data: greater autonomy at lower levels of the school 
system in return for holding local educational authorities and school 
directors accountable for improved student performance. 
Freed from the day-to-day management of schools, policy makers will 
be able to devote more of their attention to elaborating strategic educa-
tional policy, including research and analysis of system and fiscal perfor-
mance, and setting overall system goals, standards, regulations, and 
guidelines. One area of immediate concern will be designing long-term 
teacher policies to renew the teaching force and re-establish the prestige 
of the teaching profession in the ECA region.
Finally, current sector resources could likely achieve superior educa-
tional outcomes if schools were larger and if fewer but better paid teach-
ers taught slightly larger classes. Linking financing directly to student 
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performance will help to increase the efficiency of fiscal resources and 
hold local-level actors accountable for achieving the education goals of 
the central government. Special care must, however, be taken to prevent 
performance goals and financing mechanisms from punishing schools 
that have larger numbers of lesser-achieving students and instead reward 
them for improving these students’ academic achievement. In the end, 
financing modalities that give schools the flexibility to allocate resources 
to the areas of greatest need will help schools improve the performance 
of all students, not just the highest achievers.
Track Student Learning and Employment Outcomes
Better data alone do not lead to better-quality education. Partly due to 
difficult demographic trends and partly due to history, ECA education 
systems have wound themselves in a knot that will be very difficult to 
untie without devoting greater attention to data on results. The legacy of 
central planning has created a system where bureaucrats manage the sec-
tor by writing detailed norms into legislation and then managing princi-
pals so that they comply with these norms. Generations of managers have 
lived with this system for their entire lives. When asked to improve edu-
cation system performance, they therefore reach for the tools that they 
have always used, either by revising norms or ramping up inspections. 
This chapter argues that the solution is not to rewrite norms or expand 
the inspectorate but rather, to reach for different tools. However, none 
of the new tools will work without better data on performance: what 
competencies are students mastering and are graduates finding jobs?
As described in chapter 3, management of the education sector needs 
to shift from managing inputs to managing for results. This type of man-
agement requires a more sophisticated partnership between the central 
government and actors at the school (and local government) level, based 
on a shared and measurable understanding of what is to be achieved. 
That is, data on performance are what enables the central government to 
start managing for results, rather than for inputs. The chief source of this 
performance data is national and international student learning assess-
ments, together with surveys of graduates that determine their employ-
ment outcomes.
Implement Yearly National Assessments
As noted earlier in this report, many ECA countries have begun to develop 
and, in some cases, implement national assessment exams. However, few 
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(if any) countries in ECA are yet using the results of these exams to help 
design educational policies. To do so effectively, several key actions are 
needed. Most importantly, some background information about the stu-
dents who take national assessment exams needs to be collected. The 
importance of this information should not be underemphasized: in its 
absence, the usefulness of test scores is severely constrained. 
In Bulgaria, for example, a national assessment center can generate 
average national and regional scores on student achievement tests, but 
this data cannot be disaggregated to identify the performance of either 
different groups of students or individual students. The problem is that 
the assessment system (which gathers data on student test scores) is not 
linked to either socioeconomic information about students (e.g., data 
collected via survey when students take the test) or to the individual 
student identification numbers assigned by the Ministry’s education 
information system. This oversight means that education policy makers 
in Bulgaria are unable to answer crucial questions related to the large 
wave of school closures that took place during the summers of 2007–
2009, such as whether students who were moved to new schools are 
doing better or worse academically.
Further recommendations to improve assessment systems include the 
need to administer such tests on an annual basis, not only to collect stan-
dardized longitudinal data, but also to enable countries to have a baseline 
of student achievement results before and after educational reforms are 
introduced. Moreover, countries need to move beyond using national 
assessments solely for examination purposes (that is, to certify that a stu-
dent has mastered a curriculum at the end of compulsory and upper 
secondary education) and begin using such tests to assess the quality of 
education at different stages in the cycle. For instance, policy makers may 
want to use a standardized test administered each year in order to evalu-
ate how well fourth-graders are reading.
Continue (or Initiate) Regular Participation in 
International Assessments
International assessments give countries outside benchmarks with which 
they can gauge how well their education systems are performing. In addi-
tion to being able to track their performance against countries worldwide, 
participation in such tests as PIRLS, TIMSS, and PISA, will give ECA 
countries access to substantial technical assistance in how to analyze, 
understand, and use test results to design better education policies. Finally, 
systematic participation in international assessments enable countries to 
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Box 4.1
Using Data to Measure Gaps and Design Better Policies: 
Three Examples
In Serbia, researchers used PISA test scores for 2006 and 2009, together with student 
socioeconomic and ethnic information, to shed more light on what is widely known 
in the region: Roma students significantly lag their non-Roma peers (see table B4.1). 
Through careful analysis of this data, the researchers were also able to show that 
part of this performance gap was due to socioeconomic factors. That is, students 
with a Roma background were, on average, from more disadvantaged backgrounds 
(such students tend to do worse than their peers from better-off families). However, 
even when controlling for the fact that Roma students tend to come from more 
disadvantaged backgrounds, the gap is large, especially in math, suggesting that 
Roma students will need additional support to catch up, over and above that need-
ed by children from other socio economically weak backgrounds. Such information 
on its own does not provide policy recommendations, but it sheds light on where 
problems exist, quantifies them, and provides a baseline against which policy initia-
tives can be measured. 
Table B4.1 Learning Gaps between Roma and Non-Roma Students in 
Serbia, as Measured by PISA 2006 and 2009 Results
PISA 2006 PISA 2009
Gap without 
controlling for 
socioeconomic 
differences
Gap when 
controlling for 
socioeconomic 
differences
Gap without 
controlling for 
socioeconomic 
differences
Gap when 
controlling for 
socioeconomic 
differences
Matha 107 77 86 43
Reading 77 44 91 52
Science 81 45 81 38
Source: Baucal and Pavlovic´-Babic´ 2010. These findings are corroborated by Baucal’s 2006 study of the 
performance of Roma children on Serbia’s national school assessment exam.
Note: Gaps shown above are calculated as the score of non-Roma students minus the score of Roma 
students.
a Statistically significant. 
In Romania, researchers used PIRLS 2001 and 2006 data to quantify the extent 
to which students from rural schools lagged behind their peers from urban schools 
(Romania 2009). Equally important, they pointed out that the gap had widened, not 
narrowed, between the two tests. The magnitude of the gap played an important 
role in triggering the design of a project (financed by the World Bank) to address the 
quality of education in rural areas (see World Bank 2003b).
(continued next page)
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Finally, to gauge the risk that tertiary students were withdrawing from school 
as a result of the ongoing financial crisis, researchers in Romania administered a 
survey of students to identify those most at risk of dropping out (Pricopie et al. 
2010). These results can be used by policy makers to design policies to mitigate 
this risk. 
Box 4.1 (continued)
examine their educational progress over time because the tests are com-
patible and administered at pre-determined time intervals (e.g., PISA is 
administered every three years; PIRLS, every five years). 
Monitor Student Labor Market Outcomes 
The labor market outcomes of secondary graduates is another critical part 
of the performance data needed to manage education systems for results. 
This information is particularly important for transforming secondary 
education in the ECA region. This level of education can only respond to 
student and employers’ demand if policy makers have accurate and 
timely information about the career implications of students’ educational 
choices. In principle, this type of data should be gathered through regular 
labor market surveys (which exist in most ECA countries), periodic 
employer surveys (which are implemented in most countries on an ad-
hoc basis), and graduate tracer studies (which exist nowhere in the 
region, save Romania and Hungary as of 2011). Tellingly, most countries 
have statistical agencies that conduct regular labor force surveys, but 
ministries of education tend not to analyze and use such results to design 
a more responsive education sector. Moreover, the results of these surveys 
are rarely made available to students or parents in a readily digestible and 
user-friendly form. 
Create demand for more data and analysis. In order to mobilize and 
sustain resources to collect and analyze data, demand for this data and 
analysis must be stimulated. If such data are not used in the policy process, 
moreover, policy makers are quick to axe resources allocated for these 
purposes. Given the weak internal capacity of most ministries of educa-
tion in the region, central governments might consider relying on outside 
researchers—such as university and policy institute experts—for help. This 
could be done in a number of different ways, including the following:
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Set aside competitive grants for researchers to write policy notes and • 
research papers using assessment data.
Make entire datasets more readily available. For instance, the OECD • 
makes the entire PISA dataset publicly available for researchers to 
download online (http://pisa2009.acer.edu.au/; accessed December 
2010). 
Change policies to make data matter, such as making improved student • 
learning outcomes a component of teacher and school evaluations. (If 
the results of assessments have no impact, whether directly or indi-
rectly, on policies or people’s careers, it is very difficult to mobilize and 
sustain resources to maintain assessment centers and train people to 
analyze results.) 
Expand Autonomy in Exchange for Accountability for Results
The OECD (2004b) has recognized that high-performing education sys-
tems tend to have local schools and education authorities with a high 
degree of autonomy. Not surprisingly, most systemic education reforms 
that have taken place in OECD countries since the 1980s have focused 
on devolving responsibility for day-to-day decisions to the front lines, that 
is, to individual schools. The underlying logic behind such devolution is 
to empower school principals. These principals, who are familiar with 
their respective staff, students’ needs, and local conditions, are better 
suited to make operational decisions than bureaucrats in capital cities. 
School-based management, moreover, allows for stronger accountability 
relationships than micromanagement from the center (see, for instance, 
Barrera-Osorio, Fasih, and Patrinos 2009).
Policy makers can employ a range of different options for strengthen-
ing accountability, some of which are more rudimentary—and can be put 
in place faster—than others. All of these options entail risks and trade-offs 
that must be considered to prevent unwanted effects. With respect to 
school performance, ministries of education can do the following:
Create and empower school councils and create incentives for their • 
active participation in school decision-making processes, and provide 
them with adequate capacity and training, to increase the participation 
of parents and the community (see Patrinos et al. 2010).
Administer national student assessments at key stages of the education • 
cycle (e.g., after the 4th, 7th, and 12th grades) and make this data read-
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ily available to parents and school councils to help hold schools ac-
countable for results. Making assessment results more readily available 
has helped improve state-level accountability and student achievement 
in the United States (Hanushek and Raymond 2005; Carnoy and Loeb 
2002) and Mexico (Alvarez et al. 2007).
Require schools to prepare school development plans that outline each • 
school’s strengths and weaknesses, together with a vision and action 
plan for making improvements. Ideally this exercise should take as its 
starting point student scores on a national assessment exam, together 
with an institutional self-evaluation.
Prepare “school scorecards” for all schools that include basic indicators • 
(whichever are available), giving parents and students a sense of a 
school’s performance. Such scorecards should be made available on the 
ministry’s website and disseminated to local authorities and schools. 
Such score cards should publish the “value-added” of a school (e.g., an 
increase in test scores that takes into consideration students’ socioeco-
nomic background).1 
(Ideally) disaggregate school score cards—where regulations permit—• 
by the performance of
 ° Minority students
 ° Low-income students
 ° Students with limited proficiency in the language of instruction
 ° Students with special education needs or disabilities or both
Agree on criteria that objectively identify “a school in need of improve-• 
ment” and decide what actions will be taken to support such schools. 
More specifically, they can agree on the ultimate sanctions for contin-
ued failure to improve performance, such as
 °  Re-constituting the school (i.e., formally closing it down but reopen-
ing it immediately with new management and the possibility of staff 
re-applying for their jobs).
 ° Turning the school over to private management
Provide rewards to high-performing or improving schools or both. Here • 
policy makers should avoid characterizing a “high-performing school” 
simply as one that has high average student scores on a standardized 
test or a large number of graduates who go on to university, as these 
indicators may merely reflect the fact that the school attracts high-
caliber students (possibly from well-off families). Rather, a school 
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should be judged as high- (low-) performing based on whether it deliv-
ers (does not deliver) learning to all types of students, including those 
from low-income and minority households. This is why it is so impor-
tant that the performance of a school, in terms of student learning 
outcomes, be disaggregated to show the achievement of different types 
of students (e.g., low-income and minority students). 
At the level of the school, education ministries can do as follows: 
Require that principals provide explanations for a schools’ failure to • 
improve student learning outcomes. 
Revisit the issue of who can hire and fire a school principal and to • 
whom he or she is accountable. Given enhanced autonomy and more 
flexible financing, the most important question to ask is: Who is best 
positioned to ensure that a principal performs? The education minis-
try? A regional inspector? The local mayor? A school council (perhaps 
with representatives of all of the above)?
Require that school principals undertake training and be licensed and • 
institute programs to make this possible.
There are numerous risks related to holding schools accountable for 
results that policy makers must acknowledge and manage. For example, 
if an accountability system is based on tests that measure basic skills—
and if these “high-stakes” tests carry great weight in school evaluations—
the system risks focusing the education system solely on the measurement 
of basic skills, ignoring the overall goal of creating well-rounded, cre-
ative, active citizens and productive workers capable of engaging in 
lifetime learning.
A well-functioning accountability system requires credible consequences 
for success and poor performance, recognizing that outside factors also play 
a role in determining student learning outcomes. In the case of success, 
schools need to be recognized and rewarded. In the case of poor perfor-
mance, schools need to be sanctioned in some way. At the very least, if 
learning outcomes deteriorate at a given school, the principal should pro-
vide an explanation for why this has happened (e.g., the composition of the 
student body changed in such a way that the school now has more students 
from challenging socioeconomic backgrounds). In the United States, the 
ultimate sanction is to “reconstitute” a school, which means replacing the 
principal and asking all teachers to re-apply for their jobs. In most U.S. 
states that have the power to reconstitute schools, however, schools are first 
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placed on probation for two to four years, during which time they receive 
support and guidance to improve student achievement.2
Relax Class Size Norms
In the ECA region, moving toward greater school autonomy implies 
relaxing or abandoning the detailed norms or both that govern virtually 
all operational decisions. The most crippling norm that constrains school 
principals from managing for results is the class size norm. As noted in 
chapter 3, this norm—together with a centrally imposed curriculum—
determines how many teachers can be hired. This number in turn deter-
mines 65 percent or more of most schools’ annual budgets. Thus, this 
norm, more than any other, restricts principals from making the best deci-
sions for their schools in terms of student learning and financial efficiency. 
The regulation is, moreover, fiercely protected by teacher’s labor unions 
because it protects jobs. In this respect, Denmark provides an example of 
how to gradually eliminate class size norms (see box 4.2).
Abandon the Policing Mindset
Moving toward greater autonomy also implies changing a “policing” 
mindset that treats all schools more or less the same to an “auditing” 
mindset that differentiates management based on local capacity. Today, 
many schools in ECA countries are “policed” by inspectors, Ministry of 
Education staff members and financial managers: every school is visited 
at the beginning and end of a school year to check if norms and regula-
tions are being complied with. Few schools have their own bank 
accounts and those that do sometimes need multiple approvals to make 
mid-year corrections to their initial budgets. The entire system seems 
designed based on the implicit assumption that wrong-doing can only 
be prevented by wrapping lower-level actors in as many layers of control 
as possible. 
This “policing” culture will need to be abandoned to make local or 
school-based autonomy effective. Ministry of Education staff mem-
bers and inspectors may very well need to continue to vigilantly man-
age certain schools (e.g., small schools with poor capacity), but others 
(e.g., large, well-established, and well-run schools) can be managed 
with a much lighter hand. For instance, rather than making every 
transaction subject to approval (still the case in many countries), well-
run schools should be evaluated on the basis of performance criteria 
(i.e., specific learning outcomes) and year-end auditing of their finan-
cial statements.
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The ultimate goal of greater autonomy is to make an education sys-
tem more flexible and responsive to student and employer demands. 
This is particularly needed in vocational education and training in the 
ECA region (see box 4.3), enabling it to expand or contract course 
offerings in response to student and employer demand, not on rigid 
governmental norms. 
Introduce Autonomy Gradually to Offset Corruption
Education and finance officials in the region are rightly concerned about 
expanding institutional autonomy in an environment characterized by 
weak managerial capacity and widespread corruption. Such concerns are 
justified: as chapter 5 points out, the experience of expanding institutional 
Box 4.2 
Eliminating Class Size Norms in Denmark
Upper secondary schools in Denmark used to be governed by class size norms 
similar to those that exist across the ECA region today. Today, however, school 
principals have the discretion to determine the appropriate class size, while 
 ensuring that their schools remain attractive in the eyes of prospective students. 
The Ministry of Education in Denmark long mandated that class sizes in upper 
secondary schools could not exceed 24 students. This norm was removed by the 
late 1960s, after which labor contracts with teacher unions specified that teachers 
teaching classes of more than 28 students would receive (substantial) additional 
compensation. Since 1999, an agreement was reached between the unions and 
the central ministry to abandon an upper limit, allowing school principals to de-
termine this limit.a
In determining the appropriate class size, principals must weigh economic, 
pedagogical, and “marketing” factors. Since schools in Denmark are considered 
self-owned institutions, economic factors are an important consideration. Col-
lapsing two classes into one allows for considerable savings. On the other hand, 
principals must take into account pedagogical considerations so as to ensure 
high-quality education. Finally, principals know that students and parents—who 
are free to choose the school that their children will attend—value both smaller 
classes and a large selection of free electives.
Source: Meeting with school administrator in Denmark, summer 2008.
Note: a. Certain broad guidelines and requirements exist regarding class sizes. For instance, if 10 students 
at a particular school choose a particular “free elective,” the school must offer it. Moreover, the ministry 
can mandate that a particular school offer a particular course in the interest of making sure that a specific 
geographic area of Denmark has sufficiently broad course offerings.
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Box 4.3
Rethinking Secondary Education 
One area where more local flexibility is needed is in the area of vocational education, 
where ministries of education in the ECA region continue to play too dominant a 
role. In many countries, these ministries continue to directly manage the profile, 
course offerings, and budgets of vocational schools. This has left the sector largely 
underfunded and unreformed. It has also maintained a strong dichotomy between 
vocational and general education schools. This chapter recommends expanding 
 autonomy in this field by allowing either principals or local authorities (whether at 
the municipal or regional level) a greater say in determining the future of their 
schools, irrespective of their profile. In exchange for more autonomy, school princi-
pals should be held accountable for improvements in learning outcomes or 
 improvements in the rate at which graduates progress to further study or find jobs.
The still strong dichotomy between vocational and general education in the 
ECA region stands in contrast to the trend worldwide, which is away from separat-
ing secondary education into general and vocational tracks and toward a com-
mon secondary curriculum. This curriculum offers students course options and 
defers job-specific education and training until after secondary school (Rutkowski 
and Scarpetta 2005). Moreover, many of the skills for which worldwide demand is 
growing most rapidly—such as foreign-languages and scientific problem-solving 
proficiencies—are normally provided by general secondary and higher education 
programs. To that extent, general secondary education is becoming, in effect, rel-
evant vocational education. Given the need for lifelong learning and skills upgrad-
ing in a global knowledge economy, all secondary education programs should 
thus aim to provide the foundation for further educational development, includ-
ing the deepening and refinement of skills. 
Recent reforms in Poland, which led to consistent improvement in student 
learning outcomes, provide a powerful example of how educational quality at the 
secondary level can be enhanced by postponing the early sorting and streaming 
of students into academic and vocational tracks. Research suggests that the im-
provement in Polish students’ test scores can be traced to the increased exposure 
of all students, especially low-performing students, to academic instruction 
(Jakubowski et al. 2010). This goal was achieved by delaying the start of voca-
tional education, with its traditionally greater emphasis on narrow job-related 
skills, by one year for all students. The result was much stronger grounding of 
students in reading and mathematics, especially among weaker students who 
had previously been tracked into vocational schools, and consequently, better 
performance in assessments of student learning such as the PISA.
Sources: Rutkowski and Scarpetta 2005; Jakubowksi et al. 2010; authors’ analysis.
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autonomy at the tertiary level in the ECA region has not been without 
problems. Unfortunately, unethical behavior is flourishing at the tertiary 
level, which undermines the sector’s ability to deliver quality education 
for all.
There are, however, ways of moving forward at the pre-university level 
while addressing these concerns. For instance, institutional autonomy 
does not have to be granted to all schools at the same time. Since central 
authorities might reasonably have concerns about granting autonomy for 
management when capacity at lower levels is very limited, one practical 
approach would be to start with larger schools (and larger local educa-
tional authorities), which usually have more managerial experience. From 
an implementation perspective, the benefits of focusing on large schools 
are obvious. In the case of Romania, for example, focusing initially only 
on large schools would involve training, say, 1,000 school principals and 
accountants, rather than the principals and accountants of more than 
7,000 small schools.
The degree of autonomy granted to schools can also be expanded 
gradually, with country circumstances influencing the ultimate degree of 
autonomy eventually granted. It is important to note that autonomy—
like accountability—is complicated. For instance, granting schools more 
autonomy in budgetary matters is unlikely to have much impact unless 
this autonomy includes the ability to make staffing decisions (since staff 
costs are the single largest budget item). Similarly, autonomy over staffing 
decisions will, inevitably, involve providing schools the autonomy to 
determine class sizes. Policy makers are thus urged to simultaneously 
make changes to a number of rules and regulations as part of a change in 
class sizes. 
Improve the Efficiency of Resource Use
An essential step toward more results-oriented management of basic 
education is linking funding to results, which will advance several objec-
tives. First, performance-based funding signals the desired result. Because 
information on results enters budget discussions, education systems are 
forced to collect data and measure results more systematically, creating 
“demand” for student achievement data and its analysis. Second, such 
funding embeds incentives into financing flows: actors in the system are 
rewarded by delivering results and will therefore seek to do so. As a 
result, performance-based financing can help address the large inefficien-
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cies characteristic of education sectors in the ECA region. With money 
linked to results—as opposed to inputs—principals will, for example, hire 
the number of teachers and janitors needed (and that can be afforded), 
not the number mandated by norms.
In addition to instituting performance-based financing, education min-
istries can do the following:
Require local authorities and schools to present their expenditures in a • 
specific format that allows them to be compared nationwide, as well as 
have them audited by an outside party.
Require schools to run surpluses or deficits no greater than a specified • 
percentage of their total budget for a specified time period, say, one 
year.
Require that school budgets and actual expenditures be made publicly • 
available on school bulletin boards or websites or both.
Per Student Financing
In pre-university education, the most basic way to introduce perfor-
mance-based financing—the path that several ECA countries have begun 
to pursue (see figure 3.10)—is to tie school funding to the number of 
students enrolled. Hence this type of financing is referred to as “per 
capita financing” or “per student financing.” Theoretically, defining a “per-
formance” measure as a student “enrolled” is somewhat unappealing. 
A theoretically more appealing measure would be “a graduate” or even 
“a graduate who has obtained a certain level of proficiency” (or even “a 
graduate who finds a job within a fixed time frame”). 
It is important to note that per student financing does not imply that 
the number of students enrolled is the only factor that determines the 
amount of money transferred from the central government to a local 
school. In fact, most countries allow the per student amount to vary 
according to a formula. Allowing for different per student amounts makes 
sense because the cost of providing education is not uniform in a given 
country. For example, it is more costly to enroll and graduate a socioeco-
nomically disadvantaged or minority student because this student will 
require more attention and support. Similarly, areas of the country with 
few inhabitants will naturally have smaller schools that, in turn, imply 
larger costs. Good formulae take these differences into account to avoid 
punishing schools and local authorities that serve challenging student 
populations or locations or both. Box 4.4 provides an example of a 
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Box 4.4 
Per Student Funding Formula: Recognizing the Varied Costs 
of Providing Education 
The new financing system that became effective in Bulgaria on January 1, 2007, 
establishes individual per student financing standards for four different types of 
municipalities. Figure B4.4 presents these per student standards and the criteria that 
were used to differentiate between municipalities. The first type consists of munici-
palities that have 70,000 or more people living in the municipal center. The remain-
ing municipalities (all of which have less than 70,000 inhabitants living in the 
 municipal center) are divided into three groups: (1) municipalities with a population 
density greater than (or equal to) 65 people per square kilometer; (2) municipalities 
with a population density less than 65 people per square kilometer; and (3) small 
mountainous municipalities (a subgroup of 1 and 2) with more than three settle-
ments and less than 10,000 inhabitants living in their municipal centers.
Whenever the financing scheme for education is changed, there are winners 
and losers. Identifying the losers and providing them with an adjustment path is 
thus part of a good implementation program. In Bulgaria’s case, the Ministry of 
Education and Science (MES) recognized that 88 out of 264 municipalities would
large municipalities:
population ≥ 70,000 in the
municipal center
40 municipalities:
baseline amount x 1.07,
or Lev 849
139 municipalities:
baseline amount x 1.12,
or Lev 894
underpopulated
municipalities:
population < 70,000
in the municipal
center and a population
density ≥ 65 persons
per square meter
70
municipalities:
baseline
amount x 1.2,
or Lev 958 
15
municipalities:
baseline 
other municipalities:
population < 70,000 in
the municipal center and
population density < 65
persons per square meter  
small mountainous
municipalities:
population < 10,000 in the
municipal center and ≥ 3
separate settlements
Figure B4.4 Groupings of Bulgarian Municipalities, Together with Baseline 
Per Student Financing Amounts and Adjustment Coefficients, 2007
Source: World Bank 2007b.
(continued next page)
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receive less funding (in nominal terms) under the per capita scheme than they 
had received the year before the new scheme was introduced (i.e., in 2006). To 
allow these municipalities time to adjust their class sizes (and, if needed, reduce 
the number of schools), they were entitled to receive compensation equivalent 
to the difference between the allocation based on the new per student amount 
and their allocation in 2006 during the initial year of implementation.a
However, to ensure that these “losing” municipalities would eventually be able 
to operate in a fiscally sustainably manner under the new regime, they were 
 required to present a school consolidation plan to MES and the Ministry of  Finance 
in order to qualify for the compensation. In addition, the MES clearly communi-
cated that the compensation would only be available during the first year of im-
plementation. Thus, losing municipalities had strong incentives to initiate school 
consolidation; with wages increasing by about 5–10 percent per year (at the time) 
in nominal terms, the only way for them to become financially viable under the 
per capita scheme was to consolidate their school networks. As  expected, the 
reforms led to a large number of school closures, as municipalities moved to cre-
ate more viable schools.
Source: Authors based on World Bank 2007b.
a. On the other hand, implementation plans did not specify any ceilings on funding for municipalities 
that would be “winners” under the new scheme. Thus, municipalities that had well-optimized school 
systems would experience increases in their education budgets.
Box 4.4 (continued)
 formula used in Bulgaria that differentiates between the underlying costs 
of providing education in different circumstances.
Create incentives for larger class sizes. As mentioned in chapters 2 and 
3, student-teacher ratios, class sizes, and school sizes have fallen precipi-
tously in most ECA countries over the past 20 to 30 years. As a result, 
education systems in most of these countries are wasting scarce resources 
(from an educational perspective): they are heating and maintaining half-
empty buildings; employing, training, and paying salaries to a larger staff 
than needed; and maintaining class sizes that could, in all likelihood, be 
increased (e.g., to their levels of just 20 years ago) without affecting the 
quality of education.
Small class sizes and a large number of teachers relative to students 
are observed in all countries of the region for which data are available, 
except Turkey. For instance, class sizes at the primary level (i.e., grades 
1–4) in Poland, Serbia, and Azerbaijan are 20, 14, and 12, respectively, 
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compared to 23 in France, 26 in the United Kingdom, and 31 in Chile 
and the Republic of Korea (see figure 4.1). School-level data show that 
the small class problem in the ECA region is not only a problem of small 
schools—even the largest schools in these countries have relatively 
small classes (see figure 4.2). The fact that even large schools have small 
class sizes suggests that significant savings can be generated merely by 
within-school optimization, that is, forcing existing (large) schools to cre-
ate larger classes.
As noted in chapter 3, there is no “magic” size that fits all students and 
learning circumstances. What works, on average, in a Korean school in 
2010 may not work in a Ukranian school in 2010, and what works for 
some students may not work for others. A class size of 35 may be appropri-
ate in an urban classroom taught by the country’s best teachers, whereas a 
class size of 5 may be suitable for a tiny, rural school where every student 
is from an ethnic minority. Rather than focus on determining a general 
“appropriate” class, ministries of education would thus be better off trying 
to change the rules of the game for principals and local authorities. 
Specifically, as discussed in the previous section, they should expand local 
autonomy to let principals determine the appropriate class size for their 
respective schools (taking into consideration local circumstances and 
needs) and use a per student financing formula to ensure that financial 
performance is also part of a principal’s management considerations.
Encourage school optimization. The experience of ECA countries that 
have implemented per student formulae suggests that these formulae 
alone do not lead to school closures; their introduction needs to be 
complemented by other policy initiatives (e.g., a program to finance the 
transportation of children to their new schools). However, putting such a 
formula in place can signal to school principals and local communities 
that certain schools are no longer financially viable.
Until its recent push to close underutilized schools, Bulgaria had 
many villages with large school buildings capable of accommodating 
hundreds of students (see box 4.5). These schools were standing virtu-
ally empty, with only 50 to 100 students enrolled. Addressing the 
inefficiencies that result from such an oversized school network—
underutilized space, small class sizes, and scarce maintenance resources 
stretched across many buildings—is a necessity throughout the ECA 
region. Closing and merging schools will, however, be substantially 
more difficult than increasing class sizes in large schools. In addition, 
school closures may produce certain associated costs, including 
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Figure 4.2 Average Class Size in Large Primary and Secondary Schools in Nine 
ECA Countries, Various Years
Source: Authors’ analysis based on school-level data obtained from the ministries of education or national statis-
tical agencies of nine ECA countries for various years. 
Note: The definition of a “large” school is flexible in order to recognize different types of schools in ECA countries. 
A primary school that teaches only grades 1–4 is defined as a large school if it has more than 50 students per 
grade and thus a total of more than 200 students. A comprehensive general school that teaches grades 1–12 is 
defined as a large school if it has more than 600 students.
 transportation for students to reach more distant schools, refurbishing 
receiving schools, and providing after-school programs.
Address Overstaffing
School systems in the ECA region have to date focused more on protect-
ing teaching positions than on ensuring fewer, higher paid jobs. In light of 
mounting cost pressures, many countries in the region are now trying to 
downsize the number of both schools and teachers in their systems. In 
addition to increasing class sizes and optimizing existing schools, coun-
tries in the region might explore the scope for retiring over-age teachers. 
Specifically, they could use the impending wave of teacher retirements to 
implement an orderly reduction in the number of teaching positions, 
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Box 4.5
Rationalizing Class Sizes in Bulgaria 
Recent efforts in the ECA region indicate that significant cost savings can be gained 
from rationalizing class sizes. Bulgaria’s recent experience provides the clearest 
piece of evidence. Starting January 1, 2007, the Bulgarian government shifted the 
financing system for primary education from one based on inputs (i.e., teachers) to 
one based on student enrollment. The bulk of financing for education to munici-
palities is now provided in the form of a large earmarked grant based on the num-
ber of students in the municipality. Municipalities can then decide themselves how 
many schools they want to maintain. Not surprisingly, many municipalities quickly 
decided they could do with one, two, or three fewer schools than they had previ-
ously maintained, together with larger class sizes. As a result, they started approach-
ing the Ministry of Education with requests for school closures.
The Ministry of Education in Bulgaria still plays an important role in the school 
closure process. It has the final say in school closings and monitors compliance 
with a fairly elaborate set of procedures that municipalities must undertake before 
closing a school. For instance, a school closure proposal has to  include a discussion 
of how the transportation needs of affected students will be addressed and 
 demonstrate that nearby schools have sufficient capacity to accommodate the 
additional students. The government has also introduced a program to monitor 
dropout rates at receiving schools. And it has established a number of additional 
national programs to support municipalities in the process. For instance, munici-
palities with school closures can apply for school buses, additional payments for 
laid-off teachers, and resources to refurbish “central” (or newly “merged”) schools. 
Finally, the ministry has put together a list of “protected schools”: schools that 
 cannot be closed because no nearby schools exist, thus ensuring access to educa-
tion for all. Additional resources to finance such small schools (usually  located in 
mountainous areas) are also provided by the ministry.
The results of this process in Bulgaria are shown in figures B4.5A and B4.5B be-
low. After many years of unsuccessful attempts to close schools (interrupted by 
brief spikes in school closures in 1997 and 2000), Bulgaria has seen a sharp increase 
in school closures since per student financing was put in place in 2007. Prior to 
these closures, average class sizes had been gradually decreasing even in large 
schools. However, with better incentives and greater freedom to take action, the 
principals of these schools turned around this trend: the average class size rose for 
the first time (albeit only marginally) in 2008–09 (see figure B4.5A). 
(continued next page)
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Figure B4.5A Estimated Number of Public School Closures in Bulgaria from 
1991–92 through 2008–09
Source: World Bank staff calculations based on Bulgaria National Statistical Institute Web site (www.nsi
.bg/index_en.htm) and estimates for the 2008–09 school year. 
Note: The number of “school closures” has been estimated somewhat crudely, as has the difference in the 
number of public general education schools (i.e., the “net change” in the number of schools). Thus, in 
principle, there could have been more school closures in a given year if new schools were opened that 
same year. 
Box 4.5 (continued)
Source: Authors’ calculations based on school-level data obtained from Bulgaria’s National Statistics Insti-
tute Web site, www.nsi.bg/index_en.htm.
Figure B4.5B Average Class Size and Student-Teacher Ratios in Bulgaria, 
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while slotting new hires for subjects in greatest demand, such as informa-
tion technology. The use of stronger redundancy or retraining packages or 
both for departing teachers might make departures more acceptable. The 
experience of countries now in the process of reducing teacher numbers 
in response to the ongoing economic crisis (e.g., Latvia and Romania) 
may provide valuable lessons in this area.
At the same time, governments in the region will need to develop 
strategic policies to reinvigorate the teaching profession (see box 4.6).
Box 4.6
Developing New Teacher Policies
When policy makers in the ECA region are freed from the daily operational work 
of managing schools, they can devote more time to managing the most impor-
tant asset in the education sector: teachers. Specifically, they have the opportu-
nity to design long-term policies to restore the prestige of the teaching profes-
sion, attract higher-caliber teachers, and motivate them to remain in the profession. 
The importance of good teachers is well understood as a central feature of top-
performing education systems worldwide, which all share one important feature: 
the ability to attract high-performing individuals into a teaching career and turn 
them into effective instructors.a
One innovation that ECA countries could consider would be to introduce per-
formance as a more formal criterion for teacher remuneration. In Chile, the Ministry 
of Education introduced a productivity bonus called the “National Subsidized School 
Performance Evaluation System” in 1996. The aim of the program was to improve 
academic performance via the bonus, which was given to teachers working in insti-
tutions that showed the best test score results over the course of two years. To 
 ensure that test score results were compared between similar schools (i.e., schools 
with students from similar socioeconomic groups), “homogenous school groups” 
were created and the competition between teachers and schools were created 
within these groups. The scheme in Chile is thought to have been associated with 
generating better learning outcomes (Contreras, Flores, and Lobato 2003).
Another innovation that ECA countries could consider is to more carefully 
monitor teaching practices (as opposed to monitoring student test score results 
alone). Having standardized information on classroom teaching practices in addi-
tion to test score results would provide policy makers with intermediate informa-
tion on strengths and weaknesses in the learning process. 
(continued next page)
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Summary
To manage for results at the pre-university level, education ministries 
should implement national student assessment exams on an annual 
basis, as well as participate regularly in student assessments such as 
PISA, TIMSS, and PIRLS. For assessment data to produce the kind of 
information needed to improve student outcomes, however, background 
information on the students who take these assessments must be col-
lected at the time of the tests. Without such information, the usefulness 
of test scores is severely constrained because the data cannot be disag-
gregated by different types of students, such as those from different 
In the United States, a recent large-scale evaluation of teacher policies relied 
on a prominent tool—the Vermont Classroom Observation Tool (VCOT)—that 
may offer a suitable starting point for ECA countries. The VCOT reportedly 
measures those teacher practices that current research suggests are essential to 
good teaching or that have been linked to student achievement. According to 
the researchers involved in the evaluation, who reviewed all available tools for this 
purpose, VCOT has a number of desirable features, including the following:
•  An appropriate level of detail on teaching practices that are deemed to be good 
instruction, including the ability to capture complex teacher behaviors, such as 
whether a teacher makes connections between reading and writing
•  Relatively simple implementation in the field (see Glazerman et al. 2009).
Needless to say, more conventional tools to heighten the quality of future 
teachers are also important, such as accrediting teacher training programs and 
requiring that teachers be certified before entering the classroom. Best practices 
mandate that accreditation be performed by an independent agency and focus 
on evaluating the learning outcomes of teacher training programs, rather than 
prescribing fixed ways to accomplish prescribed learning objectives (OECD 
2005a). Teacher certification, moreover, can be an effective way to assess whether 
teaching candidates possess the qualities essential to the profession. 
Sources: McKinsey & Company 2007, 2008; Glazerman et al. 2009; OECD 2005a; authors’ analysis.
a. Although perhaps unsuitable for a national strategy, the Teach for America Program in the  United 
States and the Teach First Initiative in the United Kingdom provide invaluable lessons for policy makers 
seeking to develop aggressive teacher recruitment strategies. Both programs employ the same tools 
used by top private firms to attract high-caliber candidates (see McKinsey & Company 2008).
Box 4.6 (continued)
SNJD.indb   136 9/27/11   10:11:06 PM
Managing for Results at the Pre-University Level of Education        137
socioeconomic backgrounds or ethnic minorities. Policy makers can cre-
ate greater demand for this data in part by making student learning 
outcomes a component of teacher and school evaluations.
Perhaps most important, countries in the ECA region need to move 
beyond using national assessments solely for examination purposes and 
begin using such tests to assess the quality of education at each level and 
thus inform policy making in the sector. In addition to performance data, 
ECA countries need to regularly collect data on the labor market out-
comes of secondary graduates, primarily through labor market surveys 
and periodic tracer surveys of graduates. 
Central education ministries should also abandon a “policing” mindset 
that manages schools for compliance with norms and instead grant schools 
greater autonomy in return for accountability. This means giving lower-
level actors greater decision-making power over school operations and 
budgets, as well as relaxing central norms on class sizes. Greater autonomy 
is particularly needed in vocational education and training, where pro-
grams need the ability to response to demand. Among the potential 
accountability mechanisms that policy makers can implement are the 
creation of school councils; school development plans that outline each 
school’s strengths and weaknesses; “school scorecards” that include basic 
indicators on a school’s performance; and the sanctioning of low-perform-
ing schools and rewarding of high-performing schools, defined—in both 
cases—as schools that improve (or not) the learning outcomes of all types 
of students, including those from low-income and minority households. 
Significant improvements in the direction of greater autonomy and 
accountability will, however, be difficult to achieve in the school system 
unless policy makers in the region address the neglect of the teaching 
force, an effort that will involve resolution of serious overstaffing prob-
lems and improving the pay, professional development, and work condi-
tions of teachers. Specifically, policy makers should take advantage of the 
impending wave of teacher retirements to implement an orderly reduc-
tion in the number of teaching positions, while slotting new hires for 
subjects in greatest demand, such as information technology. The use of 
stronger redundancy or retraining packages or both for departing teachers 
may make departures more acceptable.
Finally, per student financing should be introduced in the school sys-
tem using a formula that allows the per student amount to vary according 
to the cost of providing education in a given region or school. Such fund-
ing also embeds incentives into financing flows: actors in the system are 
rewarded by delivering results and will therefore seek to do so. 
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Notes
 1. For an example of school scorecards, see the Ministry of Education of Chile 
website at www.simce.cl. For an example of school report cards with value-
added results, see U.K. school results on the U.K. Department for Education 
website at www.education.gov.uk/performancetables./ (both URLs accessed 
January 2011).
 2. U.S. Department of Education. 1998. “Turning Around Low-Performing 
Schools: A Guide for State and Local Leaders.” U.S. Department of Education, 
Washington, DC. http://www.ed.gov/pubs/turning/intervene.html. Accessed 
September 2010.
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C H A P T E R  5
Managing for Results in the 
Tertiary Education Sector
Despite certain areas of excellence and growing numbers of students, the 
quality of tertiary education1 among countries in the ECA region contin-
ues to be of concern. The sector has expanded, but the growth has 
occurred without sufficient quality assurance mechanisms and without 
the necessary information enabling users to make informed choices. As a 
result, it is unclear if tertiary students are graduating with the advanced 
competencies needed by future employers. 
A number of countries in the region have already granted tertiary pro-
viders considerable autonomy.2 These countries, while continuing to 
promote local management of this sector, now face the additional hurdle 
of improving academic and fiscal integrity by introducing accountability 
mechanisms that focus on improving learning outcomes. Other countries 
in the region have yet to change their centralized management practices. 
These countries face the simultaneous challenges of enhancing university 
autonomy and developing stronger accountability mechanisms. All of the 
ECA countries, however, need to make greater efforts to collect data on 
student learning and employment outcomes, and introduce performance-
based financing. 
Even though fundamental integrity problems remain widespread in 
the university sector, it is important that ECA policy makers refrain 
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from attempting to resolve these problems before they devolve authority 
to universities and introduce flexible financing. The great temptation in 
the region—given its tradition of strong centralized control—is to fix 
integrity problems with even stronger centralized control and manage-
ment, which history suggests is unlikely to improve the situation. Even 
if it could, more control is unsuited for improving either relevance or 
financial efficiency in the tertiary sector. Instead, greater autonomy is 
needed if local decision makers are to discover and adopt local, innova-
tive solutions that equip their graduates with the competencies needed 
on local labor markets. 
In addition to strengthening accountability, all ECA countries need to 
focus on collecting more student outcome data. Here, the region shares 
the problem of advanced industrial nations: an inability to evaluate sector 
performance based on student learning outcomes. Performance in tertiary 
education continues to be primarily evaluated based on the data that are 
easy to generate, namely, the number of academic publications by faculty, 
which says very little about the quality of teaching and even less about 
how much students have learned. The only way to shift the discussion of 
performance towards student learning outcomes is to start using stan-
dardized tests to measure what students learn. 
Greater use of performance-based financing in the sector is also critical 
for improving the accountability and efficiency of higher education insti-
tutions. In addition, more private resources will be needed to help the 
tertiary sector meet rising student demand, with fee-based mechanisms 
offering an additional way to strengthen the focus on results. 
Introduce Learning Assessments and Track 
Employment Outcomes
As in the pre-university sector, the need for better outcome data in the 
tertiary sector is the first priority of central governments in the ECA 
region because without such data, they cannot address the legacy of cen-
tral planning. That is, they cannot move from micromanaging inputs to 
steering the system through policy guidance and standards. Specifically, 
policy makers need to know whether scarce public resources (and exist-
ing rules and regulations) in the university sector are working or need 
adjustment. For such an assessment, a range of different data is required, 
with data on student learning and employment outcomes the most 
important. Only this type of data can answer the question: What is the 
sector achieving in terms of results? 
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Governments are not the only actors that would benefit from better 
information on outcomes. Employers, students, and parents also need 
objective, standardized data to make informed decisions. The market for 
tertiary education is a classic example of the seller (i.e., universities) being 
vastly better informed than their consumers (i.e., students, parents, and 
future employers), or even their financiers and donors (i.e., governments, 
for the most part) (Carey 2010). When students make choices about 
future universities and degrees, they usually do so without having met 
the professors who will teach them and with little to no understanding 
of the skills that they will acquire. This asymmetry places a great deal 
of power in the hands of the seller, which can contribute to worsening 
quality and higher costs for the consumer. In other parts of an economy 
characterized by similar informational asymmetries, policy makers usu-
ally play a strong regulatory role or mandate that providers provide 
better information to consumers or both. 
Currently, data on tertiary outcomes in the ECA region as elsewhere 
focus on research outcomes, such as how many publications the faculty of 
a university is producing. Unfortunately, when this is the only performance 
indicator available, it inadvertently receives more attention than it should. 
Indeed, rankings of universities in the region place significant weight on 
the number of publications that they produce. However, from a skills per-
spective, the outcome that matters most is whether students are graduat-
ing with the competencies in demand on the job market and finding jobs. 
Currently, these outcomes are not being measured. Governments in the 
ECA region can change this situation by granting tertiary institutions pub-
lic resources in return for them providing useful information about stu-
dent learning and employment outcomes. There are several complementary 
ways of gathering this information, some of which are more direct than 
others. These include rankings or league tables, tracer studies, and direct 
measurement of student competencies via standardized tests. 
As noted in earlier chapters, standardized tests are the best available 
indicator for measuring student performance, especially when socioeco-
nomic characteristics are collected for each student (allowing the results 
of different socioeconomic groups to be compared). Such data are espe-
cially useful if organized to track the progress of individual students over 
time. Together with other indicators, these tests provide data on differ-
ences in learning outcomes between weaker and stronger students and 
institutions. Without this information, policy makers have no way of 
identifying—and thereby rewarding—institutions that do the best job of 
giving the largest number of students a quality education. Unfortunately, 
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a standardized international learning assessment for tertiary students is not 
expected to be launched until 2016 (see box 5.1). Thus, to gather the 
necessary data now—when it is needed—ECA countries will need to 
begin with their own, domestically developed approaches. Several coun-
tries around the world have already started introducing standardized tests 
to measure student learning outcomes (see Salmi 2011 for a review). Such 
efforts would provide complementary information to the international 
comparisons that Assessment of Higher Education Learning Outcomes 
(AHELO) will generate in the coming years. 
Box 5.1
The Difficulty of Measuring Competencies at the 
Tertiary Level
It is perhaps understandable that higher education institutions around the world 
have been reluctant to let governments interfere in designing tests and measur-
ing competencies of their students, arguing that such attempts would interfere 
with academic freedom. Any attempt to introduce such tests should accordingly 
be carried out in cooperation with higher education institutions. 
Several countries around the world have introduced standardized tests to mea-
sure what competencies their tertiary students acquire during the course of their 
studies. For instance, in the United States, the Collegiate Learning  Assessment (CLA) 
was developed in the 2000s by a subsidiary of the RAND Corporation, and is cur-
rently used only by roughly 400 institutions. Recognizing that students choose very 
different academic specialties in college, “the CLA tests the higher-order thinking 
skills that all college graduates should possess: critical thinking, analytic reasoning, 
and communication. The exam is given to a sample of freshmen and seniors to esti-
mate how much students learn in college” (Carey 2010, 16–17).
Similarly, since 1949, the Graduate Record Examination (GRE) has been used as 
an admission requirement by numerous graduate programs in the United States. 
It is a standardized test that seeks to measure verbal and quantitative reasoning, 
analytical writing, and critical thinking skills.
The OECD is currently preparing an assessment of tertiary students called the 
Assessment of Higher Education Learning Outcomes (AHELO), a tool that will “as-
sess learning outcomes on an international scale by creating measures that would 
be valid for all cultures and languages.”a However, the OECD does not expect a 
full-scale AHELO to be launched before 2016. 
Sources: Carey 2010; author’s analysis.
Note: a. See the AHELO website for more details: www.oecd.org/edu/ahelo (accessed September 2010).
SNJD.indb   142 9/27/11   10:11:08 PM
Managing for Results in the Tertiary Education Sector        143
Experiment with Measuring Learning Outcomes
All countries in the ECA region save Tajikistan, the Kyrgyz Republic, 
Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, and Kosovo, have become signatories to the 
Bologna Process and the push to create a European Higher Education 
Area (EHEA) by 2010.3 As participants in the Bologna Process, most 
ECA countries have taken important steps towards establishing and 
strengthening quality assurance institutions, and, most important, mov-
ing towards an environment where university degrees are described 
based on learning outcomes, competencies, and student workloads 
(Adelman 2003). “Learning outcomes” in the Bologna process are generic 
statements of what a learner knows and is able to do at the end of a 
period of study. This initiative has established learning outcomes for the 
three levels, or cycles, of tertiary education (bachelor, master, and doctor-
ate), as well as for so-called “short degree” or “short higher education” 
programs.4 Important preparatory work in this area has been done by the 
Tuning Project,5 which brought together academics from all over Europe 
to develop subject-specific learning outcomes for a range of professions, 
including, for example, history and nursing. 
The establishment of a European Qualifications Framework for Lifelong 
Learning, followed by the national qualifications frameworks (NQFs) of 
individual countries, are other important milestones toward the measure-
ment of learning outcomes. Within EHEA today, qualifications frameworks 
and the European Credit Transfer and Accumulation System (ECTS) 
allow teachers and students to establish how many “credits”—the quantita-
tive indicator for units of learning—a student obtains from finishing a 
course, program, or other unit of learning. However, countries in the 
EHEA have not yet moved toward introducing standardized assessments 
to measure what students acquiring these credits can do in terms of skills. 
One way that ECA countries might begin to measure the learning 
outcomes of tertiary students would be to introduce standardized testing 
within fields of study where these outcomes have been clearly defined. 
Alternatively, ECA ministries of education might develop tests of the 
broader competencies that all tertiary graduates can be expected to have 
(e.g. verbal reasoning, quantitative abilities, analytical writing, and criti-
cal thinking skills). The OECD’s DeSeCo project (OECD 2005b), dis-
cussed in chapter 2, could provide a starting point for the definition of 
such broad competencies. 
Start with rankings, tracer studies, and student surveys. Although it is 
likely to take years before the competencies of tertiary students can be 
measured using standardized tests, policy makers in the ECA region can 
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take immediate steps to provide more information about the quality of 
the tertiary sector. First, they can mandate that all tertiary institutions 
survey their students after graduation, using graduate tracer studies. Such 
studies can be implemented relatively quickly and would provide initial 
insight into a system’s current strengths and weaknesses. Second, regular 
surveys on the practice of purchasing admission and cheating may also be 
worth considering, given the magnitude of reported fraud in the tertiary 
sector (see the next section), even though such surveys would not be a 
measure of quality per se. Third, regular (standardized) surveys of stu-
dents regarding their satisfaction with their university choice and the 
teaching at that institution could also be implemented relatively quickly 
and provide additional information for the compilation of rankings.
With respect to tracer studies, two countries in the region—Hungary 
and Romania—are making rapid progress. In fact, these studies are 
becoming a core element of tertiary management in these countries. In 
Hungary, 2010 marked the first year that results from the new “Graduate 
Career Tracking System” were produced (spanning graduates from 25–30 
institutions). This project is the culmination of work that began in 2008 
and involved 30 ongoing EU-financed projects. In Romania, data from a 
graduate survey will be available in 2011. By that time, policy makers will 
have results from surveys of students who graduated in 2008–09 (i.e., 12 
months after they graduated), as well of students who graduated in 
2004–05 (i.e., five years after they graduated). As is the case with 
Hungary, the development of the tracer study in Romania is being 
financed by EU Social Funds.
Hungary is moving ahead rapidly on tracer surveys for several reasons. 
In the first place, central policy makers in the country are pressuring 
tertiary institutions to start collecting such data. The 2005 Higher 
Education Act of Hungary, for example, makes it mandatory for every 
university and college to carry out surveys of graduates. The central gov-
ernment has also made tracer studies a part of quality assurance discus-
sions, with the availability of such surveys now (or soon to be) tied to 
institutions’ accreditation agreements. In addition, the government is 
using the power of the purse, tying tracer survey data (or their availabil-
ity) to three-year financing agreements. In the second place, institutions 
of higher education in Hungary themselves consider tracer data useful for 
a number of reasons: (1) they want labor market feedback to help them 
design better programs; (2) the data can be used in marketing; (3) the 
data is valuable for internal quality assurance; and (4) tracer surveys are 
one of many engagement tools for strengthening an alumni network. 
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Rankings have also played an important role in helping broaden what 
performance in the higher education sector means, moving the definition 
well beyond a simple measure of the total number of publications a uni-
versity faculty produces. For instance, the British newspaper The 
Guardian provides “University League Tables” on 46 different fields of 
study (from programs focusing on “agriculture, forestry, and food” to 
“veterinary science”) that includes measures of student satisfaction with 
courses and teaching.6 
Conceptually, rankings are fundamentally a less valid performance 
indicator than student assessments or surveys of employment outcomes 
because they focus primarily on inputs and processes, rather than student 
outcomes. Nevertheless, rankings play a powerful role by providing cer-
tain key information on institutions, strengthening competition among 
them, and highlighting the idea that “performance” matters.7 For example, 
the multidimensional ranking of the Center for Higher Education 
Development (CHE) (see Usher and Medow 2009), has gained a strong 
international reputation. The risk, however, is these efforts promote com-
petition along the dimensions—that is, inputs and processes—that may 
not necessarily be relevant to outcomes, thereby possibly diverting atten-
tion and resources away from the outcomes that really do matter. 
Introduce greater autonomy and encourage private sector participation. 
As noted at the outset of this chapter, authority for operational manage-
ment of tertiary institutions has been most fully devolved in the new EU 
member states and to a lesser degree, in the countries of South Eastern 
Europe and in Ukraine and the Russian Federation (see box 5.2 for a 
description of this process in Romania). By contrast, the reform process 
has barely begun in Belarus and many other CIS countries. In countries 
where more freedoms have been granted, institutions of higher education 
have begun to act in a more entrepreneurial fashion, align their programs 
to a greater degree with the demands of students and the labor market, 
and respond efficiently to government incentives.
University autonomy is not, however, generally expanded through a 
straightforward transfer of authority between two static entities: the 
national government and tertiary institutions. Rather, tertiary institutions 
themselves have changed as governments have developed new methods 
of providing guidelines—a trend that has occurred more to date in 
Europe and North America than in the ECA region. In his recent study, 
Usher (2009) notes that governments have not simply handed authority 
over to traditional self-governing universities, but rather, transferred 
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Box 5.2
Decentralization of the University Sector in Romania
The degree of autonomy granted to tertiary institutions in Romania rapidly 
 expanded between 1995 and 2005, a period that saw less state regulation, more 
academic self-governance, and greater managerial governance at the university 
level. Stensaker, de Boer, and Enders (2006) have recorded the changes in these 
three criteria for a number of ECA and non-ECA countries. When judged against 
these standards, Romania’s tertiary institutions (along with those of many other 
ECA countries) have experienced a large increase in autonomy. The financing of 
higher education in Romania also underwent major reform, shifting from input-
based funding (i.e., linked to the number of professors employed) to student-
based funding (i.e., linked to the number of students enrolled).a 
Increases in autonomy and flexibility in financing happened very quickly—
before nascent measures aimed at holding institutions accountable could take 
hold. For instance, the rapid expansion in enrollment that began in 1990 occurred 
when the newly established Romanian Council for Accreditation (CNEAA, estab-
lished in 1993), was still discovering its mandate and trying to establish its institu-
tional credibility. Many new (mostly private) institutions were established during 
the boom years, but CNEAA simply did not have the capacity to review and 
 accredit every new program or institution; that task was, in some instances, out-
sourced to public universities, which—in exchange for a fee—were charged with 
taking a private, growing institution under their wings. By 2005, the shortcomings 
of CNEAA had become apparent and it was replaced with a new quality assurance 
agency—the Romanian Agency for Quality Assurance in Higher Education 
(ARACIS)—modeled on the European Standards and Guidelines (ESG) for quality 
assurance (see Korka 2008).b
There is visible evidence that the accountability framework in Romania today 
remains insufficient. For example, a long-lasting tug-of-war continues between 
the Ministry of Education, Research, and Innovation (MERI) and the largest private 
university (Spiru Haret University)—where as many as one-eighth of all university 
students are enrolled—over the right to enroll students without a license. 
 Although MERI has refused to accredit certain long-distance learning programs 
because of a lack of adequate professors, the private university continues to enroll 
and graduate students from these programs. There are also widespread integrity 
problems in the sector, as revealed by the Coalition for Clean Universities in a 2009 
report, “University Integrity Contest.” As discussed in more detail in box 5.4, the 
Coalition identified three concrete problems that undermine universities’ ability 
(continued next page)
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to deliver quality education: increased tolerance of plagiarism, extended nepo-
tism, and a lack of transparency in decision making and the academic process.
In response to these weaknesses, the government introduced a new law on 
education in 2011. The new law imposes many restrictions on the administrative, 
 financial, and staffing autonomy of universities. At the same time, the new law 
includes key measures to strengthen accountability for performance. For instance, 
the law requires extensive reporting by the universities and much transparency in 
their operations. Importantly, the law also introduces new ways to sanction public 
universities (including by withholding public funds).
Sources: Stensaker, de Boer, and Enders 2006; Korka 2008; Nastasescu 2006; Coalition for Clean 
 Universities 2009.
Notes: a. As noted earlier, this book refers to a student enrolled as an “output” (not an “input”) and teach-
ers, textbooks, books, financing, and so forth, as “inputs.” 
b. One of the differences between CNEEA and ARACIS was that CNEEA was a consultative body of 
the Ministry of Education, while ARACIS was established as an independent body. Another difference 
between the two bodies is that CNEEA did not involve international peers, whereas ARACIS does 
(see Nastasescu 2006).
Box 5.2 (continued)
authority to an entirely new managerial level that largely superseded 
former governing entities. At the same time, these governments have put 
greater emphasis on quality assurance and accountability structures at the 
university level. According to some authors (see Santiago and Tremblay 
2008), this shift in emphasis enhances, rather than reduces, their ability 
to direct higher education systems. Thus, while they have increasingly 
devolved day-to-day decision-making powers to a new level of university 
manager, governments have intensified their oversight of higher educa-
tion. This is now the central task before the group of ECA countries that 
have already largely decentralized their university systems. 
Low-income CIS Countries Need to Initiate Reform
In ECA countries that have maintained tight centralized control over the 
tertiary sector, the task ahead will be to start devolving authority to insti-
tutions of higher education. In some of these countries, however, the very 
opposite has occurred, with governments now forcing private institutions 
to comply with a host of new curricular and budgeting regulations. 
Ministries would instead benefit from delegating detailed operational 
responsibilities (e.g., controlling the number of student seats in various 
programs, managing budgets) and focusing on monitoring educational 
quality, mobilizing resources, and designing policy to improve strengths 
and reduce weaknesses in the tertiary education. 
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Azerbaijan is a good example of a country in which the tertiary sec-
tor remains highly centralized (see Salmi 2009). Very little autonomy 
has been granted to public universities in the country and there has 
been virtually no growth in the number of private universities. The 
Ministry of Education continues to centrally control student intake at 
every university in the country, even in the few private ones that exist. 
The ministry also decides which programs a university may open and 
enforces the closing of programs in areas perceived to be either 
 saturated or of little relevance. For example, in 2006, a number of uni-
versities had to terminate their programs in law, medicine, and interna-
tional relations.
The financing of higher education in Azerbaijan has also not been 
reformed and continues to be based on historical norms, with funding 
tied to the number of professors. In terms of strengthening quality assur-
ance (an important component of strengthening accountability for 
results), the Bologna scorecard ranks Azerbaijan’s progress as very lim-
ited, with a score at the very bottom of the list of 22 ECA countries that 
participate in the Bologna Process.8 Within this restrictive framework, it 
is very difficult for more dynamic tertiary education institutions to 
emerge and expand.
It is important that this group of ECA countries not take the path of 
the group that provided autonomy first without accountability, but 
instead introduce the two as mutually reinforcing policy instruments. 
This is not only considerably more effective, it is also politically more 
feasible to implement, as it is easier to grant the two together than to 
try to impose accountability later on already autonomous institutions. 
In carrying out this reform, policy makers in these countries need not 
simply transfer autonomy to static, traditional universities but can 
instead mandate that increased autonomy be accompanied by more 
“businesslike” and accountable leadership and management. Such 
change should aim, among other things, at professionalizing institu-
tional governance and management (Stensaker, Enders, and de Boer 
2006). A number of countries (or autonomous regions within coun-
tries) provide examples of how this can be done. For example, in 
Denmark and Norway and in Quebec (Canada), the wider tertiary edu-
cation community is held accountable by university boards that have a 
majority of outside members and the power to hire and fire the leaders 
of individual institutions (Fielden 2008, as cited in Salmi 2009). Recent 
reforms in Lithuania are moving the governance of higher education in 
this direction (see box 5.3).
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Box 5.3
Introducing Businesslike Leadership and Management in 
Lithuanian Universities
Policy makers and university managers in Lithuania know that it is not easy to get 
the right balance between institutional autonomy and accountability. Lithuania’s 
Law on Higher Education of 2000 was amended six times during the period 
2000–09. On April 30, 2009, additional sweeping reforms were introduced when 
an entirely new law on science and higher education was adopted.
The 2009 reforms aim to tackle a common problem of countries that have 
granted more institutional autonomy to universities: How do you get more busi-
nesslike leadership and management from university leaders and make them 
more accountable to outsiders? Prior to the 2009 reforms, the crux of the problem 
in Lithuania—as in many other countries of the ECA region—was the position of 
rectors. Rectors were usually elected from within the university; consequently, 
they felt accountable only to other faculty members (whose ranks they expected 
to rejoin after having served their term). They also usually had limited managerial 
experience. Reformers in Lithuania recognized that changing the way rectors 
were elected (and to whom they were accountable) was not a “magic bullet” for 
getting better university management, but without this change, major reform of 
university governance was unlikely.
The essence of the 2009 reforms was twofold. First, it narrowed the mandate 
of the Senate by clarifying that its main task was to safeguard and promote the 
academic integrity and prestige of the university (i.e., approving study programs 
and ensuring admittance follows academic standards), not to manage it. Second, 
it made explicit that rectors were accountable to a broader set of stakeholders 
than just faculty members, one that included taxpayers. This was achieved by 
changing the way rectors are nominated and selected. In the future, the Govern-
ing Council—two-thirds of whose members are from outside of the university—
will establish an election committee and hold open competitions to search for 
suitable candidates. (See table B5.3 for a summary of the reforms.)
In exchange for these reforms, university leaders have sought even greater 
institutional autonomy from the central government. In particular, they pointed 
to inherent inconsistencies in the major pieces of legislation governing higher 
education. For instance, although Article 5 of the Law on Higher Education states 
that the activity of higher education establishments is based on academic free-
dom and autonomy, the same article also says that this activity is determined 
(continued next page)
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not only by this law and the statute of the institution, but also by other laws. In 
practice, this meant that universities could not own their buildings or borrow 
funds, and were only able to spend budgets as they saw fit to a limited extent. As 
part of the 2009 reforms, these inconsistencies are being addressed by changing 
the legal status of universities from a budgetary to a public entity. This will provide 
them more freedom and the right to own property, as well as expand their rights 
to manage the property entrusted to them by the state.
Table B5.3 Summary of Changes
Governing body Before 2009 reforms After 2009 reforms
Governing Council Role:
Supervisory; confirms 
that Senate and Rector 
conform to the Statute 
and whether the activity 
and administration of the 
university are transparent
Composition of Council: 
2/3 appointed by Ministry 
of Education
1/3 University representatives 
(including Rector and 
student leaders)
Role:
Highest governing body 
responsible for strategic 
decisions
Composition of Council: 
Same composition, but with 
greater efforts to select more 
business leaders as Council 
members
New mandate:
Establish an election 
committee and have open 
competition for selecting 
Rector
Rector Role:
Highest administrative office 
responsible for the 
management of the 
university
Role:
Unchanged
Senate Role:
Highest self-governance 
institution in the university, 
responsible for its general 
affairs (including selection 
of Rector) 
Elect Rector
Role:
Highest body dealing with 
academic matters; approves 
study programs and ensures 
admittance follows 
academic standards
Source: E-mail correspondence of authors with Ministry of Education of Lithuania, 2009.
Box 5.3 (continued)
Create an Accommodating Environment for Private Providers
Another possible way to create a more flexible university sector is to 
provide an accommodating environment for private providers to establish 
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universities and flourish. Although clearly not a panacea—and not with-
out some attendant integrity problems (see below)—private resources are 
nevertheless critical because the cost pressures facing higher education in 
the region are simply too great. Private providers can be advantageous 
because they are usually (although not always) nimble and responsive, 
being less constrained by a top-heavy bureaucracy and political factors. 
They are also often run by especially motivated and entrepreneurial indi-
viduals who, in many instances, establish an institution because they see 
unmet demand. This type of creativity can prove very valuable to an 
education and training system that is seeking to become more responsive 
to rapidly changing labor markets—provided, of course, that adequate 
quality standards are enforced. (For more on the subject of private pro-
viders and private funding for tertiary education, see the section on 
financing below.)
Private providers in many ECA countries already play a crucial role in 
absorbing the increased demand for tertiary education that public provid-
ers have been unable to meet. Indeed, the rapidly growing and vigorous 
role of private providers in the ECA tertiary sector is one of 
the more notable features of the region’s educational systems. While the 
private sector at the tertiary level is not equally strong across the entire 
region (in a number of countries, particularly Croatia and the Czech 
Republic, private education is notable by its almost complete absence), 
it generally has a much stronger presence than in Western Europe, 
accounting for as much as one-third of total enrollment in some 
countries. For example, in Romania, private universities have played a 
crucial role in accommodating a tripling of the number of tertiary stu-
dents since 1998. By 2007–08, private enrollment there accounted for 
approximately 40 percent of all students enrolled at this educational level 
(World Bank 2008b).
In fact, the boom in private tertiary education in the ECA region is a 
characteristic example of governments using the nongovernmental sec-
tor to absorb demand (Slantcheva and Levy 2007). Most countries that 
embraced this solution have created a large number of small institutions 
that specialize in subjects that are inexpensive to teach (primarily law, 
social sciences, economics, and business administration) and whose 
teaching staff consists primarily of academics from the public sector 
who teach part-time to supplement their incomes (see, for instance, 
Linden, Arnhold, and Vasiliev 2008). This has been an efficient way 
to meet the niche demands of specific employers, satisfy demand 
in smaller and more remote areas of countries where public institu-
tions are not available, and introduce new (usually foreign) teaching 
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techniques and curricula to a local market (for example, New York 
University in Tirana). 
These private institutions have, to a certain degree, even taken part in 
attempts to change the prevailing culture with respect to transparency, 
markets, and democracy (for example, Khazar University in Azerbaijan 
and the European Humanities University in Belarus). However, private 
sector providers have not yet been able to offer education in the sciences 
or engineering or to provide education in a research setting. Throughout 
the ECA region, these specializations have remained the preserve of the 
public sector, with the notable exception of the British-Kazakh University 
in Almaty. 
Strengthen Accountability
Accountability at the most basic level refers to fundamental academic 
and fiscal integrity, which touches on such issues as admissions and finan-
cial fraud, plagiarism, and professorial nepotism. Here, almost all ECA 
countries continue to have serious problems. Strengthening accountabil-
ity in tertiary education also entails ensuring that public resources are 
spent effectively, the education provided is of high quality, and that study 
programs are relevant to students’ future in the workforce. Although it 
might seem necessary to address basic integrity issues before dealing with 
higher-order accountability issues, all of these problems can be addressed 
concurrently, a task made easier by the fact that most basic accountability 
instruments also address higher-level concerns.
Improve Fiscal and Academic Integrity 
At the lowest level, strengthening accountability in higher education 
means safeguarding the system’s basic integrity. With regard to finances, 
this implies preventing embezzlement, fraud in public tenders, collusion, 
and so forth. With regard to academics, it means avoiding examination 
fraud, unethical behavior among faculty, noncompliance with admis-
sion standards, research fraud and other forms of plagiarism, and decep-
tion in the quality assurance process (Salmi 2009).
With the exception of a few new EU member states, evidence suggests 
that higher education across the region is still struggling with basic integ-
rity issues, both academic and financial. As discussed in chapter 2, this 
evidence comes in different forms. For example, when randomly selected 
university students in a number of ECA countries were asked a range of 
different questions related to purchasing grades, admission, and diplomas, 
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more than 60 percent of respondents reported knowing of other students 
who had purchased either entrance to the university or a specific grade 
(see figure 2.6). Newspapers and other media regularly report on fraud 
and corruption in the sector. For instance, a scandal erupted in the Czech 
Republic in 2009 following revelations that a number of students had 
been awarded law degrees by the University of West Bohemia in Pilsen 
after only a few months of study. The scandal led the Minister of 
Education to order a national audit of all university degrees awarded since 
2000, covering some 315,000 graduates (see Holdsworth 2009).
The fact that such problems persist is also evident in the work of 
national quality assurance and accreditation agencies. For instance, in 
Georgia, when a National Education Accreditation Center was finally 
established in October 2004—13 years after the first private provider 
was allowed to operate—its first assessment of the 178 existing institu-
tions of higher education (both public and private) brought sobering 
news: only 78 passed the minimum quality requirement established by 
the center. While both private and public institutions were barred from 
admitting students in 2005, the vast majority of barred institutions 
were private. During the years when there was little or no regulation 
of quality, an estimated 20–30 percent of all tertiary students gradu-
ated from unregulated—and largely unmonitored—private institutions 
(Pachuashvili 2007).
As a recent report (Salmi 2009) documents, countries around the 
world utilize a range of different instruments to address basic integrity 
problems and strengthen accountability for educational quality and 
fiscal efficiency. The good news is that more sophisticated instruments 
generally help with accountability problems across the board, that is, 
with both basic integrity and higher-order accountability concerns. 
The various instruments available and their uses are summarized in 
table 5.1.
Many new members of the EU in the ECA region are already familiar 
with the instruments used to strengthen accountability for better  learning 
outcomes. Yet these tools also strengthen basic integrity. One such instru-
ment is licensing, which is critical for strengthening academic integrity 
in tertiary institutions. Other tools that promote both academic integrity 
and the quality of education include regular institutional evaluations, 
such as accreditation procedures, academic audits, and other forms of 
evaluation. Public disclosure laws are also useful. In addition, it is possible 
to foster programs in which outsiders—or anyone with no vested interest 
in the university system—review an institution’s academic integrity (this 
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tool been used in Romania, see box 5.4). Performance contracts based 
on performance indicators can also help ensure integrity and educational 
quality. Finally, it can be valuable to facilitate the creation of rankings or 
benchmarks or both and then disseminate these data in an appropriate 
manner.
Instruments that address basic fiscal integrity also have an impact on 
the efficient use of resources. One obvious tool for improving basic finan-
cial integrity is the financial audit. Tools that accomplish both fiscal integ-
rity and the efficient use of resources include public disclosure laws, 
strategic budget plans, performance contracts, external watchdogs (see 
box 5.4), and student loans, scholarships, and vouchers. In addition, it can 
be useful to embed incentives into the resources allocated to higher edu-
cation institutions, for example, by linking funding to the number of 
students enrolled or graduating or using it to reward good performers. 
These suggestions are discussed in greater detail in the section on financ-
ing below.
Implement Immediate and Long-term Quality 
Assurance Mechanisms 
Strengthening accountability for educational quality is an especially long 
and difficult process. At the outset, setting up effective accreditation 
or quality assurance mechanisms requires building a country’s capacity 
for these tasks. In view of the relatively weak institutional capacity for 
Table 5.1 Tools for Strengthening Basic Academic and Fiscal Integrity in 
University-Level Institutions
Tools that strengthen academic integrity Tools that strengthen fiscal integrity
•  Licensing •  Financial audits
. . . and educational quality . . .and fiscal efficiency
•  Accreditation, academic audits, and 
evaluations
•  Public disclosure laws
•  Public disclosure laws •  Strategic budget plans
•  Fostering of outsiders to review academic 
integrity (e.g., Romania)
•  Performance contracts based on 
performance indicators
•  Performance contracts based on 
performance indicators
•  Student loans, scholarships, and vouchers
•  Creation and dissemination of rankings, 
benchmarks
•  Embedding of incentives into allocated 
resources (e.g., tying funding to the 
number of students enrolled or graduated, 
rewarding good performers, etc.) 
Sources: Authors’ review of available instruments, as presented in Salmi 2009.
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Box 5.4
Using External Watchdogs to Shed Light on 
Integrity Problems
In 2007 in Romania, a group of 14 nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) 
combined forces to form the Coalition for Clean Universities (CUC) to monitor 
Romanian public universities and establish norms for good governance. The 
CUC piloted a methodology to assess the academic integrity of these universi-
ties. A questionnaire was designed and teams of external evaluators—com-
posed equally of experts and students—set about requesting information from 
the universities (see Mungiu-Pippidi 2009 for a detailed description of the 
methodology). In its widely disseminated report, the CUC emphasized three 
findings:
Evidence of increased tolerance for plagiarism. Despite numerous scandals 
regarding plagiarism, universities have no tools to control this phenomenon. With 
the exception of a single university, evaluators could not identify procedures for 
combating plagiarism, either at the diploma level or the level of papers elaborat-
ed by research staff.
Evidence of extended nepotism. In a number of universities, evaluators 
identified the existence of so-called “academic families,” raising serious 
 questions about the objectivity of promotions and evaluations among col-
leagues. In one university evaluated by the CUC, eight pairs of academic fami-
lies existed: three husband-wife pairs and five father-son pairs. Taking into 
 account the total number of teachers (45), the incidence of “academic families” 
was very high.
Lack of transparency in decision making and the academic process. CUC 
found that the competition for certain teaching or academic positions is kept 
quasi-secret; in the most common cases, there was, in fact, a single candidate. 
Similarly, the procedure for approving a university budget (revenues and 
 expenditures) is often carried out without any real consultation with the univer-
sity’s senate. Promotions and pay increases are also governed by nontranspar-
ent procedures, without clear benchmarks. Evaluators have also witnessed 
problems in the publishing of asset and interest declarations, as well as the 
absence of declarations on cooperation with the former secret police. 
 Restrictions in accessing public records of public acquisitions are also a major 
problem.
(continued next page)
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 monitoring educational quality and relevance among universities and 
ministries of education in the ECA region—including newly established 
or nonexistent quality assurance agencies—policy makers need to employ 
many different, complementary tools to strengthen accountability for 
results (see box 5.5). These tools include rankings and tracer studies 
(which also provide useful data on institutional performance in the 
absence of standardized assessments), together with an enabling environ-
ment for private sector participation. Counting on a quality assurance 
agency to quickly establish the capacity needed to externally monitor a 
rapidly growing sector is risky—this kind of agency needs to be part of 
the solution, but not the only response.
In 2003, the ministers responsible for the Bologna Process began a 
consultation designed to lead to a common, but not unified, system of 
quality assurance in the tertiary education sector. Two years of consul-
tations between quality assurance agencies, higher education institu-
tions, and student representatives followed, resulting in the adoption in 
2005 of the European Standards and Guidelines for Quality Assurance 
(ESG) in the European EHEA.9 The main features of this consensus 
are the following:
Tertiary institutions have primary responsibility for quality and are re-• 
quired to have processes of internal quality assurance.
Tertiary institutions are subject to external oversight by an agency • 
charged by the government with assuring the competency of quality 
assurance mechanisms. 
Quality review agencies themselves submit (on a voluntary basis) to • 
quality assessment procedures through the European Quality Assur-
ance Register, which is a joint project of the European Network of 
Quality Assurance Agencies (ENQA), together with the European 
The lack of transparency regarding internal procedures and administrative or 
academic results or both can be discovered simply by trying to access university 
websites, as they frequently do not include such information on such topics as 
employment opportunities, teaching jobs, teacher performance, program con-
tent, or decisions of internal governing bodies.
Source: Coalition for Clean Universities 2009.
Box 5.4 (continued)
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University Association (EUA), the European Association of Institutions 
in Higher Education (EURASHE), and the European Students Union 
(ESU).
In principle, this structure means that national quality assurance bod-
ies now coordinate to determine mutually acceptable evaluation frame-
works, and thus, visions of institutional quality. At the same time, 
institutions are empowered to assess themselves within the framework of 
wider agreements on institutional quality and evaluations that their rep-
resentative organizations have worked to develop. This situation is 
indicative of a broader governance trend (and changing government role): 
increased institutional operational autonomy coupled with strengthened 
webs of external coordination.
Box 5.5
Two Approaches to Strengthening Accountability
As noted by Alex Usher (2009), two approaches have been used throughout the 
world in the past 20 years to improve tertiary educational quality by strengthen-
ing accountability. The first approach is generally referred to as “quality assurance” 
or “accreditation,” and has traditionally focused on ensuring that certain minimum 
levels of resources (i.e., inputs) and standards are present to ensure a “quality” edu-
cation. In addition, the approach seeks to put requirements in place so that ter-
tiary institutions themselves monitor the quality of their education. 
The second approach focuses on learning conditions and learning outcomes. 
This method includes rankings systems and systems of performance indicators. It 
also relies to a much larger extent on using students and parents to exert outside 
pressure on tertiary institutions to deliver results. Thus, parents and students, 
rather than a state agency, become the driving force behind better 
accountability.a
These two approaches to enhancing accountability are complementary to, 
and not substitutes for, one another. As Jongbloed (2008) has noted, quality 
assurance is the equivalent of a restaurant health inspector, while university 
rankings are the equivalent of a Michelin guide. Both have their place and nei-
ther can replace the other.
Sources: Usher 2009; Jongbloed 2008. 
a. In the terminology of the World Development Report 2004, the first approach is the “long” route to ac-
countability, while the second is the “short” route (World Bank 2003c).
SNJD.indb   157 9/27/11   10:11:12 PM
158       Skills, Not Just Diplomas
Regular stock-taking exercises are carried out to assess whether 
Bologna participants are meeting concrete measurable goals towards the 
bigger goal of creating an EHEA. That is, whether they are making aca-
demic degree standards and quality assurance standards more comparable 
and compatible throughout Europe (see Rauhvargers, Deane, and Pauwels 
2009). The last such stock-taking exercise took place in 2009 and revealed 
that many ECA countries have a considerable way to go in terms of 
strengthening quality assurance mechanisms. In particular, the exercise 
showed that many countries in the region have not yet incorporated 
international peer reviews—one of the three key benchmarks in the 
stock-taking exercise—into their quality assurance processes. Figure 5.1 
groups ECA countries into three categories, according to their Bologna 
scorecard for implementing quality assurance mechanisms.
Figure 5.1 Progress on Implementing Quality-Assurance Mechanisms: 
The Bologna Scorecard
Source: Authors’ assessment. 
Note: QA = quality assurance.
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The 2009 stock-taking exercise also revealed significant weaknesses in 
establishing internal quality assurance mechanisms.10 For example, some 
countries (both ECA and non-ECA) treat internal quality assurance 
within institutions of higher learning only nominally (i.e., having institu-
tions prepare a “self-assessment report”), thereby ignoring an essential 
part of the ESG that focuses on “learning outcomes-based and improve-
ment-oriented internal quality assurance systems” (Rauhvargers, Deane, 
and Pauwels 2009, 51). A key failing of many countries is that they have 
still not managed to induce higher education institutions to describe pro-
grams in terms of learning outcomes. Even fewer countries have moved 
to introduce “student assessment procedures designed to measure 
achievement of the intended learning outcomes” (Rauhvargers, Deane, 
and Pauwels 2009, 55).
Introduce Performance-Based Financing and 
Encourage Private Funding Resources
Financing can be a central government’s most potent policy instrument 
for steering education providers. First, budget discussions—whether 
annual or pluri-annual—are recurrent events that give policy makers a 
regular opportunity to reward or discourage managerial behavior. 
Granting more autonomy or strengthening accountability instruments, on 
the other hand, are more protracted and lengthy processes. Second, in 
most ECA countries, public resources continue to provide a large share 
of tertiary education funding, giving the central government an important 
seat at the table. Finally, public resources can be used to influence the 
behavior of private institutions that may not otherwise have formal 
reporting arrangements with the government. In turn, private resources 
can strengthen a results-oriented outcome by encouraging greater com-
petition in the sector and increasing students’ stake in the end result of 
their educations.
Per Student Financing
Per student financing is the simplest and most effective instrument for 
moving toward output- and outcome-based financing in ECA countries. 
Per student financing, combined with autonomous management of both 
public and private education institutions, creates a competitive environ-
ment in which students select the best institutions that most closely meet 
their educational goals. Creating built-in incentives for individual institu-
tions to compete for students transforms an input-oriented, supply-driven 
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education delivery system into an output-oriented, demand-driven sys-
tem. Several ECA countries (for example, Poland and Romania) have 
already adopted per student financing as a core element of managing 
public tertiary education institutions, shifting their focus away from 
inputs and toward results.
Although most countries start the move towards per student financing 
by linking financing to students enrolled, conceptually, this is not ideal. 
Policy makers should encourage high student graduation rates, as well as 
high rates of subsequent employment—not simply enrollment. Systems 
in Denmark and the Netherlands provide an excellent model, one in 
which the funding formula is based on the number of graduates pro-
duced. Other output-based funding measures are also possible, for 
example, linking funds to survey results showing alumni success in the 
labor market, giving institutions clear incentives to ensure that programs 
are relevant to labor market needs, and aiding students in their transition 
to the labor market. These steps also motivate institutions to focus on the 
true outcome desired by policy makers: more qualified workers. Financing 
reforms also need to be accompanied by accountability measures in order 
to prevent reduced program rigor.
Performance Contracts
The introduction of performance-based budgeting can be a powerful 
instrument that ministries of education (and finance) can use to guide 
the sector, as it causes governments to shift from line-item to out-
come-based funding (OECD 2007c). At the same time, universities 
are given greater autonomy in how they spend their budgets and are 
held accountable for delivering results. Three models of performance-
based funding are currently being used in higher education (Ziegele 
2009): (1) formula funding, (2) target agreements, and (3) competi-
tive funding (see table 5.2). 
A recent report (OECD 2007c) reviewed the experiences of OECD 
countries with performance-based budgeting and highlighted five poten-
tial benefits. First, this type of budgeting generates a sharper focus on 
results within the public sector. Second, it provides more and better infor-
mation on government goals and priorities, as well as how different pro-
grams contribute to these goals. Third, it encourages greater emphasis on 
planning and signals what is working and what is not. Fourth, it improves 
transparency by providing greater and more useful information to the 
central government and the public. Finally, it has the potential to improve 
both the efficiency and the management of individual programs.
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Encourage more private financial resources in tertiary education. 
Mobilizing private resources can also help strengthen results-oriented 
outcomes in tertiary education in the ECA region in two fundamental 
ways: (1) by increasing competition, as more nimble and innovative pri-
vate providers help bring innovations to public providers; and (2) by 
increasing students’ connection to the education process. When students 
and parents pay tuition fees—whether to a public or a private provider—
they are generally more demanding about the quality and relevance of 
the education provided. 
As noted earlier in this chapter, one of the most prominent features 
of the tertiary sector in many ECA countries is the presence of a vibrant 
network of private educational institutions. It is thus necessary to look 
at structures and levels of fees in both sectors to get a full picture of 
private financing of higher education.11 Private higher education insti-
tutes in the region for the most part do not receive government funding 
for core operating purposes (Turkey is the prime exception here). In 
many countries, they can apply for and receive funding for scientific 
research, but because their research facilities tend to be poorer than 
those in public institutions, their success rate is often quite low. As a 
result, private institutions are for the most part entirely self-funded via 
tuition fees. 
Public institutions in many countries have also been given considerable 
latitude to raise funds through tuition fees. The introduction of fees has 
occurred despite deep political resistance (and even, on occasion, consti-
tutional prohibitions on the practice), which is a legacy of the region’s 
communist past. Generally speaking, the introduction of tuition fees has 
Table 5.2 Three Models of Performance-Based Funding
Formula funding Target agreements Competitive funding
Quantitative indicators 
representing goals
Technical issues: weights, 
cost differences, formula 
construction
Usual indicators: students, 
graduates, Ph.D.s, external 
income, international 
students, etc.
Ex post measurement of 
performance
Negotiation on objectives
Written and signed 
performance contract
Performance criteria 
tailor-made to different 
organizations
“Contract” definition of 
rewards and sanctions
Ex ante definition and ex 
post measurement of 
performance
Central funds with defined 
purposes (e.g., research 
excellence, national 
priorities)
Application procedure, often 
including peer review
Institutional and individual 
funding, project funding
Ex ante discussion on 
performance
Source: Ziegele 2009.
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come via a “dual-track” method in which a certain portion of students—
usually those deemed especially meritorious—are not required to pay. On 
top of these students, institutions are permitted to enroll a number of 
fee-paying students, although the institutional freedom to determine 
both fees and the number of additional students varies widely across 
the region. Thus, higher education in ECA countries has managed a 
delicate political balance by both introducing the principle of fees 
while retaining the principle of free tuition. 
Given the significant private returns to people who graduate from 
tertiary schools, however, there is an argument that the main beneficiary 
of this education—the graduate—should contribute a larger share of the 
costs relative to his or her peers who chose not to attend, or are not able 
to attend, university. There is no single ideal level of funding for higher 
education and no single ideal mix of public and private funding sources. 
Different countries will make different kinds of trade-offs. Yet if ECA 
countries want to simultaneously raise participation rates and increase the 
quality of tertiary education, more private resources will be needed—the 
cost pressures facing higher education are simply too great. 
Governments could, for example, permit public institutions to collect 
more revenue in return for commitments to enroll more students, or they 
could facilitate the development of more private tertiary education insti-
tutions. In either case, it is critical that all institutions be given the right 
to fully use their fees. It is also important that the expansion of private 
institutions take place within an overall system of quality assurance, and 
that appropriate financial assistance measures be put in place to assist 
students in need.
Summary
In terms of the relationship between the central government and tertiary 
institutions, ECA countries today can, broadly speaking, be divided into 
two groups. The first group consists of most new EU member countries, 
which have already expanded the autonomy of their tertiary institutions. 
Their main challenge today is to strengthen a still weak accountability 
structure, evident in persistent allegations of corruption in the sector and 
doubts as to whether existing accountability mechanisms (such as sanc-
tions, accreditation agencies, and so forth) are sufficiently strong to induce 
providers to focus on improving learning and employment outcomes 
(as opposed to other goals of tertiary institutions). The second group of 
countries—mostly low-income CIS countries—have maintained tight 
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centralized control over tertiary institutions. In order to create a more 
flexible and responsive tertiary sector, these countries need to impart 
more autonomy to universities, make financing a more active policy 
instrument (i.e., introduce performance-based financing), and, as with the 
first group of countries, introduce a range of mechanisms to strengthen 
the accountability of tertiary providers.
Because strengthening accountability for educational quality is an 
especially long and difficult process, ECA policy makers will need to 
employ many different, complementary tools to strengthen education 
providers’ accountability for results. In addition to quality assurance agen-
cies, introducing rankings, tracer studies, and standardized tests to mea-
sure student learning outcomes, together with more effective private 
sector participation, will enable countries in the region to launch both 
immediate and long-term quality assurance mechanisms. Counting on a 
quality assurance agency to quickly establish the capacity needed to 
externally monitor a rapidly growing sector is risky—this kind of agency 
needs to be part of the solution, not the only response.
An essential part of strengthening accountability will be to collect 
more student outcome data at the tertiary level. Without standardized 
tests to measure what competencies graduates acquire and tracer studies 
to establish the kinds of jobs they find on the labor market, institutions 
of higher education are severely hampered in their ability to measure 
their own performance or respond to the changing demand for skills. 
Finally, in addition to introducing or improving performance-based 
financing in the sector, countries in the region need to find ways to encour-
age more private financial resources in tertiary education. Not only will 
fee-based mechanisms enable the sector to meet rising student demand 
and introduce needed competition among providers, they offer an addi-
tional way to strengthen these providers’ accountability for results. 
Notes
 1. Given the complexity of the tertiary sector, some clarifications are needed. 
First, the “providers” discussed in this chapter, both public and private, are all 
institutions that offer tertiary education programs. Second, it is readily 
acknowledged that tertiary education institutions serve important societal 
goals that stretch far beyond that of providing graduates with employable 
competencies. For instance, through their research, these institutions help 
expand a society’s collective knowledge and can contribute to innovations in 
the economy, giving students employable competencies in the process. And 
through their political independence, universities help society hold public 
SNJD.indb   163 9/27/11   10:11:14 PM
164       Skills, Not Just Diplomas
officials accountable. Yet, the focus of this book—the need to create educa-
tion systems that are more responsive to labor market needs—implies that 
these broader goals of tertiary institutions (and the policies related to enhanc-
ing their performance in those dimensions) are beyond its scope.
 2. See a recent report on university autonomy by the European University 
Association (Estermann and Nokkala 2009). The EUA report does a care-
ful job of discussing the complexities and all dimensions of university 
autonomy.
 3. The Bologna Process was kicked off by the signing of the Bologna Declaration 
in 1999.
 4. See Bologna Working Group 2005 for further details. 
 5. For additional information on the Tuning Project, or Tuning Educational 
Structures in Europe, visit its official website at http://tuning.unideusto.org/
tuningeu/ (accessed September 2010).
 6. See the online guide at www.guardian.co.uk/education/universityguide/ 
(accessed January 2011).
 7. For a discussion of rankings, Kehm and Stensaker 2009.
 8.  The scorecard is the result of a regular stock-taking exercise undergone by 
countries that participate in the Bologna Process. The last such stock taking 
was carried out in 2009.
 9. The “European Standards and Guidelines for Quality Assurance in the 
European Higher Education Area” is available on the website of the European 
Quality Assurance Register for Higher Education at http://www.eqar.eu 
(accessed January 2011).
10. In addition to scoring countries on three indicators related to quality assur-
ance (“external quality assurance,” “student participation in quality assurance,” 
and “international participation in quality assurance,” the 2009 stock-taking 
exercise included a “qualitative analysis” of various aspects of internal quality 
assurance.
11. Private expenditures on higher education are somewhat difficult to capture. 
Data from the UNESCO Institute for Statistics on this subject is quite 
inconsistent, in part because it includes income from many different sources 
(see the UIS website, http://www.uis.unesco.org/; accessed September 2010). 
However, it is possible to look at fee income in a relatively straightforward 
way, based on accessible published sources. In most of the OECD region 
(with the exception of Japan, the United States, and Mexico), for example, 
fee income accrues almost entirely to public educational institutions. 
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C H A P T E R  6
Advancing Adult Learning in ECA
Lifelong learning and adult education and training are fast becoming an 
important element of education systems across the ECA region. Although 
demand for labor in the ECA countries has already shifted toward 
higher-order, multifaceted competencies, it has also become more unpre-
dictable, indicating the need for a market-responsive sector that can eas-
ily facilitate the reskilling of the adult labor force. The reskilling of the 
work force is needed not only to compete in the global economy, but also 
to address the lag effects of the transition to market economies. 
Significant segments of the labor force—often comprised of less-skilled 
and more disadvantaged workers—remain inactive in many areas. Given 
the rapid demographic decline expected in many ECA countries, main-
taining high rates of growth will require an increase in labor force par-
ticipation and productivity.
High-quality, relevant adult learning relies on (1) sound regulation and 
quality standards that promote autonomy and accountability (largely miss-
ing in all but a few ECA countries), including recognized qualifications 
frameworks and certificate programs, and (2) financing incentives that 
promote a competitive market and overcome the obstacles and market 
failures associated with the provision of adult learning. Overcoming infor-
mation barriers for individuals and firms is central to both policy levers.
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Unlike pre-university and university education, adult education sys-
tems are highly underdeveloped in most ECA countries. Building such 
systems will require a shift away from government-defined programs 
towards a well-regulated market of private and public providers that 
deliver training services to both working and unemployed adults. The 
preconditions for successful adult education systems are a high degree of 
coordination and partnership between government agencies and the 
private sector, as well as a strong voice for businesses and individuals—
that is, the demand side of training—in determining training policy and 
content. Governments in the region will continue to have a role in 
education and training for the unemployed, but once a solid adult 
learning sector has been established, governments can then “steer” it 
according to the policy framework outlined previously: by monitoring 
data, promoting autonomy, and improving efficiency. 
Although adult learning is of growing significance for all ECA coun-
tries, its relative importance depends on a country’s level of economic 
development and demographic outlook. For some countries, such as 
the EU10 and Croatia, moving quickly to build or improve this sector 
will be essential; for others, such as low-income CIS countries, prob-
lems in other parts of the education system will be a greater priority in 
the near term. 
Building the Foundations for Adult Learning Systems
Adult education and training is a relatively new concept in the ECA 
region. The experience of OECD countries suggests that developing this 
part of an education system calls for a common understanding and 
approach, shared strategic objectives, and functioning communication 
channels among a multitude of heterogeneous players. On the part of 
governments, it will require increased coordination between the minis-
tries of education, labor, and finance, other relevant government agencies 
(e.g., employment services), and regional authorities. Functioning policy 
coordination mechanisms are needed to give the private sector a genuine 
voice in adult education, thus making the sector responsive to economic 
and labor requirements. Creating such coordination mechanisms, how-
ever, takes time. 
Step One: A Coherent Strategy 
A typical first step in policy coordination and partnership is the elabora-
tion of a coherent strategy for adult education and training. This strategy 
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creates the basis for a practical legislative and regulatory framework. The 
EU, for example, has advised its member states to develop and implement 
strategies on lifelong learning to advance the education and training 
dimension of the Lisbon Jobs and Growth Strategy and its successor, the 
Europe 2020 Strategy. The EU10 have been adopting such strategies 
since 2005 (see box 6.1 for a case study). 
Box 6.1 
Lifelong Learning Strategy of the Czech Republic
After consultation with a wide range of stakeholders, the Czech Republic  adopted 
a Lifelong Learning Strategy in 2007 that includes a prominent section on 
 further—or adult—education. Building on an analysis of strengths and weak-
nesses, it identifies seven strategic directions.
Recognition of prior learning through the Act on the Recognition of the Results 
of Further Education, with the elaboration of a National Qualification Framework, 
qualifications standards, evaluation standards, and verification of professional 
qualifications.
Promotion of equal opportunities in further education, particularly for disadvan-
taged groups, through financial and nonfinancial instruments, including informa-
tion and counseling services.
Development of functional literacy, including the ability to use information 
technology, language skills, and other general behavioral skills.
Introduction of a system of labor market monitoring, evaluation, and forecasting 
to harmonize educational opportunities with socioeconomic and labor market 
developments.
Stimulation of demand for lifelong learning through elimination of financial and 
nonfinancial barriers among individuals and employers, for example, through 
counseling support, assistance services, and the promotion of systems of human 
resource development in small and medium-size enterprises.
Measures to enhance the quality of educational opportunities, including a system 
of external and internal evaluations, certification of adult education teachers, and 
accreditation of educational programs.
Development of information counseling services.
The strategy is used as the guiding document for further reforms in adult 
 education and training in the country, as well as for program financing by the 
European Social Fund.
Source: Czech Republic 2007.
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The experience of EU and OECD countries suggests that ECA coun-
tries could establish multistakeholder commissions on adult learning and 
task them with drafting a plan for developing the sector. Such commis-
sions typically convene national and regional stakeholders, including 
representatives of key government agencies, private sector employers, and 
trade unions. In drawing up a strategy, the tasks of such a commission 
typically involve taking stock of existing structures related to adult learn-
ing and determining the best way to make them more relevant to the 
current needs of labor markets and individual learners. In many cases, an 
entirely new system may not be necessary.
Step Two: Coordination Mechanisms
Once a coherent strategy has been elaborated, coordination between 
government and private sector actors is important to guide implementa-
tion. Coordination mechanisms can differ, depending on the context and 
type of training. In the Republic of Korea and the United States, for 
example, large multinational enterprises, together with relevant govern-
ment institutions, industry associations, small enterprises, and education 
providers, have collaborated in creating “training consortia” and joint 
training centers that address the strategic training needs of workers. In 
the Slovak Republic and the Czech Republic, there have been similar 
efforts at collaboration between large multinational companies and gov-
ernment agencies to promote adult learning in the automotive sector. 
In an effort to facilitate coordination, a number of countries worldwide 
have set up national adult learning bodies with broad responsibilities. The 
United Kingdom, for example, has established a Learning and Skills 
Council (LSC), which is responsible for overseeing nontertiary learning 
targeted at those over the age of 16 years. The LSC works at both the 
regional and national levels (see box 6.2). In Mexico, the National 
Council of Education for Life and Work (CONVEyT) is responsible for 
building a national system of education to serve adults over the course of 
their lives, including clarifying the role of different providers and con-
ducting research and evaluations. Bulgaria has established a National 
Agency for Vocational Education and Training (NAVET) that convenes 
government, education providers, and social partners (e.g., parent associa-
tions, NGOs, chambers of commerce, etc.) to define vocational education 
and training policies. 
Such organizations are, however, unlikely to be successful if the rele-
vant governmental ministries are not prepared to fully cooperate with 
them and provide them necessary support (OECD 2005c). Creating new 
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Box 6.2 
Policy Tools for Advancing Adult Learning 
in the United Kingdom
The Skills Alliance, a ministerial-led group of adult learning stakeholders, includ-
ing employers, provides oversight of the Skills Strategy in England. Employers 
offer input to the Alliance through their representatives, together with the Skills 
for Business Network and the National Employment Panel (NEP). The provision of 
training is organized and funded by Learning Skills Councils (LSCs) at national, 
regional, and local levels in partnership with Regional Skills Partnerships, col-
leges, providers, and other key stakeholders. Providers include publicly funded 
bodies, nonprofit agencies, and private education providers.
The LSCs allocate funds based on “expected demand.”  The planning process 
involves taking stock of the existing learning environment, drawing on different 
sources of labor market intelligence, and dialoguing with key partners, including 
employers and providers. Implementation involves the securing of training 
through open bids and closed negotiations managed by LSCs. In an effort to 
make the system less supply driven, an independent review of the U.K. adult 
learning system, the 2006 “Leitch Review,” laid out the following principles for 
adult education and training: 
(1)  demand-led funding, that is, routing public funds for adult vocational skills 
training through demand-led channels, thus ending supply-side planning of 
skills provision; 
(2)  strengthening the voice of employers by rationalizing the number of bodies 
that articulate the views of employers and creating a single Commission for 
Employment and Skills; and 
(3)  providing economically valuable skills by relying on reformed and relicensed 
Sector Skills Councils to ensure that vocational qualifications reflect the skills 
valued by employers (Leitch Review of Skills 2006). 
Similar to other EU countries that have introduced National Qualification Sys-
tems, the United Kingdom established the National Vocational Qualification 
(NVQ) system to recognize a broad spectrum of vocational skills that can be 
 acquired both on and off the job. Most critically, the NVQ system recognizes prior 
learning through an assessment process. The modular system allows participants 
to learn at a pace convenient to them. During the period 1988–2003, approxi-
mately 4 million NVQ qualifications were awarded, with the majority at Level 2 of 
(continued next page)
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the system (Dearden, McGranahan, and Sianesi 2004). Yet despite the growth in 
these qualifications, wage returns to NVQ Level 2 qualifications have to date 
largely been low or nonexistent, with a few exceptions (Dearden, McGranahan, 
and Sianesi 2004).
In addition, various projects provide information to workers to keep them bet-
ter informed about market demands and the returns to training. A number of pro-
viders also offer advice to workers, particularly those who are unemployed or 
qualify as low skilled. These efforts include Jobcentre Plus work to identify the skill 
needs of Jobseeker Allowance recipients who have been unemployed and inac-
tive for six months; Learndirect’s personalized advice, information, and guidance 
tailored to the needs of adult clients at the skill level NVQ 2 or below; and the com-
munity outreach of Learning Ambassadors, local volunteers who have themselves 
undergone adult training, to identify and work with people in similar situations.
Individual Learning Accounts (ILA) in the United Kingdom provide funding to 
individuals with the lowest skill levels, making training accessible to a group that 
otherwise would not participate. ILAs make a maximum sum of between £100 
and £200 available to low-skilled individuals, who may spend it on a qualification 
and provider of their choice. Individuals and their employers are also encouraged 
to contribute to ILAs. Opening an ILA comes with a guidance package that targets 
individuals who are least able to borrow from private financial institutions. In 
2000, England implemented one of its largest ILA projects, with 1.4 million par-
ticipants, but it was later closed due to irregularities. The project was found to 
suffer from significant deadweight loss, with more than half of participating indi-
viduals stating that they would have sought training without their ILAs (OECD 
2005c). Subsequently, however, both Scotland and Wales implemented compa-
rable schemes and since 2007, England again began to pilot a similar project.
Lastly, the government’s Train to Gain Program helps employers identify train-
ing needs and then tailor corresponding training packages which are jointly or 
fully financed by the government. The program offers financial incentives to 
 workers with paid time off and subsidies to employers to compensate for trainee 
wages. This intervention targets all market failures, from financing training to over-
coming the time preferences of employees, who worry about the opportunity 
cost of training. The Train to Gain initiative was first piloted in 2002–2006 and 
 covered 30,000 employers and 250,000 employees. It has now been mainstreamed 
across the country. Initial evaluations indicate a small positive impact on the take-
up of training for both employees and employers (Abromovsky et al. 2005). 
Sources:  Abromovsky et al. 2005; Dearden, McGranahan, and Sianesi 2004; OECD 2005c; Leitch Review 
of Skills 2006.
Box 6.2 (continued)
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bodies carries the risk of adding additional layers of bureaucracy; and 
some countries, such as the Czech Republic, have managed to enhance 
cooperation between ministries without forming new agencies.
Given the varying needs across an economy, sector- or industry-level 
councils can also be key components of successful adult learning systems, 
especially for defining the standards of vocational training and developing 
national qualifications frameworks (see below). Permanent regulatory 
bodies, on the other hand, help ensure that qualifications remain relevant 
to labor market requirements over time. The United Kingdom, for exam-
ple, currently relies on a network of employer-led Sector Skills Councils 
(SSCs) to coordinate different market stakeholders and develop quality 
standards. The SSCs are monitored by the Sector Skills Development 
Agency, which also ensures that cross-sectoral skills are adequately cov-
ered by U.K. licensing systems (United Kingdom 2003). 
Building on the United Kingdom’s example, the Czech Republic has 
formed Sector Skills Councils with the involvement of social partners. 
The government convened the human resource experts from leading 
companies to help prepare a national occupations framework, which, 
in turn, laid the foundation for a national qualifications framework. 
In Croatia, sector councils—reporting to the Agency for Vocational 
Education—have recently been established to assess skills needs in spe-
cific vocational sectors and contribute to setting occupational standards 
(World Bank 2009a).
Building Adult Learning Systems in the ECA Region: Uneven Progress
Although many ECA countries, particularly the EU10, have made 
progress in developing the kinds of coordination systems described above, 
several challenges remain. First, the voice of labor market stakeholders in 
decisions on adult learning continues to be weak relative to that of the 
government. For example, in Hungary, education and enterprise repre-
sentatives were involved in developing vocational qualifications and cur-
ricula, but employers viewed the qualifications as closely modeled on 
those of school education, too supply-driven, and insufficiently forward 
looking (Gunny and Viertel 2007). A large sample of top managers 
judged that the allocation of Hungary’s employer-based training funds 
was influenced most by government institutions, followed by training 
institutions, and finally, by employers’ associations. Not surprisingly, they 
felt that this order should be reversed (Godfrey 2003). 
Second, coordination challenges, particularly across ministries, persist. 
In Hungary, for example, coordination between the ministries of labor 
and education is limited, evidenced by the fact that they operate separate 
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adult education programs.1 In Poland, the ministries of labor and educa-
tion are statutorily required to cooperate on adult learning initiatives,which 
must be approved by the Council of Ministers. In practice, however, there 
has been little coordination (OECD 2005d).
The evidence for adult learning interventions to date is either lim-
ited or mixed; the success of their effectiveness depends on context, 
specific design features, and to whom they are targeted. Building adult 
learning systems thus requires carefully examining the successes and 
failures of existing international policies and programs. Moreover, gov-
ernments in the region will benefit from rigorous monitoring and 
evaluation, including impact evaluations, of such programs to ensure 
that they meet desired objectives.
Promote Autonomy and Accountability 
of both Public and Private Providers
Autonomy
Adult education is perhaps most effective when it functions as a market 
for training. If informed well, consumers will demand programs of high 
quality that are relevant to their employment aspirations. If autonomous 
and agile, providers will respond to this demand and offer quality pro-
grams in a competitive environment. If providers are held accountable for 
the quality of the training provided, programs will meet the highest and 
latest standards. If, for example, a computer training provider delivers 
programs of limited quality and relevance, consumers will simply shift to 
another provider. 
Arguably, private providers are already autonomous in their deci-
sions regarding market entry and exit, as well as regarding investments 
and products. The same is not necessarily true for public providers if 
they receive institutional funding from the government and are bound 
by government rules. In order to truly compete in the adult education 
and training market and deliver useful, state-of-the-art programs, pub-
lic providers also require autonomy to respond to changes in demand 
and other competitive pressures. For instance, to compete successfully, 
vocational training providers and tertiary education institutions will, 
similar to private providers, need to be autonomous in their decisions 
regarding market entry and exit, as well as regarding investments and 
programs. As an example, the Czech Republic is encouraging public 
vocational education and training schools to compete in the adult 
training market. 
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Accountability
Information is the key to accountability in adult education and training. 
Functioning accountability systems require government regulatory 
intervention to ensure that (1) adequate information is available for 
consumers of such education (so that they may make informed deci-
sions), and (2) the suppliers of adult education and training programs 
maintain the quality and relevance of their program offerings. Thus, 
policies that set standards for and ensure the quality of adult learning 
opportunities both foster supply and stimulate demand. For example, 
national qualification frameworks can help to stimulate demand by 
allowing workers to obtain certified qualifications that prove their com-
petencies to employers—and address a key information constraint. They 
can also make continuing vocational education and training (CVET) and 
retraining of unemployed workers more strategic and relevant to eco-
nomic needs. Clearly, the regulation and certification of education pro-
viders—both public and private—and their programs is a key element of 
developing an adult learning system. 
National qualification frameworks (NQFs) are being developed in 
many ECA countries to establish coherent quality standards for educa-
tion and training systems and recognize prior learning, including that 
acquired through formal, nonformal, and informal learning methods. For 
many countries in the ECA region, NQFs—at least for the tertiary level—
are a mandatory component of the Bologna process (see chapter 5). The 
development of such frameworks is, however, complex. NQFs require a 
strong legislative basis, a high degree of coordination and administrative 
capacity, and a great deal of time—countries such as Ireland and the 
United Kingdom have spent years developing and refining them (Gunny 
and Viertel 2007; Ireland 2003; United Kingdom 2003). Moreover, they 
are no panacea, and it is important to set realistic expectations as to what 
they can achieve in conjunction with other policy levers in adult educa-
tion and training. A recent assessment of the experience with NQFs in 
16 countries worldwide showed that they may not always result in the 
better matching of demand for and supply of adult education and train-
ing, nor in better training outcomes (Allais 2010). The success and failure 
of NQFs appear to depend, at least in part, on the extent of the construc-
tive involvement of key stakeholders—and their willingness to eventually 
make use of frameworks devised. 
As noted in the previous section, employer-led, sector-level councils 
often play a critical role in developing standards. For example, in the 
Czech Republic, sector skills councils have started to develop national 
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occupational frameworks for each occupation, together with their 
required key competences and qualifications. National qualifications 
standards are also being developed based on this information. By early 
2009 more than 160 qualifications standards were in place, with an addi-
tional 250 yet to be defined. According to the Ministry of Education, 
Youth, and Sport, the eventual number of qualifications could reach 
between 1,000 and 1,200. Given the magnitude of NQFs, it is practical 
for countries to begin defining standards for a few important occupa-
tional sectors before working towards a broader qualifications framework. 
The Kyrgyz Republic, for example, has begun piloting a qualifications 
system for the tourism sector as part of developing an NQF (ETF 
2007).
In addition to setting appropriate standards and coordinating relevant 
stakeholders, some countries also face social barriers when implementing 
qualifications systems. For example, members of the formal education 
system sometimes believe that they are the sole legitimate providers of 
education and training, making them averse to systems that accredit for-
mal and informal learning results on an equal basis (Hungary 2006). 
Similarly, a shift in thinking is also required on the part of employers, 
who, when hiring workers, will need to be open to considering not only 
recognized education degrees, but also partial certified qualifications—
that is, an individual’s job qualifications that do not necessarily stem from 
formal education degrees. Again, the actual use of NQFs is likely to 
depend on the extent to which key stakeholders have been an active part 
of their formulation. 
In addition, some adult learners are intimidated by the process of 
obtaining qualifications. Although this does not appear to be a major bar-
rier to adult education and training in many ECA countries, it may hinder 
less educated workers in particular. In order to attract these workers, 
regulators and providers can design learning programs in small units and 
ensure that testing methods are approachable. For example, computer-
based testing, multiple assessment opportunities, and small group learn-
ing have all contributed to increasing the participation of low-skilled and 
immigrant workers in the United Kingdom as part of the London Open 
College System (United Kingdom 2003).
Quality standards and accreditation systems are also important for 
ensuring the quality of adult learning providers, especially those that 
receive public funding. Several OECD countries have developed quality 
assurance, inspection, and accreditation systems that can serve as models 
for ECA countries. For example, Denmark, Portugal, and Spain have 
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developed institutes that evaluate adult learning programs with the aim 
of ensuring quality. The United Kingdom has established an Adult 
Learning Inspectorate that assesses hundreds of publicly funded programs 
every year and publishes the results; those that underperform often lose 
funding (OECD 2005c). Quality assurance systems in adult education 
and training can also involve the use of self-evaluations by providers 
alongside external evaluations, as in the case of Slovenia. In the Czech 
Republic, the Ministry of Education, Youth, and Sport certifies retraining 
programs for the unemployed that are financed by the Labor Office. The 
ministry is also beginning to pilot a quality assessment system and plans 
to institute a star rating scheme for quality based on a simple set of crite-
ria, rather than complicated quality standards. If successful, this could be 
an interesting option for less advanced countries.
In ECA countries, programs that assess the quality of adult education 
and training may play an important role in helping adults, particularly 
those with little experience of these programs, make decisions. As noted 
in box 6.3, cost is a major barrier to adult education and training in the 
region: Polish providers have determined that learners are likely to 
choose a program based only on price, irrespective of quality (OECD 
2005d). For providers that do not typically receive public funding, qual-
ity seals are an attractive means of assessment. Even though such seals 
rely on voluntary participation, providers have the incentive to meet 
standards in order to demonstrate the quality of their product to the 
market. Both Germany and Austria have developed quality seals. In 
Austria, the initiative was originally supported by nonprofit providers 
and in Germany by market providers, but both receive funds from the 
government (OECD 2005c).
Ensure the Efficiency of Sector Financing
Financing for adult education and training programs should largely be 
private, certainly for most continuing vocational education and training 
programs. However, public funding will be needed to address market 
failures in the sector, provide incentives to encourage the participation of 
underrepresented groups (e.g., older and less skilled workers), and finance 
programs for the unemployed. Governments already play a role in the 
financing of adult education and training in ECA, funding retraining for 
the unemployed through public employment services and providing 
incentives for private investments. The existence of market failures in the 
sector presents a rationale for continued and, occasionally, expanded 
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Box 6.3
Market Failures that Impede Adult Learning
Private investments lie at the heart of adult education and training in most 
countries, but governments can create an enabling environment for private 
investment through careful regulation that facilitates the flow of information 
and ensures educational quality. Firms and workers—not governments—
should drive adult training decisions, as their main motivation for investing in 
training is the expectation of greater profits and higher wages, respectively. 
Governments, conversely, recognize both the social returns and overall eco-
nomic benefits of increased human capital. Accordingly, it is in their interest to 
provide a certain amount of financing to overcome market failures associated 
with the provision of adult learning, including externalities, credit market fail-
ures, and information failures. 
The economic literature identifies a range of market failures in adult educa-
tion and training, suggesting that the participation of individual workers in such 
training may be below the socially optimal level, despite its considerable returns. 
In other words, individual workers and company managers are making rational 
and optimal decisions about training given the constraints that they face, but 
the sum of these decisions represents a less than optimal outcome for individual 
countries. First, externalities may hold back training. Economic theory suggests 
that because firms do not enjoy the full benefits of training—some of it will 
 accrue to future employers—they may invest less in it. For example, the higher 
the risk that a worker will leave a company soon after training (i.e., the “poaching” 
of trained workers), the more firms will be cautious in investing in this area. While 
no evidence from firm surveys in the ECA region documents an externality bar-
rier, anecdotal evidence suggests that it is an important concern for employers 
in the region, particularly in those countries that, until recently, faced a very tight 
labor market.
Second, individuals and firms may also be unable to generate the necessary 
funds to finance education and training (credit market failure). For example, firms 
may be unable to raise financing in the capital markets themselves, especially 
small firms with limited physical collateral. Survey data from the EU10 suggests 
that the cost of training is presently an important barrier to more training (see 
figure B6.3). Third, workers and firms may opt out of training because they lack 
information, for example, about the availability and quality of training providers. 
Lack of recognition or certification of learning will also reduce workers’ interest in 
(continued next page)
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training because they cannot be sure that they can demonstrate their raised 
productivity to employers. Conversely, employers and workers in developing 
economies may not be fully aware of the productivity returns from training due 
to lack of information about the type and area of training, as well as a lack of 
managerial skills in small and medium-size enterprises. Survey data from ECA 
confirm a positive correlation between the incidence of training and the avail-
ability of information (see figure B6.3, panel b), with the information barrier par-
ticularly acute for less educated workers.
Source: Authors.
Box 6.3 (continued)
Figure B6.3 Barriers to the Expansion of Adult Education and Training in 
the ECA Region
Sources: Authors’ calculations based on AES data (2007).
Note: See “Abbreviations” for country abbreviations and groupings.
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government investment in adult learning in the region (see box 6.3). 
Government financing is unlikely to make a difference, however, unless it 
is used strategically to support better partnerships and overcome the 
disconnect between different market players. 
Public funding will be most effective if it provides incentives that 
promote quality, empowers the demand side, and follows competitive 
principles. To make government financing effective, ECA countries will 
need to focus on outcomes, rather than inputs, thus shaping a competi-
tive market for adult education and training. For example, government 
funding for training programs for the unemployed can be made com-
petitive and outcome-based. State funding can also address market fail-
ures that result in lower average participation rates, or lower participation 
by certain groups of workers, by offering the private sector more incen-
tives to invest in adult education and training, such as voucher programs 
and tax breaks (see the following section). The scope of government 
financing for adult education and training will vary by the type of training 
and target group. Because retraining programs for the unemployed, 
including the underdeveloped field of “second-chance” education, gener-
ally have social returns, they are generally financed by state resources. 
Conversely, CVET and education for the employed generate substantial 
private returns to firms and individuals, and should therefore be largely 
financed by these groups.
Public financial incentives for CVET have been rare in the ECA 
region, but are likely to become more prominent as economies become 
more technologically advanced and the need for “upskilling” becomes 
more prominent. Again, it is important that countries in the region create 
the right incentives and focus on strengthening demand. As described 
earlier in this chapter, governments in many OECD countries use public 
financing both to promote more private investment in training and to 
overcome market failures. Two incentives for firms found in many OECD 
countries are tax deductions for training costs and payroll training levies. 
Some ECA countries have also begun experimenting with these tools. In 
addition, a number of EU10 countries have begun utilizing financing 
from the European Social Fund (ESF) to create grant programs for firms, 
while others have used demand-side financing, such as vouchers, to target 
individual workers to participate in training. 
Offer Tax Deductions to Firms that Offer CVET
Allowing firms to deduct the costs of training from their taxes is one 
of the most common forms of training incentives for firms. Such tax 
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deduction schemes have been implemented in some countries in the ECA 
region, particularly in the EU10 and the Russian Federation, and have 
been a useful first step for stimulating demand for training. Tax deduc-
tions for training costs are relatively simple for governments to administer 
and for firms to use, as they rely on existing tax systems. Although tax 
deductions generally benefit only firms that are profitable, this bias can be 
managed by allowing deductions to be spread over a period of years.
However, tax deduction systems can also result in deadweight loss and 
higher administrative costs. Deadweight loss occurs when individuals and 
firms take advantage of tax deductions even though they would have 
offered training without them. For example, large firms are generally 
most likely to take advantage of deductions and are more prone to use 
funds to train highly skilled workers (Cedefop 2009). This reality is why 
several OECD countries employ more complex, multilevel tax deduction 
systems that target financial incentives to those firms and individuals who 
face barriers to training. While such targeting is attractive in theory, it also 
increases administrative costs, invites manipulation by firms and makes 
the system more difficult to use. In an effort to reduce deadweight loss, 
for example, the Netherlands experimented with targeted tax deductions 
but decided later to abolish them because they were ineffective and too 
complex (OECD 2005c). However, despite these challenges, tax deduc-
tion schemes can be a valuable tool for giving an initial boost to adult 
education and training, particularly in environments where few firms and 
individuals currently provide training.
Consider Payroll Levies and Other Grant Mechanisms
Grant systems based on payroll levies can also create an effective funding 
source for training and allow for greater targeting of training funds. 
However, such systems can be challenging to implement. This type of 
grant system levies a payroll tax (typically of 0.5–2.0 percent) and dis-
burses the funds collected to firms for training purposes, either in the form 
of reimbursements or grants (Dar, Canagarajah, and Murphy 2003; OECD 
2005c). There is promising evidence from OECD countries that well-
designed training levies can increase training rates, particularly for 
medium-sized firms (OECD 2005c; Tan 2001). By allowing grants to be 
targeted to firms and individuals who are less likely to seek training in the 
absence of a financial incentive, levy grant systems can in theory also 
be designed to limit deadweight loss. However, to implement an effective 
levy grant system, countries need to consider the preparedness of firms to 
participate in such a system, management of the funds, and ways to ensure 
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the actual participation of small and medium enterprises (SMEs) in train-
ing programs. Careful communication and coordination with the enter-
prise sector is crucial, as such systems can be problematic in situations 
where firms complain of high payroll taxation and believe that they will 
have a low chance of successfully accessing and utilizing training funds.
Even in countries where payroll levy grant systems have had a gener-
ally positive impact on raising training participation, noncompliance rates 
are often a concern, particularly in less advanced countries and among 
small firms (Dar, Canagarajah, and Murphy 2003). Most existing levy 
grant systems rely on a central agency that manages the funds and awards 
them to firms—a role that can be filled by a government or social part-
ners (Ok and Tergeist 2003). To be effective, levy grant agencies require 
strong capacity in administration, quality control, and training policy. 
Levy grant systems can also be managed by a firm itself; Poland, for 
example, has set up a combined training fund and subsidy based in indi-
vidual firms, thus avoiding a central management structure. If a firm com-
mits at least 0.25 percent of its total wage bill to a training plan designed 
in cooperation with employee representatives, the government will sub-
sidize the training (OECD 2005e).
Despite the training benefits for medium-sized firms, one of the draw-
backs of levy grant systems is that they tend not to benefit either SMEs or 
very small firms. The most effective way to implement a levy grant pro-
gram may thus require additional targeting of SMEs and exempting the 
smallest firms (e.g., those with fewer than 50 employees), which are pro-
vided a different type of assistance. (For specific barriers to SMEs that are 
not alleviated by simple financial incentives, see box 6.4.) The Human 
Resource Development Fund (HRDF) in Malaysia is an example of a suc-
cessful payroll levy program that alleviates the additional constraints faced 
by SMEs and reduces the administrative burden. For example, rather than 
requiring SMEs to develop their own training plans, established training 
providers are used to offer time-tested and preapproved training programs. 
This feature also helps stimulate supply by giving training providers the 
opportunity to market well-defined programs (Tan 2001).2
Grant schemes play an important role in many ECA countries, par-
ticularly in the EU member states, which have access to grants from the 
ESF. They use these grants to support lifelong learning programs in 
line with the EU Lisbon Jobs and Growth Strategy and its successor, the 
Europe 2020 Strategy. These funds, however, sometimes bolstered the 
supply, not the demand, side of adult education and training. Instead of 
providing workers with vouchers, they have often been channeled to 
training institutions. Some countries have utilized general budget funds 
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Box 6.4 
Supporting Small and Medium Enterprises 
to Participate in Training
Small and medium enterprises often face a variety of constraints that make it dif-
ficult to provide and take advantage of training, such as obsolete technology, lack 
of access to finance, limited administrative capacity, poor management skills, and 
an inability to use training effectively. Programs that alleviate credit and  financial 
constraints, however, may not be sufficient to stimulate more worker  training—such 
programs must be designed to address additional constraints as well. The Integral 
Quality and Modernization (Spanish acronym CIMO) Program in Mexico was devel-
oped when it became clear that training subsidies alone were not effective in in-
creasing worker training in many SMEs. Firms who participate in the program un-
dergo a diagnostic process that identifies their production methods and assesses 
workers’ skills needs and other firm constraints. CIMO then organizes clusters of 
enterprises (where possible), links firms to outside providers, and subsidizes up to 
half of the cost of training per firm—a set of policies that is likely to be more effi-
cient than having the government provide the training directly.
An evaluation of the CIMO program suggested positive impacts on training 
participation rates and enterprise performance. In sectors with many SMEs, par-
ticularly where they partner or act as suppliers to larger firms, programs to pool 
resources are promising. For example, the Korean government has  supported the 
development of large enterprise-led training consortia in response to the low 
take-up of payroll tax-funded training grants by SMEs. Large enterprises have 
 developed training consortia in response to skilled labor shortages and low- quality 
partner organizations and suppliers. The consortia—which have had very high 
participation rates—can capitalize on training  resources that already exist in large 
enterprises, benefitting from higher-quality inputs and more efficient relationships 
with partners. They receive some direct subsidies and also benefit from a higher 
uptake of existing training grants. In the ECA region, the Czech Republic is launch-
ing a similar SME retraining voucher program funded by the European Social Fund. 
The program will promote professional retraining, pooling resources from enter-
prises, municipalities, and the ESF.
Source: Tan and Lopez Acevedo 2005; OECD 2005c; OECD 2004a. 
for grant schemes, especially to fund services for the unemployed. 
Bulgaria, for example, is now operating a grant cofinancing scheme to 
encourage  in-service training of the workforces of private companies. 
Careful evaluations could help determine the effects of these efforts.
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Alternative Financing Mechanisms: Provide 
Support Directly to Workers
Demand-side programs that offer incentives directly to workers are an 
alternative or supplement to supply-side programs that finance adult 
education and training providers. Since financial and time constraints are 
often cited by workers as hindrances to training (see box 6.3), programs 
that directly address these problems can be beneficial. These programs 
build on the individual motivation to learn, which may increase the 
chances of learning success, and also have the advantage of directly help-
ing workers with the greatest skills deficits.
The simplest and most widely implemented demand-side program is a 
tax incentive that allows workers to deduct the cost of self-financed train-
ing. Such programs more effectively benefit targeted individuals than do 
tax incentives for firms; however, individual-based tax incentives only 
reach those workers who earn wages high enough to pay income taxes. 
An alternative is training leave, which provides workers reduced working 
hours or breaks from full-time employment with some degree of com-
pensation, to enroll in training programs, combined with the guarantee of 
a job upon completion of the training. This type of program is used in 
many OECD countries and takes various forms in terms of targeting, 
length, and the level and source of financial compensation (see OECD 
2005c, chapter 3).
Grants and vouchers are increasingly popular programs that provide 
incentives for workers to seek education and training. The advantage of 
these programs is that different levels of subsidies can be offered to dif-
ferent types of workers, based on need. For example, education and train-
ing voucher programs in Austria offer more generous support to older 
workers, while the Adult Learning Grant (ALG) in the United Kingdom 
offers an “allowance” that varies in size according to the means of the 
recipient (IFF Research 2008). Voucher and grant programs oriented 
towards shorter courses have been designed to cover only education and 
training costs, while programs geared towards higher qualifications must 
usually offer subsidies that provide living expenses in order to be effective 
(see OECD 2005c).
Like several other new EU member states, the Czech Republic is using 
financing from the ESF for a demand-side voucher program called “Pivo.” 
The program targets both employed and nonemployed individuals aged 
25–64 years to finance education and training in languages, information 
and communication technology (ICT), and entrepreneurship skills—all 
skills that have been identified as underdeveloped among the Czech 
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workforce. However, training vouchers do have limitations. Recent evalu-
ation evidence from the United States, for example, indicates that their 
effectiveness may be hampered by faulty information, as when up-to-
date data on local skill needs are not available to either training providers 
or participants (particularly disadvantaged and low-skilled participants) 
(Barnow 2009). In addition, the effectiveness of vouchers can be affected 
by a limited supply of quality training providers, at least in more remote 
geographical locations—though the existence of vouchers can help 
stimulate the training market.
As noted earlier in this chapter, Individual Learning Accounts (ILAs) 
are another form of support for individual workers. Individually desig-
nated bank accounts that can receive financing from a firm, an indi-
vidual, or the government, ILAs encourage investments in adult 
learning but can be onerous to administer. Like other demand-side 
financing schemes, ILAs are appropriate only where it is possible to 
safeguard against abuse and fraud. Indeed, England abandoned a large 
ILA program because of this very concern. Nevertheless, ILAs are 
appealing because they often rely on matching funds, sometimes in a 
(tax-sheltered) savings account. Although several OECD countries 
have found them difficult to implement, some of their large employers 
have independently started implementing ILAs to encourage employ-
ees to do training. Providing tax relief for firm-based accounts, where 
they exist, could also be a helpful way to encourage education and 
training in ECA countries.
Continued Government Role in Retraining 
and Education for the Unemployed
In most ECA countries, retraining and education programs for the unem-
ployed are largely publicly funded and represent a significant share of 
government spending on active labor market programs. The record on the 
effectiveness of such training is mixed, but there is evidence that they can 
have positive impacts on employment if well designed, especially over 
the medium term (Betcherman, Olivas, and Dar 2004; Card, Kluve, and 
Weber 2009). Access to training for the unemployed in the ECA region 
is limited (see chapter 2), yet its importance is set to grow in light of 
shrinking populations and the increasing need to expand labor force par-
ticipation. Retraining programs can make a crucial contribution to pro-
moting employment by strategically reskilling laid-off workers for new 
jobs—an important agenda in the wake of the recent economic crisis. 
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When focused on basic skill gaps, these programs can also promote social 
inclusion (see box 6.5).
Although many ECA governments have long funded industrial 
training institutes that trained or retrained unemployed adult workers, 
in most instances, these institutes were not always designed to meet the 
needs of the modern work force. Governments today would be better 
Box 6.5 
Second-Chance and Remedial Education
The demographic decline being experienced in most ECA countries suggests that 
every person of working age needs to be brought into the labor force. This means 
that, in addition to the equity imperative, there is a growth imperative for greater 
skills. Many unemployed and economically inactive people in the ECA region face 
educational disadvantages as a result of leaving school early or a failure to acquire 
basic skills. Second-chance and remedial education and training are promising 
tools for addressing basic skills deficits that prevent adults and young adults from 
entering the labor force and becoming sustainably employed. These programs 
often involve basic literacy and numeracy training. Overall, second-chance edu-
cation programs remain limited in many ECA countries, even though basic skills 
deficits often are a key barrier to the labor force participation of disadvantaged 
workers. Some countries in the EU10, such as Bulgaria, have recognized that lit-
eracy is a concern for a small but significant portion of the disadvantaged popu-
lation, including the Roma minority, and have begun to extend their literacy 
programs in response.
Opening new pathways to employment through this type of education 
 requires developing new outreach and delivery mechanisms. Employment ser-
vices in many ECA countries have a poor record of effectively serving the most 
disadvantaged.a Basic skills gaps such as functional literacy are typically not even 
considered when identifying active labor market interventions for the registered 
unemployed, even if these people are highly disadvantaged. Second-chance 
education and training are thus ideally part of employment activation programs 
for the disadvantaged, long-term unemployed, and welfare-dependent adults. 
However, these programs require employment services and social welfare offices 
to integrate their efforts in partnership with NGOs and community-based organi-
zations—both in order to reach beneficiaries and to deliver tailored support to 
them.
(continued next page)
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Second-chance education and training programs often involve behavioral 
and social skills training—especially for young people who have failed to enter 
the workforce and for other long-term unemployed who have attained some 
basic level of education. Many such individuals are from disadvantaged back-
grounds and lacked the opportunity to develop the social and behavioral skills 
needed to effectively hold down a job. For example, Czech employers cited 
 irregular job  attendance and low work motivation as reasons for not hiring 
 (especially young) Roma (World Bank 2008a). It is thus critical that job training 
for such groups take such concerns into account. The youth-oriented Jovenes 
program in Latin America, which was deemed successful in short-run evalua-
tions, is an example of a program that successfully combines training in voca-
tional skills with a curriculum aimed at improving communications, personal 
relations, and self-esteem.
a. For evidence from the Czech Republic, see World Bank (2008a). 
Box 6.5 (continued)
off by contracting out retraining services through a competitive bid-
ding process, rather than relying on these training institutes. In this way, 
they would both foster the restructuring of formerly public providers 
and trigger the market entry of new, private providers. As a large pur-
chaser of training services for the unemployed, a government can 
implicitly set the rules of the overall adult education and training mar-
ket and thereby foster more private investment, including in CVET, if 
public financing is following competitive rules. The Czech Republic 
followed this approach in shaping its training market, which resulted, 
deliberately or not, in substantial market entry and a largely private-
provider market.
Retraining programs in ECA countries can become more effective if 
they are designed to meet identified labor market needs; center on the 
needs and capabilities of individual job seekers; and are well linked to 
other active labor market programs, such as job referral services. Effective 
training and requalification efforts would also benefit from regular labor 
market assessments, including analysis of vacancy data, to gauge changes 
in labor demand and ensure that jobseekers become retrained in voca-
tions that are actually in demand on the labor market. 
As valuable as such analysis is, it can be difficult to implement in 
practice. In the Czech Republic, for example, labor offices conduct 
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regular assessments of vacancies at the regional and municipal levels. 
However, the actual provision of training does not always respond to 
such assessments, as certain training programs are procured in bulk by 
the labor office. In Poland, it has been argued that regional labor offices 
lack the resources and training to conduct labor market assessments. 
Clearly, capacity building in this area is a critical to ensuring that such 
assessments take place (OECD 2005d).
When contracting out training to private providers, output-oriented 
incentives such as performance-based contracts can boost the relevance 
and effectiveness of the training. Turkey has had good experience with 
contracts that include built-in incentives for private providers to achieve 
high job placements rates. Until 2008, the Turkish Public Employment 
Service (ISKUR) followed this course to ensure that there was an actual 
demand for the skills that providers offer in their training classes.3 Recent 
ISKUR data provided to the authors indicate significant differences in 
placement rates for in-class training programs between providers that 
have employment incentives (i.e., employment guarantees) and those 
that do not, highlighting the importance of contract design in placement 
intermediation (see figure 6.1). 
Figure 6.1 Employment Placement Rates by Type of Retraining, Turkey, 2008
Source: Staff calculations based on administrative data for 2008 provided by the Turkish Public Employment 
 Service (ISKUR).
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Priorities for Adult Education and Training Systems 
in ECA Countries
Given that the development of modern adult learning systems is a complex 
and lengthy task, countries in the ECA region need to carefully prioritize 
their efforts in this sector. In many cases, improving the quality and equity 
of other levels of education may be of greater importance in the near term. 
Figure 6.2 suggests priorities for countries in the region based on their GDP 
per capita (as a measure of economic development) and demographic out-
look. The figure groups ECA countries into three broad groups: 
(1)  Advanced economies facing a demographic decline that compete in 
highly competitive markets (i.e., the new EU member states, Croatia, 
and Russia);4 
(2)  Less advanced economies facing a demographic decline (i.e., many 
countries in South Eastern Europe plus several rapidly aging CIS 
countries); and 
Figure 6.2 Adult Education and Training Priorities in the ECA Region
Source: Staff calculations based on United Nations 2006.
Note: See “Abbreviations” for country abbreviations.
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(3)  less advanced economies facing a demographic expansion, consisting 
of the majority of the Central Asian countries along with Albania. 
Turkey and Kazakhstan do not fit well into any of these categories, but 
it can be argued that their priorities are the same as those of group 1. 
Table 6.1 provides a rough policy framework for adult education and 
training in ECA countries, based on their respective economic and demo-
graphic indicators. 
Advanced Economies in Demographic Decline
Expanding adult learning is a priority for advanced economies in the 
region that are facing a demographic decline. Their challenge is to ensure 
that existing coordination mechanisms function well and that regulation 
and financing are used to facilitate the emergence of a private sector-
oriented adult education and training market. As shown in chapter 2, 
some EU10 countries are relatively advanced and on par with many older 
EU member states in terms of training participation. The Europe 2020 
Strategy places a strong emphasis on lifelong learning and has served as 
an engine for policy change and the programming of EU funds. These 
funds, in turn, have stimulated greater promotion of adult education and 
training. The strategies in these countries are in place, supported by 
multistakeholder coordination bodies, and legislation is being introduced 
alongside regulatory regimes and new financing schemes.
The challenge in the EU10 and Croatia is to ensure that the demand 
for education and training emanating from the labor market can be 
served by flexible, high-quality programs. Within this group, certain 
countries, such as the Czech Republic and the Slovak Republic, have 
high training participation rates and a culture of adult education and 
training has taken root. Here, the task is to make training more effec-
tive and strategic, improve quality through autonomy for providers and 
accountability mechanisms, carefully evaluate outcomes, and use gov-
ernment financing in a tactical way. Across the region, given their 
importance, special attention should be given to encouraging training 
in small and medium enterprises. A particular challenge will be ensur-
ing that less educated, older, and disadvantaged workers can participate 
more in education and training, regardless of whether they are 
employed, unemployed, or outside the labor force.
Turkey and Kazakhstan might also consider following this agenda for 
adult education and training. Although neither country fits well into the 
country groupings used in this chapter, both countries have expanding 
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Table 6.1 Recommended Policy Framework for Adult Education and Training in 
the ECA Region
Advanced 
economies with 
demographic 
challenge
Less advanced 
economies with 
demographic 
challenge
Less advanced 
economies with 
no demographic 
challenge
EU10, HRV, RUS
ARM, BIH, BLR, 
GEO, MDA, MKD, 
MNE, SRB, UKR
ALB, AZE, KGZ, 
TJK, UZB
Policy and institutional foundation
Multistakeholder skills task force 
National strategy on adult 
learning
Coordination mechanisms 
Autonomy
Promote autonomy of training 
institutions 
Accountability
National qualifications framework
Regulation and certification 
regime
Certification and quality control 
agency
Strategic financing 
CVET—firms 
Training tax deductions for firms
Training grant schemes based on 
payroll levy
Grant schemes
SME support schemes, with training 
focus
CVET—individuals
Worker tax deductions for 
training
Subsidies or vouchers for 
individuals
Training leave
Individual learning accounts
Loan schemes for individuals
Retraining and education for the 
nonemployed
Job training for the unemployed
Second-chance education 
programs
Source: Author’s assessment.
Note: Color key: priority, consider, not a priority. See “Acronyms” for country abbreviations and groupings.
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populations and aspire to develop more advanced economies. In the case 
of Turkey, the EU accession process will also focus on the Europe 2020 
Strategy and thus, lifelong learning. In addition to developing effective 
policy coordination mechanisms and strategies for adult education and 
training, both countries should consider introducing regulatory systems 
that use accountability and financing schemes to promote more labor 
market-relevant adult learning programs. 
Less Advanced Economies in Demographic Decline
The principal priority of less advanced economies in the region experi-
encing a demographic decline (i.e., many of those in South Eastern 
Europe and the middle-income CIS countries) is to introduce a strategic 
framework for adult learning and create the tools needed to implement 
this strategy (e.g., coordination mechanisms, plus initial steps toward 
regulation). Their demographic challenge and less advanced level of eco-
nomic development make adult learning critical for these countries. 
However, in view of resource constraints, the competing claims of other 
parts of the education system, and limited administrative and policy plan-
ning capacities, these countries should initially focus more on introducing 
a strategy for adult education, and less on financing and regulation. At the 
same time, this group can benefit from the experience of the EU10 (e.g., 
the Czech Republic) to learn how to foster competitive, private sector-
driven adult education and training markets.
Less Advanced Economies with Growing Populations 
For the less advanced economies in the region that are not facing a demo-
graphic decline (i.e., those of low-income CIS countries and Albania), it 
may be more productive to limit efforts to establish strategic frameworks 
and coordination mechanisms for adult education and training. It is sug-
gested that this group of countries refrain from creating and piloting 
financing schemes or implementing regulations until other educational 
challenges, including the achievement of high secondary completion 
rates, are adequately addressed. The more limited scope of action pro-
posed for this group is a specific reflection of the fact that (1) low-income 
CIS countries face significant impediments to improving learning out-
comes in other education sectors, which will absorb much of their fiscal 
and policy-planning capacity and (2) the relevance of adult education and 
training to their economies is presently more limited, due to their differ-
ent demographic outlook and the greater distance of their economies 
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from advanced technology compared to the EU10 and middle-income 
CIS countries. 
Summary 
Lifelong learning and adult education and training are growing in 
importance across the ECA region. Increasing demand for skilled labor, 
accelerating technological change, and significant demographic decline 
are all contributing factors. Although building adult learning systems is 
critically important, its overall priority in individual ECA countries 
depends on economic and demographic conditions and their most 
pressing education challenges. 
Successful adult education and training systems are based on a high 
degree of policy coordination and partnership between government 
agencies and the private sector, with a strong voice for the demand 
side—businesses and individuals—in determining training content. Once 
a solid policy foundation has been created, governments can “steer” adult 
education and training through tracking data on program quality 
(derived from both routine monitoring and evaluation and impact stud-
ies), promoting autonomy and accountability, and ensuring efficient 
government financing. 
Across the board, private investment lies at the heart of adult educa-
tion and training, though governments will need to provide a certain 
amount of financing to overcome market failures. In the case of CVET 
programs for the employed, governments will mainly need to create an 
enabling environment for private investment through appropriate regu-
lation and the provision of information. In addition, various financial 
incentives for more private investment can be targeted to both firms and 
workers. For the unemployed, retraining and education programs are an 
important part of active labor market policies in most ECA countries; in 
this case, governments can use their role as purchasers of retraining ser-
vices to shape the overall adult training market. 
Notes
 1. For a discussion of regional variation in SEE countries, see Gunny and Viertel 
(2007). See also OECD (2005d) and Hungary, Ministry of Education and 
Culture (2006). 
 2. The program also supports SMEs with training needs analysis and provides 
opportunities for group training with other SMEs. 
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 3. Despite its evident effectiveness, Turkey’s new Law on Labor Force Training, 
adopted in 2008, abolished the placement incentive scheme.
 4. Bulgaria, Romania, and Belarus lie close together in terms of GDP per capita 
and the scale of their demographic decline. However, Bulgaria and Romania 
should consider adult education and training more of a priority than should 
Belarus, given the former countries’ membership in the EU, participation in 
the Lisbon Agenda, and access to financing for lifelong learning from the 
ESF.
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Extended Summary: The Path 
for Education Reforms in the 
ECA Region
The countries of Europe and Central Asia are coming out of a deep eco-
nomic crisis—the worst since the economic transition-induced recession 
of the early 1990s and the deepest recession among all devel oping 
regions. Post-crisis conditions look very different from those of preceding 
years. Previously, growth in the region was fueled by cheap borrowing 
from abroad, growing exports of goods and services (including labor ser-
vices), and, in the case of natural resource exporters, rising global demand. 
The world of 2011 is a changed one. Borrowing is significantly more 
expensive and export growth is restrained by potentially slower growth 
in destination countries. Restoring and sustaining growth in this context 
requires boosting competitiveness and increasing labor productivity—the 
very reforms that were postponed in the boom years. These reforms are 
all the more important given a shrinking working-age population in many 
countries of the region.
The boom years also exposed significant bottlenecks to growth in the 
ECA region, particularly with respect to the skills of the labor force 
(Mitra, Selowsky, and Zalduendo 2010). Paradoxically for a region with 
relatively high educational attainment, a shortage of worker skills 
emerged as one of the two most important constraints to firm expansion 
(the other being the tax regime). This finding makes it crucial for 
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 countries to undertake reforms to reduce skills shortages as they plan for 
recovery. Education systems play a very important role in creating the 
right skills.
This book investigated two primary questions: Are education systems 
in the ECA region able to inculcate the right skills in their graduates and 
what can they do to improve on their performance? In answering these 
questions, a fundamental problem emerged: data exist on the number of 
students who graduate (i.e., how many diplomas are issued) in ECA 
countries, but internationally comparable information on whether gradu-
ates of upper secondary and tertiary institutions (from which the bulk of 
ECA graduates now enter the labor market) have the right skills and 
competencies for the job market is not available.
A range of available data sources was examined to argue that there is 
significantly more that education systems can do to improve the quality 
and relevance of education and thereby enhance the skills of their stu-
dent populations. Although ministries of education are constrained in a 
 number of ways from effectively managing their education and training 
sectors for results—that is, with an eye to student skills and 
 competencies—greater efforts should be made to reduce and eventually 
eliminate the three most important and interrelated impediments to 
educational success: the lack of systematic data on key skills-related per-
formance issues, the legacy of central planning, and the inefficient use of 
resources.
Education and training systems in the region have simply been slow in 
making the transition from teaching the basics (i.e., factual content, often 
via rote learning) to inculcating the kind of higher-order skills increasingly 
required in a modern economy. The ECA countries should therefore view 
the reform of their education systems—at all levels and for all ages—to 
be critical to their future economic success.
The following is an extended summary of the findings and policy rec-
ommendations of this study.
The Skills Challenge in the ECA Region
The ECA region had a well-regarded education system prior to the end of 
central planning. Not only did countries in the region succeed in providing 
mass basic education, they had a number of highly regarded universities 
and research institutes, particularly in the basic sciences and mathematics. 
While the intervening years have taken some of the shine off this reputa-
tion, these countries continue to have strong achievements. Notably, 
enrollments are high at all levels of education. Primary enrollment rates 
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are above 90 percent and primary completion rates are also very high 
throughout the region. Although secondary enrollment rates in many 
countries suffered a decline in the 1990s, they have since climbed and are 
now at or above what might be expected in all ECA countries, given their 
respective income levels.
The socialist legacy is particularly visible in low-income countries in 
the region, which have the highest secondary enrollments in the world for 
their income level. Tertiary enrollments, which have grown rapidly in the 
past two decades, are also high relative to income levels, with the few 
exceptions of certain low-income CIS countries, such as Azerbaijan and 
Uzbekistan.
In addition to attainment, ECA countries also do well in delivering a 
relatively good-quality education, particularly in the lower grades. In fact, 
many younger students in the region outperform their Western European 
students in reading at the fourth-grade level, scoring above the scale aver-
age on the Progress in International Reading Literacy Study (PIRLS) in 
both 2001 and 2006.1 These results are not uniform across ECA, how-
ever. Countries that have not joined the European Union (EU), for 
example, scored below the average, with the marked exception of the 
Russian Federation, which scored well above the average and demon-
strated the greatest improvement between 2001 and 2006 (see figure 
7.1). The commendable performance in reading at the elementary level 
indicates that schools in ECA countries are very capable of providing a 
quality education at the early stages.
Many ECA countries, though certainly not all, continue to do well on 
international reading assessments such as PISA and TIMSS at or near the 
end of lower secondary education, but only relative to the performance 
of other countries at the same income level. Figure 7.2 provides a scatter 
plot of 2008 per capita GDP against the PISA 2009 reading scores of 
countries participating in PISA (with ECA countries highlighted by their 
letter acronyms). The figure shows a positive relationship between the 
two values, suggesting that 15-year-olds in countries with higher national 
incomes tend to perform better on the reading component of the PISA. 
Significantly, the ECA region seems divided. Many of the new EU mem-
ber states (including Poland, but also Turkey and Serbia) lie above the 
regression line, demonstrating that their students apparently read better 
than would be predicted on the basis of GDP per capita alone. Others lie 
below the regression line, including Romania, Montenegro, Bulgaria, 
Azerbaijan, and the Kyrgyz Republic. Students in these countries scored 
lower on the reading component of the PISA than their GDP per capita 
would have predicted.
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In spite of these positive achievements of ECA education systems, the 
EBRD-World Bank Business Environment and Enterprise Performance 
Surveys (BEEPS) show that ECA firms’ perception of skills constraints 
changed dramatically around 2005.2 By 2008, skilled labor shortages 
had become one of the most commonly reported constraints to growth 
in the BEEPS survey across all countries in the region, second only to tax 
rates (see figure 7.3). On average, 30 percent of firms considered educa-
tion and skills to be a major or severe constraint in 2008. The highest 
proportion of firms reporting constraints were found among the middle-
income CIS countries, where upwards of 40 percent of firms were dis-
satisfied with the availability of skilled workers. A smaller proportion of 
firms in the Western Balkans reported similar levels of dissatisfaction, 
with significant variability in the dissatisfaction levels of firms in the 
EU10+1 countries and Turkey (BEEPS dataset 2008).
Why Are Skills an Emerging Problem if Education 
Systems Are Delivering?
Despite generally high average enrollment and attainment rates, as well as 
respectable quality education for their income levels, especially at lower 
levels of education (and even at lower secondary, where two-thirds of 
participating countries “punch” at or above their weight), skills shortages 
Figure 7.2 Analysis of Reading Competency of 15-Year-Old Students on the 
PISA 2009
Sources: PISA 2009 Database and World Bank staff calculations based on World Development Indicators Database.
Note: The figure shows a regression line representing countries’ predicted PISA reading scores based solely on 
GDP per capita, compared to the OECD mean reading score (horizontal line) on the assessment and GDP per 
capita in 2008. See “Acronyms and Abbreviations” for a key to country abbreviations.
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were constraining growth in ECA countries before the onset of the cur-
rent downturn. This is a puzzle that this book could not fully resolve, 
mainly because crucial information is missing. International assessments 
provide information about student competencies up to the age of 15 (usu-
ally the end of lower secondary education), but beyond that age, no infor-
mation exists on student competencies. Nor does information exist on the 
quality of upper secondary or tertiary education or the relevance of educa-
tion at these levels. Moreover, no information exists on students’ noncog-
nitive (or socioemotional—“soft”—skills) (see World Bank 2011b for an 
example of testing noncognitive skills in Peru). For policy makers to better 
understand the role of education in contributing to skills bottlenecks—and 
how to address it—this informational gap needs to be addressed.
Although the education offered in ECA countries at the end of lower 
secondary is respectable relative to levels of income, it does not appear to 
be adequate (or of the right relevance) to meet the demand for skills in the 
region. In addition to higher levels of education, firms are demanding 
higher-order skills that higher education alone does not guarantee, including 
Figure 7.3 Distribution of Firms in ECA Region That Consider Worker Skills a 
 “Major” or “Very Severe” Constraint, 2008
Sources: BEEPS 2008; Mitra, Selowsky, and Zalduendo 2010.
Note: LI = low-income; MI = middle-income; x = % of firms (in respective countries) that consider education as 
an obstracle. See “Acronyms” for a key to country abbreviations. 
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cognitive skills such problem solving, together with behavioral skills such 
as teamwork (see box 7.1). Such skills are increasingly a part of the land-
scape of work in modern economies. Figure 7.4, which illustrates findings 
from the European Work Conditions Survey, demonstrates how the cogni-
tive demands of work have risen relative to more routine tasks.3
The need for higher-order skills is not, moreover, confined to a few 
high-technology sectors, even construction—which is not normally viewed 
as a highly skilled industry—requires the ability to learn on the job, work 
independently, and solve complex problems. Nor are higher-order skills a 
requirement only of upper-middle income countries. Surveys of employ-
ers in lower-middle income countries, such as Kazakhstan and the former 
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, point in the same direction: the skills 
that are lacking include commu nication, thinking skills, problem-solving 
skills, and the ability to work independently (Ivaschenko 2008, World 
Box 7.1
Higher-Order Skills for the World of Work in the 21st Century
It is now recognized that beyond formal qualifications, what is needed to function 
effectively in 21st century economies is the ability to use knowledge and other 
personal and social skills to complete tasks and solve problems as they arise. This 
broad group of abilities is generally called “skills” or “generic skills” because they are 
not specific to a job and are transferrable across employers. While there is no 
 international consensus on key generic skills, most experts would agree that they 
include both basic and higher-order skills. Basic skills include reading, writing, 
computation, and the ability to use technology. Higher-order skills can be cogni-
tive (e.g., learning to learn, problem solving, and creative thinking) or behavioral 
(e.g., communication, negotiation, and teamwork). The OECD list of key “compe-
tences” includes, in addition, the ability to act autonomously—that is, to perform 
and conduct one’s own life plans—a skill that is particularly important in the mod-
ern world, where stable lifelong employment is less common. At present, stan-
dardized tests of secondary school students measure basic skills and some 
 higher-order cognitive skills, but not behavioral skills. Recent research in Peru pro-
vides an example of how to incorporate the testing of behavioral skills into regular 
household surveys (see World Bank 2011b).
Sources: Authors, based on OECD 1999a and materials available on the following websites: State 
 Secretariat for Economic Affairs of Switzerland (www.seco.admin.ch), Australian National Centre for 
 Vocational Education Research (www.ncver.edu.au), American Society for Training and Development 
(www.astd.org); all URLs accessed September 2010.
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Bank 2010b). These findings mirror longer-term trends observed in other 
parts of the world (see  chapter 1).
Many Students are Failing and Problem-Solving Skills are Weak
Two problems related to quality seem particularly acute in the ECA region: 
too many students are failing and education systems have difficulties 
imparting problem-solving skills. A closer look at ECA countries’ perform-
ance in international assessments show a large number of underperformers: 
15-year-olds with such weak math and literacy skills that their ability to 
succeed in today’s workplace is highly questionable (see box 7.2). As work 
becomes more demanding even for this group, their poor skills will become 
more apparent. Although ECA countries perform reasonably well on inter-
national assessments that measure students at the primary level (grade 4), 
their performance is weaker on assessments of students around the end of 
lower secondary education (grade 8), suggesting that their education sys-
tems are adept at imparting basic skills, but have problems imparting 
problem-solving skills—the very skills that firms increasingly seek.
Another reason why firms are increasingly complaining may be that 
the quality of education in the ECA region has not shown consistent 
improvement. In many countries, the quality of education appears to be 
Figure 7.4 Worker Responses to Survey on Working Conditions in Europe, 2005
Source: Authors’ calculations based on data obtained from Eurofound 2007.
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getting worse, not better. Rather than narrowing the gap between their 
scores and OECD mean scores, many ECA countries that participate in 
international learning assessments at this level—which are likely the 
better-managed countries—either seem stuck or have regressed in terms 
of their scores. It is probable, moreover, that the situation is even worse 
in ECA countries that do not participate in efforts to measure and com-
pare the academic performance of their students. In fairness, the latest 
round of PISA (2009) showed some improvements for 11 ECA  countries, 
Box 7.2
A Large Proportion of Students Are Failing
Despite PISA scores that are largely in keeping with countries at the same income 
level, a large proportion of students in many ECA countries still achieved only a 
basic level of competency (Level 1) or less on the reading part of the PISA 2009 
(see table B7.2). This level means that a student can complete a basic reading task, 
such as locating a piece of information or identifying the main theme in a text, but 
cannot necessarily use this information in problem solving. The factors underlying 
this poor performance vary. In Turkey, a nontransition country, a very selective 
academic system leaves many graduates of vocational and general high schools 
with poor basic skills. In Azerbaijan, poor reading competencies co-exist with 
strong competencies in mathematics, largely because the transition from a Cyril-
lic to Latin alphabet in the post-independence period left a generation of stu-
dents and their parents without adequate reading materials to build 
 reading skills.
Table B7.2 Proportion of 15-Year-Old Students in ECA Who Achieved Only 
Basic Reading Competency on PISA 2009
Students scoring at or 
below Level 1 Country
< 10 %
10–20 % Estonia, Poland, Latvia, Hungary, OECD average
20–30 % Croatia, Czech Republic, Lithuania, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, 
Russian Federation, Turkey, 
30–40 % Serbia
40–50 % Bulgaria, Montenegro, Romania
50–60 % Albania, Kazakhstan
> 60 % Azerbaijan, Kyrgyz Republic
Source: PISA 2009 Database. 
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compared to their 2006 performance (including big increases in Bulgaria, 
Romania, Serbia, the Kyrgyz Republic, and Turkey). However, seven 
ECA countries experienced a deterioration compared to their 2006 
 performance.
The Quality and Relevance of Upper Secondary and Tertiary 
Education Is of Concern
An additional explanation of the skills gap perceived by employers may 
be that the quality of upper secondary and tertiary education in the 
region is not keeping up with changing skill demands, although the lack 
of data makes it hard to confirm this suspicion. With educational quality 
failing to show consistent improvement at the lower secondary level, this 
weakness is probably mirrored at the upper secondary level (although 
with a delay). Moreover, enrollments at the tertiary level used to be 
tightly controlled and reserved for the few, best performers. In the past 
two decades, however, enrollments have doubled, tripled, or quadrupled 
in an environment with the expansion of new programs, institutions and 
types of students. This growth has taken place without the benefit of 
quality assurance mechanisms and without the kind of information stu-
dents and parents need to make informed choices. There is also evidence 
of widespread unethical behavior, such as purchasing admission, grades, 
and even degrees (see figure 7.5). Educational quality at the tertiary level 
is thus unlikely to have improved. Weaknesses in the quality of upper 
secondary and tertiary education is particularly problematic from a skills 
perspective because, most of ECA’s new labor market entrants now enter 
the labor market after having completed either an upper secondary or a 
tertiary degree (see chapter 3, figure 3.1).
Finally, graduates of upper secondary and tertiary education may also 
be graduating with the wrong set of skills. During the early years of the 
transition, the vocational school system—which once produced more 
than half of all secondary graduates in most ECA countries—rapidly 
declined. Since then, students have left vocational schools in favor of 
general secondary education and the prospect of pursuing a tertiary 
degree. However, ECA firms still value technical and vocational skills, 
judging by the better employment prospects of graduates with technical 
skills (see chapter 1). Thus, the pendulum may have swung too far in one 
direction, with the vocational sector having retrenched too far. 
Nevertheless, as the region’s vocational schools remain unable to produce 
graduates with appropriate skills, it is likely too soon to be promoting a 
return to this sector.
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Adult Learning Remains a Blind Spot
The skills deficit relates not only to the uneven quality and uncertain 
relevance of formal education. It also involves too little progress in pro-
viding workers with options for additional training. Since continuous 
adult education and training have been shown to foster employment and 
greater productivity, the development of this sector should be central to 
the region’s economic growth strategy, particularly in more advanced 
ECA countries and those that are facing a significant demographic 
decline. Yet many of these countries have only started to plan for the 
development of this sector. In light of the growing skills shortage, adult 
education and training in ECA countries can no longer be neglected.
Priority Areas for Action
As noted previously, three major impediments are inhibiting the creation 
of flexible and responsive education systems in the ECA region. First, 
Figure 7.5 Students Report Unofficial Payments Are “Usually” or “Always” Needed 
in Public Technical Colleges and Universities, 2006
Source: Raw dataset from EBRD-World Bank 2006.
Note: LI = low-income, MI = middle-income. The graph reflects the answers from Question 3.13 of the Life in 
Transition Survey in ECA countries, which can be downloaded at http://www.ebrd.com/downloads/research/
economics/litsques.pdf (accessed January 2011). The exact question asked was: “In your opinion, how often is it 
necessary for people like you to have to make unofficial payments/gifts in these situations?” One of the response 
options was: “Receive public education (university, college).”  Thus, it is unclear whether the response refers to 
grades or admission, or simply to regular payments. 
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these systems have been operating “in the dark” because they do not sys-
tematically collect data on the learning and employment outcomes of all 
students. Second, the legacy of central planning has kept the governance 
and management of school systems highly centralized, with central policy 
makers deeply involved in operational details. While virtually all OECD 
countries have embraced performance-oriented management in educa-
tion since the 1980s (see OECD 2005c)—albeit at different speeds—
most ECA countries continue to use management practices that focus on 
compliance with detailed regulations and financing schemes based on 
inputs, not outputs. This means that most local education authorities and 
school principals in the ECA region lack the autonomy and authority to 
make crucial management decisions for their own institutions, including 
how much and what type of vocational content students can choose from 
and how many teachers to employ. As a result, the education and training 
system is inflexible and does not respond either to labor market needs or 
to changes in student numbers.
Third, financial resources are ineffectually used in the region, particu-
larly in the pre-university sector, where few countries have adjusted teacher 
staffing levels in response to falling student numbers over the past 20 years. 
As a result, student-teacher ratios (STRs) have fallen sharply as per student 
costs have risen—more so than in any other region in the world (see figure 
7.6). This implies that scarce resources are misused by paying meager sala-
ries to too many staff members and heating half-empty buildings.
With few exceptions (notably Turkey), class sizes in ECA are also 
smaller than those in other parts of the world. For instance, the average 
class size at the primary level in Poland, Serbia, and Azerbaijan is 20, 14, 
and 12, respectively, compared to 23 in France, 26 in the United Kingdom, 
and 31 in Chile and the Republic of Korea (see figure 7.7). Although the 
ECA region also has a large number of small schools, relatively small class 
sizes are prevalent even in the largest schools, with the possible exception 
of Armenia.
Small class sizes and lower STRs in the ECA region have not, how-
ever, improved educational quality—as the cost per student has 
increased, student learning outcomes have not improved. Instead, these 
conditions have led to poor teacher remuneration—especially at the 
entry level, but also relative to other professions—and ultimately, to the 
demoralization of the teaching workforce. This has discouraged talented 
young students from becoming teachers, while simultaneously encourag-
ing those already in the profession to stay on as long as they can to 
 benefit from  seniority-related pay. As a consequence, the profession as a 
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whole is failing to renew itself: few new recruits are entering the system 
and the teaching cadre is aging (see figure 7.8). As the wage bill squeezes 
out other spending, less resources are available for training and the training 
received is often of questionable value. Given the importance of effec-
tive teaching, especially for inculcating higher-order cognitive skills, 
ECA countries are thus poorly positioned to improve student learning 
with their existing teaching workforce.4
To be fair, these impediments affect ECA countries differently and 
vary accordingly to the level of education. However, no ECA country has 
fully escaped the legacy of central planning.5 That system focused on 
generating data on inputs—that is, it checked whether local actors were 
in compliance with detailed norms for all inputs. Education ministries 
remained in the dark, however, about the return on those inputs, that is, 
whether students actually acquired skills and competencies.
In terms of how these impediments affect the different levels of educa-
tion, they are most clearly apparent at the pre-university level, which 
absorbs two-thirds of total education funding in the ECA region. The 
Figure 7.6 Primary School Student-Teacher Ratios in ECA Compared to Other 
 Regions of the World, 1990–2008
Sources: EdStats Database, plus authors’ linear interpolations for missing years.
Note: Actual data are marked with dots. One of the problems with international data on student-teacher ratios 
(in both the World Bank’s EdStats  Database and other international education databases) is that it is unclear 
whether or not data for a particular  country are reported on a full-time equivalent basis.
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same three impediments affect tertiary education in a slightly different 
way, as this sector has already undergone significant reform over the past 
20 years, during which time it has doubled or tripled in size in many 
countries (see chapter 5). Because most ECA countries do not yet have 
adult education sectors in the modern sense, these impediments cannot 
be fairly characterized as problems of this sector. However, the policy 
recommendations offered in this book do apply to adult education and 
offer ideas and principles for how this subsector could be developed and 
managed in the region (see chapter 6).
Managing Education Systems for Results
This book argues that in order to address the three constraints outlined 
above, countries in the ECA region need to manage their education sys-
tems for results. First and foremost, they need to collect more information 
on “performance,” that is, what are students learning, what jobs they are 
finding, and what salaries graduates are earning. In addition, ECA coun-
tries need to follow the lead of OECD countries and replace input- 
oriented management of the education sector with performance-oriented 
Figure 7.8 Percentage of Students with a Teacher Over 50 Years Old in ECA 
 Countries, Selected Years
Sources: IEA (1995, 1999, 2003, and 2007): Mathematics and Science Teacher Background Data Almanacs.
Note: LI = low-income, MI = middle-income.
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management. This change implies devolving more autonomy to frontline 
providers and putting in place accountability mechanisms—for instance, 
performance contracts and performance-based budgeting—that empha-
size results and performance, not compliance with norms. With greater 
availability of performance data and frontline providers empowered with 
greater decision-making power, the preconditions will be in place for 
education systems in the region to become both more responsive to labor 
market needs and more efficient.
Focus Attention on Learning and Employment Outcomes
Better data alone does not lead to better-quality education. Partly due to 
difficult demographic trends and partly due to history, ECA education 
systems have wound themselves in a knot that will be very difficult to 
untie without devoting greater attention to results. The legacy of central 
planning has created a system where bureaucrats manage the sector, and 
schools in particular, by writing detailed norms into legislation and then 
micromanaging principals so that they comply with these norms. 
Generations of managers have lived with this system for their entire lives. 
When asked to improve education system performance, they therefore 
reach for the tools that they have always used, either by revising norms 
or ramping up inspections. This chapter argues that the solution is not to 
rewrite norms or expand the inspectorate. Rather, the solution is to reach 
for different tools. However, none of these “new” tools will work without 
better data on performance, data that answers the question: What are 
students learning and are graduates finding jobs?
The good news is that there is significant consensus on the key skills 
and competencies that basic education is expected to deliver, as well as 
standardized tests to measure them. Many countries in the region already 
participate in international assessments, which are more useful when 
complemented by national assessments. Although all school systems in 
the region have national assessment systems, many of these systems are 
in the early stages of development (see figure 7.9) and there is very little 
evidence to date that ECA countries are using these assessments to 
inform policy. Rather, national assessments continue to be seen as a certi-
fication mechanism, one that confirms a student has gained a mastery of 
a predetermined curriculum, thus enabling a diploma to be issued or the 
student to progress to upper secondary or tertiary education. Student 
assessments are rarely seen as an opportunity to identify the strengths and 
weaknesses of an education system.
When students graduate, ministries of education in the ECA region do 
not systematically collect, analyze, and disseminate information on their 
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employment outcomes. Such information is, however, critical for policy 
makers and higher education institutions because it helps them detect 
which programs and fields of study are in high demand among employers. 
Moreover, these data can help students make better choices about which 
university and field of study to pursue. Again, some member countries of 
the OECD (including Hungary, Italy, and the Netherlands), together with 
Romania, provide examples in this area for others to emulate. Using the 
Figure 7.9 Status of Measuring and Using Data on Student Learning Outcomes in 
the ECA Region, 2009
Sources: Authors’ assessments based on data from UNICEF (2007, table 2.1); the extent of countries’ participation 
in PISA, PIRLS, and TIMSS since 1995; and inputs from World Bank country experts. The UNICEF data is drawn 
from “Table 2.1: Status of Reforms of Assessment and Examination Systems, 2006,” regarding “Introduction of 
other school exams or assessments (e.g., basic school)” and “Introduction of sample-based national assessment.” 
In this table, UNICEF scores the progress of countries on a range of 0 to 4, with 0 representing “not planned or 
started” and 4 representing “operational.” In addition, the figure uses World Bank staff compilations on the 
number of  international assessments in which each country has participated.
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example of the tracer study in the Netherlands (which has been in place 
since 1989), table 7.1 provides an example of the types of information 
such surveys can provide.
At the tertiary level, data on employment and learning outcomes are 
also needed to shed light on how the sector is performing from a skills 
perspective. Currently, data on tertiary outcomes (both in ECA and 
around the world) focus on research outcomes, such as how many publi-
cations the faculty of a university is producing. Unfortunately, when this 
is the only performance indicator available, it inadvertently receives more 
attention than it should. Indeed, rankings of universities in the region 
place significant weight on the number of publications that they produce. 
However, from a skills perspective, the outcome that matters most is 
whether students are graduating with the competencies in demand on 
the job market and finding jobs. Currently, these outcomes are not being 
measured, and, unfortunately, an international standardized learning 
assessment for tertiary students is not expected to be launched by the 
OECD until 2016 (see box 5.1). Thus, to gather the necessary data 
now—when it is needed—ECA countries will need to begin with their 
own, domestically developed approaches.
There are several complementary ways of providing more information 
on the performance of the tertiary sector, some of which are more direct 
than others. These include rankings or league tables, tracer studies, and 
direct measurement of student competencies via standardized tests. One 
way that ECA countries might begin to measure the learning outcomes 
of tertiary students would be to introduce standardized testing within 
fields of study where these outcomes have been clearly defined by the 
National Qualification Frameworks which have been built in most coun-
tries (e.g., for graduates of nursing programs). Alternatively, ECA minis-
tries of education might define and measure a set of broad competencies 
that all tertiary graduates are expected to have. The OECD’s DeSeCo 
project (OECD 2005c), discussed in chapter 2, could provide a starting 
point for the definition of such broad competencies.
Introduce Autonomy and Accountability Based on Results
Overcoming the legacy of central planning involves moving away from 
detailed norms and instead holding actors accountable for performance 
(or results). At the central level, this implies that policy makers in the 
ECA region would relinquish certain duties and assume others so that 
education systems may innovate and improve student learning outcomes. 
The opportunity before central governments in these countries is to 
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move away from micromanaging schools and classrooms and focus 
instead on setting goals, policies, and standards; defining responsibilities; 
mobilizing financial resources; ensuring political consensus; targeting 
poor and excluded students; and monitoring and evaluating service deliv-
ery and system quality.
Extending autonomy throughout education systems means placing 
authority and responsibility in the hands of the people most able to inno-
vate and improve the quality of education: local managers and education 
authorities (see Osborne and Gaebler 1992). It also means holding these 
actors accountable for improving the learning outcomes of the bulk of 
their students. Aligning the incentives of these stakeholders with the stu-
dent learning outcomes desired by policy makers requires education 
ministries to set overall performance goals; articulate who is responsible 
and accountable to whom and for what; and ensure that these responsi-
bilities are agreed, accepted, and understood.
At the pre-university level, policy makers can expand the autonomy of 
lower-level actors in the school system by granting them greater decision-
making power over school operations and budgets and relaxing norms on 
class sizes. Greater autonomy is particularly needed in vocational educa-
tion and training, where programs and institutes need the ability to 
expand or contract course offerings in response to student and employer 
demand, not rigid governmental norms.
Simultaneously, policy makers will need to implement a range of 
accountability mechanisms to hold schools accountable for results. 
Potential mechanisms include the creation of school councils that involve 
parents and local communities in school decision-making processes; 
requiring schools to prepare school development plans that outline each 
school’s strengths and weaknesses, together with an action plan for mak-
ing improvements; preparing “school scorecards” that include basic indi-
cators on a school’s performance; as well sanctioning low-performing 
schools and rewarding high-performing schools (see chapter 4 and box 
7.3). Here, however, it is important to define a high-performing school as 
one that delivers improved learning outcomes to all types of students, 
including those from low-income and minority households.
In general, the weaker a country’s national assessment system, the 
more it will need to rely on more qualitative measures to assess school 
performance. It is important to stress here that utilizing information on 
student learning outcomes to strengthen accountability does not neces-
sarily imply “paying for performance” or conducting tests that have very 
high stakes for principals, local authorities, and teachers. If not carefully 
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Box 7.3
Options for Making Schools More Accountable 
for Learning Outcomes
Administer national student assessments at key stages of the education cycle 
(e.g., after 4th, 7th, and 12th grades) and include such data in school “scorecards.”
Require schools to prepare school development plans that outline each 
school’s strengths and weaknesses, together with a vision and action plan for 
making improvements. Support implementation of these plans and monitor their 
outcomes.
Reward schools that show improvement in student performance.
Prepare school “scorecards” for all schools that include information that 
 enables parents and students to get a sense of their performance. Make such 
scorecards available on the website of the ministry of education, as well as dis-
seminated to local authorities and schools.
Agree on criteria that objectively identify schools in need of improvement and 
decide what actions should be taken to support such schools.
Sanction schools that show low or no improvement in student performance.
Require all school principals to be trained and licensed and be held more 
 accountable for learning outcomes of the school’s pupils.
designed, such an approach could create exactly the wrong incentives for 
improving learning. Rather, policy makers should use performance data 
to identify both schools that need greater support and schools that offer 
successful models for innovation.
Significant improvements in the direction of greater autonomy and 
accountability will, however, be difficult to achieve in the school system 
unless policy makers in the region address the demoralization of the 
teaching force, an effort that will involve resolution of serious overstaffing 
and improving the pay, professional development, and work conditions of 
teachers.
Most countries in the region have shied away from adjusting teaching 
staff levels in response to declining student numbers, even in contexts 
where per student financing provides powerful incentives to reduce 
teacher numbers. Addressing this inefficiency will free up funds for 
more classroom learning materials. Judicious use of retirement incen-
tives for older teachers and stronger redundancy or retraining packages 
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for departing teachers or both may make departures more acceptable. 
Countries now in the process of reducing teacher numbers (e.g., Bulgaria, 
Latvia, and Romania) may provide valuable lessons in this area.
At the tertiary level, policy makers in most of the ECA region have 
already granted substantial autonomy to institutions of higher learning, 
which now manage their own budgets and make important managerial 
decisions about their respective institutions. This autonomy has helped 
create some (but not all) of the conditions needed to improve the quality 
of course offerings and pedagogy with the goal of preparing students for 
the world of work. Policy makers have also begun to use financing incen-
tives to “steer” these institutions towards education of greater quality and 
relevance to employer needs. In fact, considerably more countries in the 
region have adopted per student financing in the tertiary sector than in 
the pre-university sector. In terms of accountability, all countries in the 
region (with the exception of four central Asian countries and Kosovo) 
have become signatories to the Bologna Process, which aims to make 
academic degree and quality assurance standards more comparable and 
compatible across Europe.
Today, the challenge of tertiary education systems in ECA is to 
wield the instruments of autonomy, accountability, and performance-
based financing more effectively with the goal of rapidly improving 
the quality and relevance of higher education. As noted earlier, most 
of new EU member states and, to a lesser extent, countries in SEE, the 
Russian Federation, and Ukraine, have devolved a fair degree of auton-
omy to tertiary institutions and have taken initial steps toward flexible 
financing. However, this group has lagged behind in establishing effec-
tive accountability frameworks. Certain countries in SEE and low-
income countries in the CIS have retained more centralized control 
over tertiary education systems and would benefit from moving ahead 
to introducing greater autonomy, flexible financing, and accountability 
mechanisms.
Indeed, it makes little sense to delay in enhancing accountability in the 
tertiary sector. In the first place, greater autonomy and flexible financing 
will be ineffective without mechanisms that hold education providers 
accountable for the quality of the education that they provide. In the 
second place, it takes considerable time to develop and implement these 
mechanisms effectively. Many countries that have moved ahead on flex-
ible financing and autonomy without strengthening accountability have 
later had to claw back control over tertiary institutions—a process that 
can be politically difficult.
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Strengthening accountability at a minimum means safeguarding basic 
integrity in higher education. On the financial side, this means preventing 
embezzlement, fraud in public tenders, collusion, and the hiring of 
unqualified family members, among other practices. On the academic 
side, this means preventing examination fraud, unethical faculty behav-
ior, noncompliance with admission standards, research fraud and plagia-
rism, and fraud in the quality assurance process (Salmi 2009). With the 
exception of a few new EU member states, evidence suggests that higher 
education institutions across the region continue to struggle with these 
basic integrity issues.
While integrity problems are widespread, that does not mean that 
policy makers need to resolve these problems first, before they make 
progress on accountability in other areas. The great temptation in the 
region—given its tradition of central planning and central control of 
universities—is to fix integrity problems through even stronger central-
ized control and management (e.g., requiring that every hiring and 
 procurement decision be reviewed by the central education ministry). 
Rather, policy makers need to embrace solutions that show promise in 
terms of addressing basic integrity and strengthening accountability. 
The good news is that most of the instruments that help improve basic 
academic and fiscal integrity also strengthen accountability for desired 
outcomes and the efficient use of resources.
Looking at the different options illustrated in table 7.2, it is clear that 
strengthening accountability in the tertiary sector can be a long and 
Table 7.2 Tools for Strengthening Academic and Fiscal Integrity in University-Level 
Institutions
Tools that strengthen academic integrity. . . Tools that strengthen fiscal integrity…
 • Licensing • Financial audits
. . . and educational quality . . . and efficiency of spending
 •  Accreditation/academic audits/evaluations • Public disclosure laws
 • Public disclosure laws • Strategic budget plans
 •  Fostering outsiders to review academic 
 integrity (e.g., Romania)
•  Performance contracts based on 
 performance indicators
 •  Performance contracts based on perfor-
mance indicators
• Student loans/scholarships/vouchers
 •  Creation and dissemination of rankings/
benchmarks
•  Embedding incentives into allocated 
 resources (e.g., tying funding to the 
number of students enrolled or graduated, 
rewarding good performers, etc.)
Source: Authors’ review of available instruments, as presented in Salmi (2009).
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 difficult process. Building an effective accreditation agency or a national 
quality assurance system, for example, is a long-term proposition. Building 
the capacity of a national quality assurance agency to fully meet its man-
date is a challenge for all countries in the ECA region. Many smaller 
countries, for example, simply do not have the in-country capacity to 
conduct effective national quality assurance. Here, coordination across 
countries and closer integration with external quality assurance agencies 
may be important to support the development of national capacity.
In light of these challenges, countries would be well-advised to fol-
low a two-pronged process to strengthen accountability: first, build an 
effective quality assurance system that ensures tertiary institutions 
have the minimum levels of inputs and processes needed to provide a 
quality education; and second, emphasize greater transparency and 
information dissemination, so as to strengthen student choice (e.g., by 
developing rankings). These two approaches are complementary to 
one another.
As noted earlier, most ECA countries are signatories to the Bologna 
Process. Proper implementation of its 2005 Standards and Guidelines for 
Quality Assurance would go a long way to putting in place the building 
blocks of an adequate quality assurance system. A large number of coun-
tries in the region have not, however, begun the process of strengthening 
external quality assurance. In fact, a number have treated the strengthen-
ing of quality assurance within higher education institutions (so-called 
internal quality assurance) in a rather cavalier fashion. For the five ECA 
countries that are not yet signatories, aligning themselves with the 
Bologna Framework would be beneficial.
Improve the Efficiency of Resource Use through 
Performance-Based Financing
Managing school systems for performance means moving away from 
inflexible line-item budgeting towards greater use of delegated budgets, 
with incentives for maintaining enrollment and attendance (i.e., per stu-
dent financing—a path on which the majority of ECA countries have 
already embarked). More flexible, smarter financing in the form of block 
grants (i.e., contract- or performance-based) can also provide funding to 
local education in return for meeting agreed learning outcomes. Not only 
does this type of financing give local education authorities much-needed 
flexibility that input-based budgets do not permit, it keeps them focused 
on student results.
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At the pre-university level, countries in the ECA region are at different 
stages of introducing per student financing (see figure 7.10); the experi-
ence of those that have gone farther can provide lessons for countries that 
have yet to start on this path. Whether per student financing actually 
results in greater fiscal efficiency and an increased focus on student learn-
ing outcomes depends on the financing formula used and the broader 
context in which it is implemented. If, for example, a financing formula 
Figure 7.10 Progress Towards Results-based Education Financing in the ECA 
 Region, 2009
Source: Authors’ assessment.
Note: The “result” referred to in this table is a student enrolled. As discussed in chapter 6, a more desirable per 
student financing scheme would be to finance a student who is graduating, or better yet, a student who is 
graduating with a desired level of competencies. However, even the most advanced ECA countries (in terms of 
moving to school financing based on results) still base financing on the number of students enrolled (an inter-
mediate  result, at best). This report therefore intentionally distinguishes between the inputs of teachers, classes, 
and finances, and between students “enrolled,”  “graduating,”  “graduating with a desired level of competencies,” or 
“graduating and finding a job” as results (or outputs).
not started or
very early stages
in discussions 
per student
financing under
discussion 
piloting of per
student financing 
per student
financing widely
introduced 
Armenia (2005)
Bulgaria (2008)
Czech Republic
(1992) 
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Georgia (2007)
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Kosovo (2002)
Lithuania (2001)
Poland (2000)
Romania (2010)
Slovak Republic
(2004) 
Azerbaijan
Latvia
Macedonia, FYR
Moldova
Serbia
SloveniaAlbania
Belarus
Bosnia and
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Moldova (2010)
Russian
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mirrors current unit costs of different localities, it may simply perpetuate 
an inefficient delivery model. In the Slovak Republic, per student recur-
rent costs are 100 percent higher for upper secondary vocational educa-
tion and sports education schools than for gymnasia (upper secondary 
academic schools). These differences in unit costs, however, are largely 
caused by differences in class sizes and teaching loads, factors that should 
not necessarily be encouraged to continue (World Bank 2009b). By con-
trast, countries that have devised simple, transparent formulas which 
reflect the real costs of schooling have created strong incentives for school 
consolidation, increased class sizes, and a rebalancing of educational 
spending from wage to nonwage components (see the discussion of 
Bulgaria in chapter 4).
At the tertiary level, several ECA countries (for example, Poland and 
Romania) have already adopted per student financing, shifting their focus 
away from inputs and toward outputs. The remainder of countries in the 
region will need to introduce performance-based financing to improve 
the efficiency of spending in this sector.
Beyond per student financing, there is still relatively little use of “per-
formance contracts” and “performance-based budgeting” in the region 
(see OECD 2007c). Such contracts (and budgeting arrangements) could 
be put in place between the ministry of education and universities, or 
simply between the ministry of education and its key agencies (which 
are charged with various roles in the management of the university sec-
tor) as discussed in chapter 5. Most ministries of education in OECD 
countries have moved toward such arrangements to enable ministries to 
focus on strategy and system monitoring rather than day-to-day opera-
tional details.
Another important move in terms of financing would be for ECA 
countries to consider more cost sharing at the tertiary level. Indeed, if 
ECA countries want to simultaneously raise participation rates and 
increase the quality of tertiary education, more private resources will 
also be needed—the cost pressures facing higher education in the 
region are simply too great. Mobilizing private resources will help 
strengthen results-oriented outcomes in the tertiary sector in two fun-
damental ways: (1) by increasing competition, as more nimble and 
innovative private providers help bring innovations to public providers; 
and (2) by increasing students’ connection to the education process. 
When students and parents pay tuition fees—whether to a public or a 
private provider—they are generally more demanding about the quality 
and relevance of the education provided. There is no single ideal level 
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of funding for higher education and no single ideal mix of public and 
private funding sources. Different countries will make different kinds 
of trade-offs.
Build the Foundations of Adult Learning Systems
The reskilling of the work force in the ECA region is needed not only to 
compete in the global economy, but also to address the lag effects of the 
transition to market economies. Significant segments of the labor force—
often comprising less skilled and more disadvantaged workers—remain 
inactive in many of these countries. Given the rapid demographic decline 
occurring in many ECA countries, achieving and sustaining high rates of 
growth suggests that labor force participation will have to increase and 
each individual will have to become more productive—and stay so for a 
longer period of time.
Unlike pre-university and university education, adult education sys-
tems in the modern sense are largely nonexistent in most ECA countries. 
Building such systems will require shifting away from government-de-
fined programs towards a well-regulated market of private and public 
providers that deliver training services to both working and unemployed 
adults. Governments in the region will, however, continue to play a role 
in education and training for the unemployed, often by contracting 
 private providers to deliver needed services. Policies that address market 
failures in this sector are especially important for laying the groundwork 
for effective adult education systems. In general, successful systems 
require a high degree of coordination and partnership between govern-
ment agencies and the private sector, as well as giving the demand side of 
training—that is, businesses and individuals—a strong voice in determin-
ing training policy. Once a solid adult learning sector is established, gov-
ernments can then “steer” it by monitoring data on program quality, 
encouraging autonomy and accountability, and improving the efficiency 
of government financing in the sector.
Expanding adult learning is a priority for advanced economies in the 
region that are facing a demographic decline. Their challenge is to ensure 
that existing coordination mechanisms function well and that regulation 
and financing are used to facilitate the emergence of a private sector-
oriented adult education and training market. The principal priority of 
less advanced economies in the region experiencing a demographic 
decline (i.e., many of those in South Eastern Europe and the middle-
income CIS countries) is to introduce a strategic policy framework for 
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adult learning and create the tools needed to implement this strategy 
(e.g., coordination mechanisms, plus initial steps toward regulation). Less 
advanced economies in the region that are not facing a demographic 
decline (i.e., low-income CIS countries and Albania) may find it more 
productive to limit efforts to establishing a strategic policy framework 
and coordination mechanism for this sector. For many countries, partici-
pating in the OECD’s Programme for International Assessment of Adult 
Competencies (PIAAC) would be an important first step in understand-
ing the current skills and competencies of their work forces.
Summary
Reforming education systems in the ECA region so that they deliver 
higher-quality and more relevant education to the majority of students 
will go a long way towards addressing the skills gap that many countries 
in the region face. Although the recent economic downturn has dimin-
ished the demand for labor and skills. Skills shortages will likely reemerge 
once growth picks up again. The process of reforming education will take 
time; consequently, ECA countries should not wait to begin.
Many needed changes—assessment systems that measure what stu-
dents learn, changes in the size and remuneration of the teaching force, 
and strong quality assurance systems—are not without cost. Given that 
economic growth is expected to be lower and fiscal constraints tighter in 
the near to medium term, ECA countries will have little choice but to 
free up resources that are currently funding existing inefficiencies in their 
education systems, particularly those associated with school infrastruc-
ture and staff levels designed for much larger student populations. More 
resources will also need to be raised from outside the education system, 
especially at the tertiary level. Putting off the policy reform directions 
discussed in this book—whether for financial or political reasons—risks 
the deterioration of a fundamental source of national competitiveness: a 
skilled workforce. This is clearly not an acceptable option for any country 
in the region.
For movement of education systems away from an emphasis on inputs 
and processes to an emphasis on improving the learning outcomes of the 
majority of students, much more measurement of student learning out-
comes is needed at all levels of education. This data must then be used in 
the policy process to identify strengths and weaknesses and help formu-
late appropriate policy responses. As the role of central governments is 
SNJD.indb   220 9/27/11   10:11:29 PM
Extended Summary: The Path for Education Reforms in the ECA Region         221
redefined to focus on strategic policy, system goals, and regulation, central 
policy makers can articulate clear goals for their education systems and 
use incentives to manage lower-level actors in these systems to meet 
these goals. In schools, this means greater use of per student financing, 
more autonomy, and greater accountability for learning outcomes. At the 
level of higher education, this means strengthening national quality assur-
ance mechanisms in the short and long term, greater dissemination of 
information (e.g., rankings) to inform student choice, greater perfor-
mance-based budgeting, and, where warranted, greater institutional 
autonomy.
It is difficult to draw conclusions about which reform options are the 
most relevant to the various subregions of Europe and Central Asia, as 
there is enormous variation in their current conditions. What is clear is 
that some member countries of the EU, together with certain countries 
in South Eastern Europe and the Commonwealth of Independent 
States, have not yet begun to systematically measure student learning. 
What is also clear is that virtually all countries in the region are not yet 
using assessment results to design education policy, a process that is 
complicated by the fact that assessment data—where it exists—often 
cannot be sufficiently disaggregated to identify problem schools and 
groups of students. A similar situation holds for per student financing: 
the greatest progress has been made in this area by the EU10, but prog-
ress has been highly variable in other subregions. It is also clear that all 
countries in the region need improved accountability mechanisms in 
the tertiary sector.
The economic crisis provided many countries in the region a reason to 
initiate reforms, particularly those linked to the financing of education. 
Under pressure to reduce spending, countries such as Romania, Poland, 
Serbia, and Latvia introduced per student financing in their general edu-
cation sectors (covering primary and secondary education). This policy is 
likely to result in greater efficiency and open the way for future spending 
increases to focus on improvements that enhance the quality of educa-
tion. These countries will, we hope, establish a path that can be followed 
by countries that have not yet focused on increasing the efficiency of 
educational spending.
Increasing demand for skilled labor as growth picks up, accelerating 
technological change, and significant demographic decline will soon make 
modern adult education and training systems an imperative in many 
countries in the region. Although building such systems is critically 
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important for reskilling adult workers and retaining workforce productiv-
ity, its overall priority in individual ECA countries will depend on their 
specific economic and demographic conditions.
While the economic crisis offered opportunities for reform, it also 
made certain reforms more difficult. Both Bulgaria and Romania, for 
example, slowed the introduction of student loan programs, which are 
important for raising tuition fees and diversifying the sources of tertiary 
funding. Whatever measures countries in the region decide to adopt, it is 
important that they continue to build learning assessment systems and 
monitor and evaluate the impact of reforms on desired learning out-
comes. This approach offers the only way to determine whether reforms 
have the intended effect, whether course corrections are needed, and 
whether funding is achieving the ultimate goal of education systems in 
the region: delivering the skills and competencies needed in the labor 
market.
Notes
 1. The PIRLS scale average is a metric established by setting the mean scores 
of participating countries to 500 and the standard deviation to 100, thus 
enabling comparisons over time, since all cycles are placed on this metric so 
that scores are equivalent from cycle to cycle. In contrast, the international 
average, obtained by averaging across the mean scores for each of the par-
ticipating countries, needs to be recomputed for each new cycle, based on 
the set of participating countries and changes from cycle to cycle, depend-
ing on the set of countries taking part. For more information on PIRLS 
2006, see its website at http://timss.bc.edu/pirls2006/index.html (accessed 
January 2011).
 2. The EBRD-World Bank Business Environment and Enterprise Performance 
Surveys (BEEPS) provide successive snapshots of the self-reported constraints 
to expansion by firms in the ECA region. The surveys were conducted in 
virtually all ECA countries in 1999, 2002, 2005, and 2008. Survey samples 
are constructed by random sampling from the national registry of firms (or 
equivalent) and cover both industry and service sectors.
 3. The Fourth European Work Conditions Survey conducted in 2005 covers the 
EU-27 countries, Norway, Switzerland, Croatia, and Turkey (see Eurofound 
2007).
 4. The importance of effective teaching for learning is now increasingly recog-
nized. A good teacher can make a huge difference, with high-quality teachers 
able to “get an entire year’s worth of additional learning out of their students 
compared to those near the bottom” (Hanushek 2006, 3). That is, a good 
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teacher will get a gain of 1.5 grade-level equivalents, while a bad teacher will 
get only the equivalent of 0.5 years for a single academic year. When consid-
ered over the entire school cycle, such differences accumulate rapidly and 
make the impact of other variables small in comparison.
 5. Although Turkey comes from a different tradition, education management 
remains highly centralized. The impediments identified in this section— 
specifically, too little information on student skills and competencies and too 
little autonomy and accountability—apply with equal measure to Turkey.
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